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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

THE EARLY SOPHISTS AND THEIR EDUCATIONAL THEORIES

by



BRENDAN ALPHONSO RAPPLE

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the rise and development of the early Sophistic Movement in Athens during the second half of the Fifth Century B.C., together with some of the main theories, teaching practices, and curricula of certain of the more prominent Sophists. The first chapter provides a sketch of education in Greece before the rise of the Sophists. Brief surveys of Homeric education and the Spartan agōgē are followed by a longer account of the "Old" Athenian education, that is the elementary education which was in existence in Athens at the arrival of the Sophists and which, indeed, continued after their coming.

Chapter two begins with a discussion of some of the major characteristics associated with the Sophistic Movement, in particular its emphasis on humanistic studies and anthropocentrism and also the growing realization of the heterogeneity of societies which caused many Sophists to consider how the old dichotomy between nomos and physis affected the bases of human morality. The Sophists, who were primarily teachers, saw that the social and political climate of Athens rendered it necessary that the young Athenians should receive an education which would prepare them for public life. Such an education aimed at teaching students the art of rhetoric, that is how to speak eloquently and persuasively and it was this training, above all else, which the Sophists professed to teach. After a discussion of just who the students of the Sophists were there is an account of why so much antagonism was shown to these teachers by a certain





segment of Athens' population. The chapter concludes with an examination of why the evidence which we possess for the Sophists is so meagre. An attempt is then made in the following chapter, chapter three, to provide brief biographies and the titles of the works of a number of the more prominent early Sophists.

Chapter four examines some of the philosophical view points of the Sophists and considers whether these teachers deserve the title of philosophers or not, the conclusion being that much of their teaching would today be subsumed under the general heading of philosophy. Their thought covered a wide spectrum and included such topics as epistemology, sociology, politics, ethics, the question of the existence of the god(s). The bulk of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of the epistemological relativism, the attitudes towards god(s), and the political, social, and ethical views of certain Sophists.

An account of the teaching methods and the curricula of the Sophists and their role as introducers of higher education into Athens is presented in chapter five. The concluding chapter attempts to summarize the achievement, importance, and influence of the early Sophistic Movement.





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## CHAPTER ONE

### EDUCATION IN GREECE BEFORE THE SOPHISTS

#### Homeric Education

The Sophists were not the first educators of Greece as a knightly education had existed in Homeric times. There are very few references to education in the Iliad and the Odyssey and it is unlikely that there was any system of formal education at home or in school.<sup>1</sup> However education may be considered as existing in more than the formal institutionalized sense. The wider perspective of Homeric education shows it as signifying some of the ethical, social and cultural traits and values pervading the world of Agamemnon, Achilles, Ajax, Odysseus.

In Book IX of the Iliad we encounter the most important aspect of an Homeric warrior's education. Here, Phoenix was to teach his pupil Achilles the two great qualities of the warrior

ΜΥΘΩΝ ΤΕ ῬΗΤΗΡ' ἔΜΕΝΑΙ ΠΡΗΚΤΗΡΆ ΤΕ ἔΡΥΩΝ

To be a speaker of words and a doer of deeds. 2

Thus Achilles will possess the diverse qualities of the eloquent Odysseus and of Ajax, the man of action, thereby personifying "the highest ideal of developed humanity".<sup>3</sup>

The Homeric warrior must at all times strive to develop his ἀρετή (areté). Areté connotes all the different ways in which a man displays his excellence.<sup>4</sup> Jaeger considers that Homeric areté when applied to a man could only be the attribute of a hero and not of a common man.<sup>5</sup> Thersites, for example, did not possess areté and, therefore, appeared as a figure of ridicule. Areté or excellence,





for Homer connoted all-powerful strength, expertise in battle, military valour. Moses Finley asserts that a hero's ultimate worth was measured by the following three considerations: whom he fought, how he fought, and whether he won.<sup>6</sup> As Livingstone says, the Homeric warrior "is dominated, almost possessed, by a passion for *ἀρετή*." To win honour in battle is in a sense a religion and all else is subordinated to it.<sup>7</sup>

The agonistic nature of Homeric education is well summed up in the following line

*αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔρμεναι ἄλλων*

always be best and be superior to other men.      8

This was evident in peace as well as war, as we may see in the countless war games and, more specifically, in the funeral games celebrated after the death of Achilles' friend, Patroclus.<sup>9</sup> Not only were winning and *τιμή* (timé), or honour which results from success, important to the Homeric warrior, but he should receive due recognition and praise for his deeds. It was not enough for a warrior to perform noble acts — they had to be known by everyone. As Ferguson and Chisholm relate, Homeric culture was a "shame-culture" rather than a "guilt-culture", "that is to say that the standard of action is found in the opinion of others, not in the inward conscience."<sup>10</sup> In fact, the leit-motiv of the *Iliad* revolves about the slight to Achilles' honour by the refusal of Agamemnon to present him with the slave girl Briseïs as a prize. The hero Ajax, as we read in Sophocles' play of the same name, after being refused the arms of the



dead Achilles, became mad and preferred suicide to life. The weapons had been awarded to Odysseus and as a result Ajax's *timé* had been offended. One of the finest vignettes of noble character in literature occurs when the shade of Ajax turns with cool and silent disdain from the greeting of his former rival, Odysseus, in the underworld.<sup>11</sup> A hero's *areté* and *timé* continued even after death.

As mentioned, the education of an Homeric warrior did not rely on schooling in the formal sense. His main education came from life. Frederick Beck, after briefly discussing the development of Odysseus' son Telemachus from helpless youth to mature man, states that together with the notions embodied in Phoenix's speech Homer's educational theory is represented in his

theory of character development through the guidance of an elder, through association with different types of men and the general broadening effect of travel and experience compelling a man to stand on his own feet.   12

In the Telemachou Paideia, as Werner Jaeger writes, "every educational factor comes into action on his soul", a journey which will bring about his maturity.<sup>13</sup>

The education of the young warriors, *οἱ κοῦροι*, had a large element of a training for leisure. Sports played a major part as we see in the feast at Alcinous' palace. Sport with a more serious purpose had its place at funeral games.<sup>14</sup> Knightly courtesy is predominant in these sports (even in battle, as Henri Marrou reminds us, courtesy is often present). This polite and noble good breeding is seen to good effect in the relations between Telemachus and Penelope's suitors, even though great antagonism and animosity





existed between them. A sense of refinement is also felt in the warriors' attitudes towards women. This life of courtesy presupposed a specific type of education aimed at its inculcation. Homeric warriors had to learn "how to act in polite society, how to react to unforeseen circumstances, how to behave, and above all how to speak."<sup>15</sup> Also Achilles, even though angry and withdrawn, receives the embassy sent by King Agamemnon with due respect and restraint.<sup>16</sup> When Priam comes seeking the body of the dead Hector Achilles, as Beck points out, "behaves with splendid courtesy and deep respect for age."<sup>17</sup>

Besides the ethical aspect of education there must have been some technical instruction.<sup>18</sup> Youths had to learn how to use weapons and prepare for war. Carpenters, metallurgists, farmers had to learn their skills. The famous Shield of Achilles<sup>19</sup> presupposes a cadre of highly skilled workers. There must have been some sort of apprenticeship training scheme and, perhaps, some type of guild in existence. At any rate, skilled and experienced artisans taught their craft to learners. Also the physician was very important in Homeric times and he must have learned his medical knowledge from someone.<sup>20</sup> However, it must be admitted that it remains easier to consider Homeric education in its ethical as opposed to its technical aspects precisely because there is little definite information in the two poems for the latter.

### The Spartan Agōgē

A highly developed though ignoble totalitarian education existed in post-Lycurgan Sparta — ἀγωγή (agōgē) as it was termed — which



aimed at a narrow military training and which was completely under State control and entirely subordinated to State needs. It was a terrifyingly harsh inhuman discipline for which I can offer little praise though Plato in his Laws was favourably influenced by it. Xenophon also looked with favour on Sparta's society and education as is evident in his State of the Lacedaemonians. The story of the Spartan agōgē is too well known to need recounting here but it is worthwhile reminding ourselves that there are two distinct periods in Ancient Spartan history. In Archaic times Sparta was not the barbaric city closed to culture and the artistic impulse. From the archaeological discoveries and the poems of Tyrtaeus and Alcman we see that early Sparta was indeed the centre of Greek civilization long before that role was held by Athens.<sup>21</sup> However, about 550 B.C. began Sparta's "Grand Refusal"<sup>22</sup> and the classical form of her educational system commenced to develop. Now, as Gerald Gutek declares, "As a political and educational policy, Spartan educators used their skills to transform young men into disciplined savages."<sup>23</sup>

### The "Old" Athenian Education

We commonly speak about the "Old" Athenian education and the "New" Athenian Education. These terms "Old" and "New" were assigned by the Athenians themselves — in the Frogs Aristophanes talks about ἡ ἀρχαία παιδεία or "the Old Education".<sup>24</sup> It is naturally very difficult to be precise about dates but Boyd and King are probably correct in approximating that the "Old" education lasted from the Sixth Century B.C. until about the Mid-Fifth Century B.C. and the





"New" for about another century after that until Philip of Macedonia conquered the Greek States in 338 B.C.<sup>25</sup> The terms are used to distinguish the more traditional elementary education from that of the innovative "higher" education introduced into Athens in the latter part of the Fifth Century by the early Sophists. However, it would be wrong to consider that the "New" education heralded a complete and utter change. Changes were, indeed, introduced but, as Lynch writes, "The Sophists did not revolutionize Athenian practice so much as they built their new kind of instruction into the existing system. For the elementary stage of education all the Sophists seem to have accepted the Athenian practice as it was; it was only on the secondary level that they sought to go beyond the provisions already in existence."<sup>26</sup> As Havelock declares, the Sophists "strove to preserve continuity with the past."<sup>27</sup> However, the story of the Sophists belongs to later chapters. First I wish to consider the educational practices which the Sophists found in existence when they commenced their teaching in Athens.

We do not know when schools first began in Greece. Literary sources provide evidence that some schools existed by a certain date but for how long schools were in existence before that date it is difficult to know. Also with regard to the evidence Beck points out that none of the passages which are commonly used as testimony for the early existence of schools actually mention schools for their own sake — the fact that they were schools is incidental to some more important observation. He considers it probable that schools were such a regular feature of life that they were taken for



granted.<sup>28</sup>

Plutarch tells us in his life of Themistocles that in 480 B.C. when the Persian menace was great those Athenians who could not fight were evacuated to Troezen and that schoolmasters were appointed and paid to teach their children.<sup>29</sup> It is significant that the Athenians thought it important that their boys receive some formal instruction. Pausanias relates an incident which is supposed to have occurred in the first decade of the Fifth Century B.C. (It must be acknowledged that Pausanias is writing long after the event.) He declares that the boxer Cleomedes after having killed Iccus of Epidaurus during a boxing match and being subsequently found guilty of cheating by the referees returned to his native Astypalaea. Grief-stricken he pulled down the roof of a school there of about sixty children.<sup>30</sup> If there were a school catering for sixty children in a relatively small town like Astypalaea it is very probable that Athens' children would be even better provided for.

Herodotus relates that during the time of the Ionian Revolt a disaster occurred on the Island of Chios in 494 B.C.:

Moreover, at about this same time, a little before the sea-fight, the roof fell in on boys at school, insomuch that of a hundred and twenty of them one alone escaped. 31

Again, the large number of students is of interest — one hundred and twenty. The Greek for "the roof fell in on boys at school" is:

παισὶ γράμματα διδασκομένοις ἐνέπεσε ἡ στέγη

The boys were "learning their letters".





Thucydides relates that in the Summer of 413 B.C. Dieitrephe and his horde of Thracians fell upon the city of Mycalessus and sacked it. They attacked a boys' school, "the biggest in the town" and killed all the children.<sup>32</sup> There was obviously more than one school in Mycalessus since Thucydides wrote that it was "the biggest in the town".

Flacelière<sup>33</sup> points out that schools, at least those of the kitharistes, must have existed in the days of the men who had fought at Marathon if we are to believe the evidence of the Clouds of Aristophanes:

To hear then prepare of the Discipline rare which flourished  
in Athens of yore  
When Honour and Truth were in fashion with youth and Sobriety  
bloomed on our shore;  
First of all the old rule was preserved in our school that  
"boys should be seen and not heard:"  
And then to the home of the Harpist would come decorous in  
action and word  
All the lads of one town, though the snow peppered down, in  
spite of all wind and all weather:      34

Marrou writes that the system of physical education employed in the palaestra must have been fully developed before the end of the Seventh Century since at the Olympic Games of 632 B.C. children's competitions were included. The physical education of children was thereby recognized and Marrou states that it can be assumed that it was on an organized footing throughout Greece. In like manner he declares that we may assume that schools of letters existed because writing was quite widespread and it is reasonable to expect that schools existed to teach it.<sup>35</sup> With regard to the question of literacy inscriptions from the Eighth Century survive as do practice-



alphabets from the beginning of the Seventh.<sup>36</sup> It is often pointed out that the process of ostracism which Cleisthenes introduced into Athens between 508 and 507 B.C. implies that writing was common among the citizens and that there were schools which taught letters.<sup>37</sup> However, not all citizens were literate as we learn from Plutarch. This writer in his life of Aristides relates an incident at the time of Aristides' ostracism in 482 B.C. concerning one Athenian citizen who was illiterate. This rude fellow turning to Aristides whom he did not recognize asked him to write ARISTIDES on his OSTRAKON. In reply to Aristides asking what harm he had done him the fellow declared that Aristides had never wronged him, that he did not even know him, but that he was fed up with hearing everyone calling him "The Just".<sup>38</sup> Although it is well nigh impossible to give precise figures concerning the rate of literacy in Athens Webster considers that, with regard to the classical period, the multitude of inscribed public notices and the great number of vases with inscriptions "argues for a rather high degree of literacy."<sup>39</sup>

Whatever the truth about when schools first appeared in Greece and how widespread they were there is no doubt that education was considerably advanced in Athens in the first half of the Fifth Century B.C. It was about this time also that education began to lose its essentially military character. Athens, according to Thucydides, was the first State to do away with the great stress on military training.<sup>40</sup> The former military education soon turned into athletic and physical training, however the *ὅπλομαχία* (hoplomachia) or contest in fully armed fighting remained as a survival.<sup>41</sup> The





educational system in Athens at the time under consideration was completely private. The State set no curricula of any sort nor did it give any support for education.<sup>42</sup> Thus while the Spartan State enjoyed complete control over the education of its citizens the State in Athens was content, for the most part, to leave education as the responsibility of the parents. This was the case right up to the Macedonian supremacy in 338 B.C.<sup>43</sup> While it is not certain whether parents were obliged by law to send their boys to school or not, still custom and tradition would have made attendance at school virtually compulsory.<sup>44</sup> However, the State did pass certain laws with regard to education from time to time, those of Solon in the Sixth Century B.C. being of particular importance. The main evidence which we have for these laws (the existence of which has been debated) comes from Aeschines' speech Against Timarchus:

In the first place, consider the case of the teachers. Although the very livelihood of these men, to whom we necessarily entrust our own children, depends on their good character, while the opposite conduct on their part would mean poverty, yet it is plain that the lawgiver distrusts them; for he expressly prescribes, first, at what time of day the free-born boy is to go to the schoolroom; next, how many other boys may go there with him, and when he is to go home. He forbids the teacher to open the schoolroom, or the gymnastic trainer the wrestling school, before sunrise, and he commands them to close the doors before sunset; for he is exceeding suspicious of their being alone with a boy, or in the dark with him. He prescribes what children are to be admitted as pupils, and their age at admission. He provides for a public official who shall superintend them, and for the oversight of slave-attendants of school-boys. He regulates the festivals of the Muses in the schoolrooms, and of Hermes in the wrestling-schools. Finally, he regulates the companionships that the boys may form at school, and their cyclic dances. He prescribes, namely, that the choregus, a man who is going to spend his own money for your entertainment, shall be a man of more than forty years of age when he performs this service, in



order that he may have reached the most temperate time of life before he comes into contact with your children. 45

It is clear that these laws, if indeed they did exist, are more concerned with questions of morals than any others. The law forbidding schools being open before sunrise and after sunset was to protect the children from exposure to any dangers on the empty streets.<sup>46</sup> As Flacelière states, the law prohibiting older males from entering the school is obviously directed against pederasty.<sup>47</sup> This law appears to have been totally ignored in classical times when, as we read in Plato, it was common for adults to enter schools. In the Lysis, for example, we see Socrates and some of his friends entering the newly built palaestra of Miccus for the express purpose of admiring the youths. As Beck concludes, this would indicate "either that the laws are apocryphal or that they had fallen into desuetude."<sup>48</sup>

It would perhaps be true to say that until about the middle of the Fifth Century B.C. the typical formal education of Athenian boys was rather limited. Reading and writing were taught by the *γραμματιστής* (grammatistes) or teacher of letters; some basic arithmetic was studied; *μουσική*<sup>49</sup> (mousiké) or music which was a mixture of poetry, dance and song, and which was considered to be highly important was taught by the *κιθαριστής* (kitharistes); physical education was taught by the *παιδοτρίβης* (paidotribes) or P.E. teacher in the *παιλίστρα* (palaestra) or sports ground. It is difficult to ascertain in which order boys learned these subjects and engaged in the various activities. Kenneth Freeman considers that pupils were exposed to all the studies from an early age.<sup>50</sup> Flacelière declares



that if we are to accept the evidence of the famous vase of Douris, where the grammatistes and kitharistes are represented together, then training in reading, writing, and music were given together in the same school. The evidence from Plato's Protagoras (325D-326C) could imply a sequence in education — training from the kitharistes followed by that of the grammatistes and after that children went to the paidotribes. Beck, however, points to the following passage as supporting the opinion that the subjects were studied concurrently:

Later on when they send the children to school, their instructions to the masters lay much more emphasis on good behaviour than on letters or music. 51

Flacelière himself considers it very likely that intellectual education comprising reading, writing, and music preceded gymnastic training but that from about the age of fourteen physical education came to be deemed more important than the intellectual but without completely superceding it.<sup>52</sup> At any rate it is obvious that boys had to learn to read and write before they tackled works of literature.<sup>53</sup> We read in the Protagoras that when children had learned to read the teacher gave them the works of good poets to read and learn by heart so that they might long to emulate the good men of olden times and live like them.<sup>54</sup>

As Walden declares, from an examination of how poetry was studied we may better understand the predominant aim of the "Old" education. The poets were studied primarily not for aesthetic purposes but as teachers of morality. Poetry was read not so much to form literary tastes but to form a basis for character development.<sup>55</sup> Aristophanes, in particular, stresses the poet's function as the educator of man:





Pluto: Then farewell, Aeschylus ! Go your ways,  
 And save your town for happier days  
 By counsel wise; and a school prepare  
 For all the fools — there are plenty there ! 56

In the same play, the Frogs, Aristophanes has Aeschylus declare that we should learn from the poets, for they are the teachers of men:

There, there is work for poets who also are MEN. From the earliest times incitement to virtue and useful knowledge have come from the makers of rhymes ....

It's true. But the poet should cover up scandal, and not let anyone see it.

He shouldn't exhibit it out on the stage. For the little boys have their teachers to show them example, but when they grow up we poets must act as their preachers, and what we preach should be useful and good. 57

It is likely that the works of Aesop (Aesop himself is a shadowy figure) were taught in school. Kenneth Freeman reminds us of the Birds where it is alleged to be a sign of an inadequate education not be acquainted with Aesop:

You are not educated. You never inquire. Of your Aesop you don't know a word. 58

But it was Homer who was especially popular for inculcating lessons of morality.<sup>59</sup> And not only were the Homeric Epics generally considered a repository and guide to morality but they were regarded as constituting a compendium of human knowledge.<sup>60</sup> So revered was the study of Homer that the earlier Greeks, according to Isocrates in the Panegyricus, gave the Poet a place of honour in the education of youth.<sup>61</sup>

The Athenian boy spent far more time learning passages by heart and was also more adept at it than his counterparts today. This was natural in a society where books were rare. It was impossible for



each boy to possess his own individual copies of all the poets. As Andreades declares, in Ancient Athens a library, because of the high cost of manuscripts, constituted a luxury which would today be analogous to an art collection.<sup>62</sup> The great powers of memory are particularly well illustrated by the rhapsodes. It was by means of prodigious feats of memory and not by manuscripts that the Homeric Epics survived the Dark Ages. We have no reason to believe that Xenophon was making Niceratus guilty of gross exaggeration when he had him declare that he could repeat all of the Iliad and the Odyssey off by heart.<sup>63</sup> Together the two poems constitute about 27,000 lines and almost a fifth of a million words.

Besides the fact that there was a practical necessity to learn by heart it was felt also that good moral and pedagogical value would result. In the Fourth Century B.C. Plato in his Laws lauds the teaching of both serious and comic poetry in schools and recommends the practice of learning it by heart in order that a man might become good and wise by means of familiarity with worthy literature and extensive knowledge.<sup>64</sup> When the boys are despatched to the kitharistes or music master the aim of character development and morality is still stressed. We read in the Protagoras that the kitharistes teaches the boys the works of the good lyric poets and how to accompany them on the lyre:

By this means they become more civilized, more balanced, and better adjusted in themselves and so more capable in whatever they say or do, for rhythm and harmonious adjustment are essential to the whole of human life. 65

Playing the lyre had an ancient tradition in Greece. In Book IX of





the Iliad when the ambassadors from Agamemnon came to the tent of Achilles they found this noble warrior taking his pleasure of a splendid lyre. He was delighting his heart while he sang of the glorious deeds of heroes.<sup>66</sup> To be able to play the lyre was part of a liberal education in Athens, that is, an education befitting a freeman. The proverb, "He doesn't know the way to play the lyre" signified that one was uneducated. Kenneth Freeman quotes from the Wasps of Aristophanes where the plea for the defendant was

He may have stolen. But acquit him, for  
He doesn't know the way to play the lyre.      67

Plato in the Laws has the Athenian Stranger say that a man who is well educated is one who is able to sing and dance well.<sup>68</sup> This sentiment would also have been applicable to the latter half of the Fifth Century B.C. Boys did not learn an instrument in order to become as technically and as professionally competent as possible but only to reach such a standard so as to be able to accompany themselves while reciting and singing the poets.<sup>69</sup> As Freeman writes, "Every gentleman at Athens was expected to be able to sing and play in this manner when he went out to a dinner-party."<sup>70</sup> Plutarch relates a story of Cimon singing at a dinner party and how the guests considered him cleverer than Themistocles who, though knowing how to make his country rich and powerful, was not, however, able to sing and play the lyre.<sup>71</sup>

But music without words was of very little moment to the Greeks. Music's purpose was to serve as the accompaniment of various types of verbal expression.<sup>72</sup> Aristotle, agreeing with Plato, asserted



that to earlier generations music was the form of pastime proper for a freeman. Other subjects served utilitarian purposes to a greater or lesser degree but music helped one to spend leisure in a noble manner.<sup>73</sup>

Little has been said so far about the teachers. It seems that anyone could become a schoolteacher, no special qualifications being required. As the State had no control over education, apart from an interest in certain moral aspects, it accordingly took no cognizance of the knowledge and efficiency of teachers.<sup>74</sup> As the fees charged by teachers were relatively low the teaching profession was a correspondingly poorly paid one. Teachers often vied with each other charging fees at competitive rates in an effort to drum up business.<sup>75</sup> Some parents were loath to part with any money, thereby making the financial affairs of schoolteachers even more difficult. Theophrastus writing on the character of the Mean Man relates that such a man will not send his sons to school at all during the month of Anthesteria because there are so many holidays in that month. He will, therefore, save the school fees for a whole month.<sup>76</sup>

The practice of school-mastering seems to have been held in low esteem in Athens — no gentleman would stoop so low. In De Corona Demosthenes is contemptuous of Aeschines because he is the son of a schoolmaster:

In your childhood you were reared in abject poverty. You helped your father in the drudgery of a grammar-school, grinding the ink, sponging the benches and sweeping the school-room, holding the position of a menial, not of a free-born boy.      77



Many teachers were Metics and some were slaves. But, as Butts remarks, sometimes these schoolteachers had been taken as prisoners of war and had formerly held very high rank as citizens in their own State.<sup>78</sup> However, with regard to the social status of teachers Castle observes that the elementary teacher was often incompetent, that he received little respect and little remuneration, and that he was a figure of scorn and sometimes of pity to his employers. Schoolmastering, he declares, "was the last refuge of the unemployed."<sup>79</sup> Demosthenes implies that some schools (and some teachers) were better than others, for in De Corona he states that he had attended "respectable" schools. This would seem that there were certain schools which were other than "respectable".<sup>80</sup> If it is true that the schoolmaster received little respect in Ancient Athens it also seems that he was often as little liked by boys as his successors have been in subsequent ages. Xenophon obviously had had some bad experiences at the hands of teachers, for writing of Clearchus in the Anabasis he says:

For he had no charm, and he was always severe and cruel, so the soldiers felt toward him as boys towards a schoolmaster. 81

As Barclay states, the Athenian father had little time to look after the education of his son himself. His duties of citizenship, i.e. participation on the Boulē, in the Ekklesia, role as a dikastes, membership of embassies, and military involvement took up most of his time.<sup>82</sup> To help in looking after the children Athenian families had a *παιδαγωγός*, (paidagōgos), usually a slave who brought the children to school and carried their books. There was usually one for each family, no matter how many boys were in it. It is





difficult to give an adequate translation of "paidagōgos" as there is nothing in the English educational system which has any real connection with it.<sup>83</sup> Freeman writes that the paidogōgos was a combination of "nurse, footman, chaperon, and tutor",<sup>84</sup> whereas Mahaffy declares that he was a sort of male duenna.<sup>85</sup> The word means literally "one who leads children" and indeed, as has been stated, one of the functions of the paidagōgos was to accompany the children to and from school.<sup>86</sup>

However, bringing children to and from school was only one duty of the paidagōgos; perhaps his main one was in overseeing the moral well-being of his charges. We have seen already in Aeschines' Against Timarchus that Solon passed a law concerning the oversight of schoolboys by paidagōgoi.<sup>87</sup> In the Protagoras we read that the paidagōgos (in common with the nurse and parents) should instruct the child in what is right and wrong, honourable and disgraceful, holy and impious and that he is allowed to threaten and beat him "like a warped and twisted plank" if he does not obey.<sup>88</sup> To instill good moral lessons in Athenian children was much more the duty of the paidagōgos than the schoolmaster. Although there were many paidagōgoi who were good at their job there were others who were notably unsatisfactory. For example, the paidagōgoi of Lysis and Menexenus in the Lysis of Plato not only spoke Greek poorly but also were clearly a little drunk.<sup>89</sup>

Before going on to consider what was the most important aspect of a boy's education during the period of the "Old" education, i.e. that



of physical training, it should be mentioned that it is likely that other subjects were learned besides reading and writing, literature, and music. It seems possible that arithmetic was taught in the elementary school. Indeed, as Castle remarks, it would be natural if, at any rate, some Athenian children, since they belonged to a nation of merchant seamen, learned at least the rudiments of mathematics to help them in the calculations necessary for navigation.<sup>90</sup> Anyway, ability to count is a fundamental attribute of anyone claiming basic education and Athenian children must have been taught this skill somewhere. It appears from the Wasps of Aristophanes that Athenians were accustomed to use their fingers for rough calculations and counters for more exact work:

καὶ πρῶτον μὲν λόγισαι φύλως, μὴ ψήφοις ἀλλ' ἰπὸ  
χειρὸς 91

A relevant passage occurs in the Protagoras:

The others treat their pupils badly; these young men, who have deliberately turned their backs on specialization, they take and plunge into special studies again, teaching them arithmetic and astronomy and geometry and music — here he glanced at Hippias — but from me he will learn only what he has come to learn. 92

It appears from this that students had learned at least some mathematics in the elementary school.<sup>93</sup>

Kenneth Freeman considers that it is likely that some instruction was given, at least to certain boys, in swimming, riding, and rowing. He mentions an old law, purported to be from Solon, which ordained that every boy should learn his letters and also swimming.<sup>94</sup> Apparently there was a proverb in Ancient Greece for one who was completely uneducated: "He doesn't know how to read nor how to swim."<sup>95</sup> Freeman





reminds us that well-to-do citizens had to learn how to ride for they would have to serve as knights in the cavalry.<sup>96</sup> Furthermore, he considers that it would be surprising if some boys, at least those of the lower classes, were not taught how to row. For each trireme required 200 oarsmen. Freeman reminds us of the rowing lesson conducted by Charon in Aristophanes' Frogs (lines 200ff.).<sup>97</sup> Wherever Athenian boys learned these skills it is unlikely that they learned them in the confines of the elementary schools at the hands of the grammatistes, kitharistes, or the paidotribes.

The third aspect of elementary education for the Athenian boy was physical activity which took place in a palaestra under the supervision of a paidotribes, a word which means literally "boy-rubber". Part of the paidotribes' duty was to rub the boys' bodies with oil prior to exercising.<sup>98</sup> According to the Protagoras the Greeks saw a dual purpose in having boys indulge in physical activity: a good mind should have a well-trained body to serve it and also those with a fit and well-exercised body would not be cowardly because of physical weakness in times of war and other troubles.<sup>99</sup>

Physical exercises took place in two different establishments in Athens, the palaestra and the gymnasium. These two institutions had many attributes in common, but there were also some differences. The palaestrae were usually privately owned<sup>100</sup> whereas the gymnasia were owned by the State. The former were generally simpler affairs catering to younger people (though older youths and adults did attend some palaestrae) while gymnasia were more elaborate institutions whose



clientele were usually older and who engaged in more specialized gymnastic training. It is worth quoting Beck:

An essential feature of the gymnasium was a running track; a public palaestra was normally included among the facilities. But palaestrae could also exist independently of the gymnasium; they were essentially wrestling schools, or small training areas for other sports. In their simplest form they consisted of an open square with a building containing facilities for undressing and washing. Provision might also be made for the playing of ball games either in a special room or in the courtyard. The boys stripped for their exercises, which were always performed naked. The actual exercise ground was exposed to the open air above, was surrounded by columns, and had a floor of sand. Pick-axes were provided to dig up the sandy soil to make it soft. All equipment necessary for the exercises was provided, such as punch-balls, halteres, scrapers, boxing cords, javelins and so forth. The paidotribes himself carried a forked stick as the symbol of his office. A flute-player was in attendance to provide the music necessary for the timing of the exercises. 101

The games and sports engaged in by the Athenian boys in the palaestra included: wrestling, boxing, the pankration,<sup>102</sup> running, long-jumping, javelin and discus throwing.<sup>103</sup>

After the elementary stage of education was completed (at about the age of fifteen or fourteen) we find the State becoming directly involved in education by its control of public gymnasia in Athens. The city had three gymnasia provided at the expense of the State, the Academy, the Lyceum, and the Cynosarges. Each gymnasium was directed by a public official called the *γυμνασάρχος*, or gymnasiarch, and each catered to a different element of the population. The more aristocratic attended the Academy which was the oldest. The newer citizens, particularly of the artisan and commercial classes, were especially catered for by the Lyceum which was founded in the Fifth Century B.C. by Pericles. Metics, traders, and those



who were not full citizens attended the Cynosarges.<sup>104</sup> It seems that smaller privately owned gymnasia also existed. In the Pseudo-Xenophontic treatise, The Constitution of the Athenians, composed sometime in the later part of the Fifth Century B.C. we read:

A few of the rich have gymnasia for exercises and baths and dressing-rooms for their own use, but the people itself for its own use builds many palaestrae, dressing-rooms, public baths, and by this the masses profit more than the few and well-to-do people. 105

If we can accept the above evidence it would appear that the State-run facilities for the poorer residents of Athens were inadequate.

Both youths and adults spent much of their time in the gymnasia, perfecting the exercises they had commenced at an earlier age in the palaestra and beginning many other sports more suitable for rapidly maturing bodies.<sup>106</sup> With the gradual change to a relatively more peaceful way of life (especially after the Persian Wars) the old ideals of the warrior education with its emphasis on valour and success in war and battle began to give way to an eagerness to shine and succeed in the sports arena. As Edward Myers remarks, the Odes of Pindar laud the exploits of the victors in the great Pan-Hellenic athletic competitions just as Homer had celebrated the deeds of the noble warriors at Troy.<sup>107</sup> Even Homer was not content to describe the physical activity of war and battle. We read in Iliad, Book XXIII, of the funeral games in honour of Achilles' young friend Patroclus; in Odyssey, Book VIII, of the games celebrated by Alcinous; and in Odyssey, Book XXI, of the Contest of the Bow. Certainly physical fitness and the cultivation of valour were still considered to be very important goals of the educational system in Athens, particularly





because of their value in times of war and military necessity. However, as Bowen observes, by the Fifth Century B.C. valour and fitness began to be seen in a broader perspective. The explorations of the Pre-Socratic philosophers with their views of soul, harmony, measure, and balance began to give wider connotations to the simple Homeric warrior virtues. Physical fitness was seen to be an end in itself — the balanced and harmonious development of man in accordance with the proper cosmological precepts of nature. The body was cultivated for its own sake, "towards beauty, economy and rhythm of movement."<sup>108</sup> W.C. Green writes that it was fortunate that this training in gymnastics went hand in hand with training in music. Because of training in athletics Greek art was kept from indulgence and an overt effeteness. On the other hand, artistic training helped to exclude mere strength and a desire to break records at the expense of grace and form. In fact, physical training was often accompanied by the music of the flute.<sup>109</sup>

Writing in the Fourth Century B.C. Isocrates declares in his Antidosis that his ancestors long ago had intended that there be two arts, training for the body and training for the mind. These two kinds of education were not to be separate but rather "parallel and complementary", both together helping to render the mind more intelligent and the body more serviceable.<sup>110</sup> So important and well-entrenched were gymnastics and music in Greek education that Plato still finds a place for them in the education of the Guardians in the Republic:

And what shall be their education ? Can we find a better than the traditional sort ? — and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music for the soul. 111



In short, the Greek felt that it was essential to be in good physical shape for at least three reasons: One, physical beauty was important to him for aesthetic purposes; two, he had to be in good condition in order to defend his polis in time of war; three, it was considered that a healthy body served to produce a healthy mind. An interesting passage occurs in Xenophon's Memorabilia where Socrates seeing that one of his companions, Epigenes, was in bad physical shape begins to champion the advantages and necessity of physical exercise. He asserts that even mental illness may often be traced to a weak ill-exercised body.<sup>112</sup> Socrates is advocating the ideal of a completely developed mind in a perfect body, an ideal which is not totally foreign to the later dictum of Juvenal — MENS SANA IN CORPORE SANO.<sup>113</sup>

As Beck remarks, the dichotomy between, on the one hand, mere strength and athleticism and, on the other, intelligence had existed in Greek minds for a long time. Even in Homer the intellect of Odysseus was contrasted with the strength of Ajax.<sup>114</sup> As early as the later half of the Sixth Century B.C. we find the Pre-Socratic philosopher Xenophanes condemning excessive praise of athletes and declaring that mental ability is superior to physical prowess.<sup>115</sup> However, his sentiments would not have found a favourable response in the heart of Pindar, the aristocratic poet who wrote odes in praise of the victors at the four great games. But in time it came to be felt that an over-indulgence in athletics was to be condemned. Plato, whom we have seen earlier praising the practice of gymnastics in education, in Republic Book III castigates the man who spends too much time exercising his body. The soul of such a man, because of a lack of





contact with the Muses, becomes weak, deaf, and blind. He himself becomes a misologist and because of his ignorance and ineptitude lives a life lacking in harmony and grace.<sup>116</sup>

When the "New" education began to be ushered in during the second half of the Fifth Century B.C. and the influence of the Sophists began to be felt there was a turning away from the ideals of athleticism and physical prowess espoused by the older generation and the conservatives. Now many students abandoned the physical activities of the gymnasia and flocked to the lectures of the Sophists. Euripides, himself a product of the new age and one who was deeply influenced by the teachings of the Sophists, strenuously condemned athletes and athleticism declaring that "Of countless ills in Hellas the race of athletes is quite the worst."<sup>117</sup> In the Electra Euripides implicitly condemns the sports dominated education of the aristocrats and seems to favour a more democratic approach. Here Orestes is praising the farmer while at the same time mocking the sportsman:

Such men of manners can control our cities best,  
and homes, but the well-born sportsman, long on muscle, short  
on brains, is only good for a statue in the park,  
not even sterner in the shocks of war than weaker  
men, for courage is the gift of character.     118

As we have seen, the "Old" education placed a great emphasis on character training and the inculcation of a definite ethical code.<sup>119</sup>

The ethical ideal was dominant and it can be summed up by one word,

*καλοκἀγαθία* i.e. "being both beautiful and good." *καλός*

(beautiful) signifies physical beauty together with the eroticism

which, as Marrou declares, inevitably accompanied it. *ἀγαθός* (good)



refers to the essential moral aspect — mental, emotional, spiritual.<sup>120</sup>  
 The education of the kalokagathos was a combination of the dignity and bravery befitting a man and the beauty of a boy.<sup>121</sup>

Marrou emphasizes the point that this "Old" education was by no means technical for "it was still designed for the leisured life of the aristocracy."<sup>122</sup> It was certainly not to fit a man for commerce, war, or politics. Nor was it regarded, as Beck observes, as so much providing a training in letters and literature as preparing the youths for leisure. Leisure was the main ingredient of the life of the Athenian citizen with games, chariot-racing, and other physical activities being the chief pastimes of the daylight hours, while in the evening the men retired to their clubs where conversations, discussion, and the recitation of poetry and the singing of songs were the dominant activities.<sup>123</sup> Men of worth in Athens, according to Aristophanes, were trained in sport, in dancing, and in music:

καὶ τραφέντας ἐν παλαίστραις καὶ χοροῖς καὶ μουσικῇ <sup>124</sup>

No mention is made of any vocational subjects. Socrates in the Theages while omitting dancing adds letters to these subjects befitting a gentleman.<sup>125</sup>

It would be understandable, as Kenneth Freeman remarks, if we considered that a great commercial city like Athens devoted at least part of its educational curriculum to the study of commercial subjects. However, this was by no means the case.<sup>126</sup> There were enough slaves in the city to perform most of the menial domestic and practical jobs. It would be wrong, of course, to imagine that no Athenian



citizen engaged in commercial and other vocational jobs. Many most certainly did. However, children learned their crafts and trades from their fathers, not in schools. Barclay<sup>127</sup> reminds us of Plato's Protagoras:

if you looked for a teacher of the sons of our artisans in the craft which they have in fact learned from their father to the best of their ability .... 128

Generally, as Hale relates, the Athenians regarded the school "as an early preparation for life, not for a livelihood."<sup>129</sup>

The Athenian boy's elementary education was almost certainly completed by the age of fifteen and very likely considerably earlier with regard to the poorer citizens.<sup>130</sup> The sons of the wealthy started their education at the earliest age and stayed in school the longest.<sup>131</sup> Beyond this rather elementary education there was no other formal systematic education which would equip the Athenian youth for the arduous responsibilities of manhood. It is possible that the Athenian youth became involved in military training shortly after leaving school. However I do not wish to provide a detailed discussion on the very thorny question of the "Ephebia" or cadet-training. There is evidence that the Ephebic College was not in existence until after 335 B.C. William A. Smith declares that the oath may have been very old and that the system itself may have taken a long time to evolve. But it is very likely that military training was a matter for the individual and was not a State responsibility. In fact he remarks, "the introduction of the compulsory ephebic program appears to have represented more than anything else a deliberate attempt on the part of Athens to check its military decadence after





the defeat at Chaeronea."<sup>132</sup> Marrou agrees that the "Ephebia" did not develop into its full form before the late Fourth Century B.C.. Any "Ephebia" before that time was not military in character; rather it probably signified the ceremonies attendant on a youth coming of age as an adult.<sup>133</sup> It is very likely, however, that the Ephebic Oath below existed in the Fifth Century B.C.:

- I 'I will not disgrace these sacred arms,
- II and I will not desert the comrade beside me  
wherever I shall be stationed in a battle line.
- III I will defend our sacred and public institutions
- IV and I will not hand over (to the descendants) the  
fatherland smaller, but greater and better, so far  
as I am able, by myself or with the help of all.
- V I will obey those who for the time being exercise  
sway reasonably and the established laws and those  
which they will establish reasonably in the future,
- VI if anyone seek to destroy them, I will not admit it  
so far as I am able, by myself or with the help of all.
- VII I will honour the traditional sacred institutions.
- VIII Witnesses are the gods Aglauros, Hestia, Enyo,  
Enyalios, Ares and Athena Areia, Zeus, Thallo, Auxo,  
Hegemone, Herakles, and the boundaries of the father-  
land, wheat, barley, vines, olive-trees, fig-trees.' 134

In general, what the student did after leaving school depended in large part on his economic position. If he were poor he was obliged to earn a living. If he were more well-to-do he could spend much of the day in the gymnasium continuing on the exercises which he had commenced in the palaestra.<sup>135</sup> It is to be noted that many activities other than the purely physical ones came to be offered by the gymnasia. These activities included public lectures, free discussions and many other broadening influences. In short, the gymnasia became intellectual and social centres.<sup>136</sup> Generally further education was to be gained by normal day to day living. As Boyd declares of Athens: "Here, if ever, life itself was the real educator."<sup>137</sup> If education



in the narrow sense was essentially a private affair, however in the wider sphere education was very public. Indeed the Athenian was expected to devote a large part of his time to the affairs of the polis, as Pericles states in the Funeral Speech:

And you will find united in the same persons an interest at once in private and in public affairs, and in others of us who give attention chiefly to business, you will find no lack of insight into political matters. For we alone regard the man who takes no part in public affairs, not as one who minds his own business, but as good for nothing; 138

Vast sums of money were spent on stadia, gymnasia, theatres etc. and the Athenians thronged to the various activities held there. As Andreades writes, "even if the city did not interest itself in schools, it did expend on works of art a proportion of the public wealth that was incomparably greater than that of any nation of today."<sup>139</sup> From his attendance at a multitude of various events and his constant interaction with other citizens there is some truth in Hale's remark that education "has never been more public."<sup>140</sup> It was also possible for many people who lived outside Athens to take part in the public festivals and attend and observe all the cultural activities which Athens had to offer. Consequently, education in the wider sense spread its far-ranging influence.<sup>141</sup> Obviously the great works of art and architecture with which the Athenians were surrounded had immense educative influences. The whole life of the Athenian citizen was a sublime cultural experience. Pericles in the following passage from the Funeral Speech is referring (as the translator points out) just as much to the spiritual products of Athens, e.g. art, poetry, music, as to the more physical ones:





Moreover, we have provided for the spirit many relaxations from toil: we have games and sacrifices regularly throughout the year and homes fitted out with good taste and elegance; and the delight we each day find in these things drives away sadness. And our city is so great that all the products of all the earth flow in upon us, and ours is the happy lot to gather in the good fruits of our own soil with no more home-felt security of enjoyment than we do those of other lands. 142

The man who frequented the Pnyx, the agora, the theatre could not fail to get some education. Drama, "the greatest literary and moral achievement of Hellas", played a very influential role in imparting ethical instruction.<sup>143</sup> Castle considering the often highly persuasive impression made by the Greek tragedians and playwrights of comedy concludes that Athenian schoolboys had, outside the schoolroom and gymnasium, more effective teachers than the ordinary schoolmaster.<sup>144</sup> The first stone theatre in Greece was built in the early Fifth Century B.C. in Athens with room for approximately 17,000 spectators. Many other theatres spread throughout Greece.<sup>145</sup> It is to be noted that much of the normal day-to-day activity in Greece took place out of doors. It is true, as Kitto remarks, that the climate of Athens helped the growth of education in the wider sense. For it was only in such a clement climate that all the great assemblies could take place in the open air. Without the sun there would not have been, perhaps, the development of Athenian democracy and Athenian drama.<sup>146</sup>

When Simonides said "polis teaches man" he was not thinking of public education organized by the State.<sup>147</sup> Rather, as Ehrenberg declares, he was considering man in his role of *ζῶον πολιτικόν*, or political creature, i.e. member of the political society.<sup>148</sup> Among the



men of the generation of Pericles and Sophocles almost everything they knew in philosophy or literature was learned "by individual precept and informally from their elders and contemporaries, or by their own efforts."<sup>149</sup> As Davidson relates, the university or the alma mater of the Athenian adult which he attended all his life was the State, while his civic duties constituted his curriculum.<sup>150</sup> It is important to bear in mind that Athenians such as Pericles, Sophocles, and Pheidias who were all born in the decade 490-480 B.C. and who were consummate exponents in the fields of politics, literature, art had only received an elementary education which was roughly analogous to the level of our primary school.<sup>151</sup> As Davidson declares, the "Old" education was certainly successful for it produced such men as Miltiades, Aristides, Themistocles, Aeschylus, Pericles, Socrates, and it was products of this education who achieved the great victories over the Persians at Marathon, Salamis, and Plataeae.<sup>152</sup> Well could Pericles call Athens the "School of Hellas".<sup>153</sup> The Greeks, both young person and adult, of the period under discussion were true recipients of that informal education which is not confined to the classroom or lecture hall. They were liberally educated by normal living.<sup>154</sup>

### Conclusion

In the foregoing, together with a brief consideration of the Old Homeric education and also the Spartan agogé, I have provided an account of the "Old" education in Athens, i.e., that elementary educ-



ation which the Sophists found in existence when they commenced their teaching in this city in the second half of the Fifth Century B.C. While the "Old" education furnished an adequate schooling at the elementary level in such areas as reading, writing, music, literature, physical training, the political and social changes which were becoming manifest in Athenian society in the latter part of the Fifth Century B.C. rendered it increasingly necessary that a more formal secondary or higher education be introduced. The time was approaching when the informal education provided by normal day-to-day living in the "School of Hellas" would no longer be sufficient for a youth to become a force in the State. The "Old" education had been eminently suitable for the relatively small aristocratic element at Athens especially before the rapid increase in democratic institutions. However, with the spread of democracy and the growth in numbers both of those young men from a non-aristocratic background desiring to make their mark in a changed society and also of those aristocratic youths who wished to regain political sway under the new democratic regime, there was an ever increasing need for a more elaborate and appropriate education than that provided by the "Old" elementary one. The Sophists professed to be able to provide for this need.

In the following chapter, "The Coming of the Sophists", I wish to consider some of the reasons why the Sophistic Movement took root in Athens in the second half of the Fifth Century B.C. and also some of the more important characteristics of this Movement. In addition I shall discuss who the students of the Sophists were and





why there was such dislike shown towards these teachers by a certain segment of the Athenian population. I shall conclude with a brief examination of the evidence which we possess for the Sophists.



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— Outside the area of human affairs it might refer to the distinguishing excellence of any species, natural or otherwise — the strength of a lion, the fleetness of a rabbit, the sharp cutting edge of a pruning hook enabling it to clip branches effectively.  
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33. FLACELIÈRE, Robert, Daily Life in Greece at the Time of Pericles, translated by Peter Green, Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1965. p. 93.



34. ARISTOPHANES, Clouds, lines 961-965, translated by Benjamin Bickley Rogers in Aristophanes, Vol. I. Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann Ltd.: London, 1930.

Webster remarks that this cameo of boys trooping to school in a body does not strike us that education was conducted on a small scale. WEBSTER, T.B.L., Athenian Culture and Society, Batsford: London, 1973. p. 60.

35. MARROU, op. cit., pp. 40-41 and p. 43.

36. WEBSTER, op. cit., p. 60.

37. BECK, op. cit., p. 77.  
see also EHRENBURG, Victor, Society and Civilization in Greece and Rome, Martin Classical Lectures, Vol. XVIII. Harvard University Press: Massachusetts, 1964. p. 49.

38. PLUTARCH, Life of Aristides 7.

The word "ostrakon" meant potsherd in Greek and citizens were allowed to write the name of the man they wished banished from the city on such a piece of pottery. Hence the name of the institution of ostracism.

Ferguson and Chisholm quote a character from the Laws of Cratinus:

Good God ! I don't know how to read or write.

But I can put it into words; I've a good memory.

translated by Ferguson in FERGUSON and CHISHOLM, op. cit., p. 110.

However, the Sausage Merchant in the Knights of Aristophanes declares that though he is but little educated he can read his letters albeit badly. ARISTOPHANES, Knights, line 188.

39. WEBSTER, op. cit., p. 60.

40. THUCYDIDES, Book I. 6.

41. EHRENBURG, op. cit., p. 48.

42. GOOD, H.G., A History of Western Education, Second Edition. The Macmillan Company: New York, 1960. (First Edition 1947). p. 32.

Referring to the following passage Beck declares that it points to the possibility of the State being indifferent to education:

I have only to remark .... that no one cares about your birth or nurture or education, or, I may say, about that of any other Athenian, unless he has a lover who looks after him.

PLATO, Alcibiades I 122B, translated by B. Jowett in The Dialogues of Plato, Vol. II. Random House: New York, 1937.



see BECK, op. cit., p. 93.

43. POUNDS, Ralph L., The Development of Education in Western Culture, Appleton-Century-Crofts: New York, 1968. p. 45.  
Even though education was essentially a matter of private rather than State responsibility it is interesting, as Vlachos remarks, that both Plato and Aristotle devoted much of their treatises on political science to the topic of education in the Republic and Politics respectively. Education evidently signified education for citizenship. VLACHOS, Nicholas P., Hellas and Hellenism, Ginn and Company: U.S.A., 1936. p. 180.
44. FLACELIÈRE, op. cit., p. 92.  
also BARCLAY, William, Educational Ideals in the Ancient World, Collins: London, 1959. p. 110.
45. AESCHINES, Against Timarchus 9-11, translated by Charles Darwin Adams in The Speeches of Aeschines, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann: London, 1919.
46. BOYD and King, op. cit., p. 19.
47. FLACELIÈRE, op. cit., pp. 91-92.
48. BECK, op. cit., p. 94.
49. As Walden reminds us, "Music", taking the broad context, signified any art under the patronage of a Muse. WALDEN, John W.H., The Universities of Ancient Greece, Charles Scribner's Sons: New York, 1910. p. 10.
50. FREEMAN, Kenneth J., Schools of Hellas, Teachers' College Press: New York, 1969. (First Published 1907). pp. 50-51.
51. PLATO, Protagoras 325D, translated by W.K.C. Guthrie in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns. Bollingen Series LXXI. Princeton University Press: New Jersey, U.S.A., 1978. (First Published 1961).  
see BECK, op. cit., p. 81.
52. FLACELIÈRE, op. cit., pp. 93-94.
53. A picture of the grammatistes teaching writing occurs in the Protagoras:  
You know how, when children are not yet good at writing, the writing master traces outlines with the pencil before giving them the slate, and makes them follow the lines as a guide in their own writing.  
PLATO, Protagoras 326Cff., translated by Guthrie in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.





54. PLATO, Protagoras 325Eff.
55. WALDEN, op. cit., p. 11.
56. ARISTOPHANES, Frogs, lines 1500-1503, translated by Gilbert Murray in The Complete Greek Drama, edited by Whitney J. Oates and Eugene O'Neill Jr., Vol. Two, Random House: New York, 1938.
57. ARISTOPHANES, Frogs, lines 1030ff., translated by R. Lattimore in Aristophanes, Four Comedies, edited by William Arrowsmith, Ann Arbor Paperbacks. The University of Michigan Press: U.S.A., 1969.
58. ARISTOPHANES, Birds, line 471, translated by Gilbert Murray, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.: London, 1950.
59. WALDEN, op. cit., p. 11.  
Plato called Homer the Schoolmaster of Greece:  

... τὴν Ἑλλάδα πεπαιδευκεν οὗτος ὁ ποιητής

(Republic 606E).
60. See for example XENOPHON, Symposium IV. 6-8.
61. ISOCRATES, Panegyricus 159.  
As Cary and Haarhoff remind us, in Aristophanes' Banqueters a father examines his son's progress at school by questioning him with regard to archaic words in Homer. Even for the purpose of teaching language great emphasis was obviously placed on Homer. CARY, M. and HAARHOFF, T.J., Life and Thought in the Greek and Roman World, Methuen and Co. Ltd.: London, 1942. (First Published 1940). pp. 283-284.  
see also EDMONDS, J.M., The Fragments of Attic Comedy, Vol I, Aristophanes 222. E.J. Brill: Leiden, Netherlands, 1957. p. 639.
62. ANDREADES, A.M., A History of Greek Public Finance, Vol. I, translated by Carroll N. Brown, Harvard University Press: Massachusetts, 1933. p. 229, note 5.
63. XENOPHON, Symposium III. 5.
64. PLATO, Laws 810Eff.
65. PLATO, Protagoras 326Aff., translated by Guthrie in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.



66. HOMER, Iliad, Book IX, lines 186-189.
67. ARISTOPHANES, Wasps. line 959, translated by K.J. Freeman, in FREEMAN, op. cit., p. 110.
68. PLATO, Laws 654Aff.  
For the importance of music in Plato's ideal State see Republic III 401Eff.
69. BARCLAY, op. cit., p. 130.  
With regard to prose works Freeman declares that on the whole they very rarely figured in the elementary schools, partly because they were usually too technical, still more because the artistic and literary sense of the Hellenes regarded poetry, if only because of its greater beauty and imaginative value, as better for educational purposes than prose. FREEMAN, op. cit., pp. 96-97.
70. FREEMAN, ibid., p. 108.
71. PLUTARCH, Cimon 9. 1-2.
72. BARCLAY, op. cit., p. 124.  
also FREEMAN, op. cit., p. 112.
73. ARISTOTLE, Politics VIII. 1337b22-33 and VIII 1338a13-23.
74. FLACELIÈRE, op. cit., p. 95.
75. BARCLAY, op. cit., p. 111.
76. THEOPHRASTUS, Characters XXX.
77. DEMOSTHENES, De Corona 258, translated by C.A. Vince and J.H. Vince, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann: London, 1926.
78. BUTTS, R. Freeman, A Cultural History of Western Education, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.: New York, 1955. p. 42.
79. CASTLE, E.B., The Teacher, Oxford University Press: U.K., 1970. p. 25.

However, with regard to the status of the teacher in the community, it is also worthwhile to quote Beck who concludes:

that there is little direct evidence to prove that teachers were held in disrespect during our period. The attempts to prove this point consist in ascribing to the fifth and fourth centuries the prejudices of later times. Nor has it been established that the



disparity, if any, between teaching and other occupations was a source of contempt. However, and we have made the point before, there was a strong antipathy on the part of the aristocracy towards the new arts of mass instruction. Pindar had heaped scorn upon 'those whose knowledge comes from lessons learned' and both Socrates and Plato reflect this aristocratic prejudice. It was therefore natural that some resentment against teachers might survive among aristocratic writers and thinkers, but this would certainly not be proof of general contempt. It is to this aristocratic prejudice that we may trace the germ of the later widespread disrespect for the elementary teaching profession. BECK, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

80. DEMOSTHENES, De Corona 257, op. cit.
81. XENOPHON, The March Up Country 2. 6, translated by W.H.D. Rouse, Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd.: U.K., 1947.
82. BARCLAY, op. cit., p. 96.
83. ibid., p. 97.
84. FREEMAN, op. cit., p. 66.
85. MAHAFFY, J.P., Social Life in Greece from Homer to Menander, Macmillan and Co.: London, 1907. (First Edition 1874). p. 331.
86. See PLATO, Lysis 208C.
87. AESCHINES, Against Timarchus 10.
88. PLATO, Protagoras 325Cff., translated by Guthrie in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
89. PLATO, Lysis 223A.

However, some paidagōgoi were of good character. Beck points out a passage in Herodotus:

Then Themistocles, when the Peloponnesians were outvoting him, went privily out of the assembly, and sent to the Median fleet a man in a boat, charged with a message that he must deliver. This man's name was Sicinnus, and he was of Themistocles' household and attendant on his children; at a later day, when the Thespians were receiving men to be their citizens, Themistocles made him a Thespian and a wealthy man withal.

HERODOTUS VIII 75, translated by A.D. Godley, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann: London, 1930.

As Beck remarks, it is to be noted that not only was the paid-





agōgus a member of Themistocles' household but he was trusted enough to be given care of an important message. BECK, op. cit., pp. 105-106.

90. CASTLE, Teacher, p. 24.
91. ARISTOPHANES, Wasps, line 656.  
see also MacDowell's note to this line in MACDOWELL, Douglas M. (editor), ARISTOPHANES, Wasps, Oxford at the Clarendon Press: U.K., 1971. p. 220.
92. PLATO, Protagoras 318Dff., translated by Guthrie in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
93. As Pounds points out, it is likely that the ability to perform even a moderately high level of mathematics was unusual mainly due to the intricacies of the Greek number system. POUNDS, op. cit., p. 46.
94. FREEMAN, op. cit., p. 57.
95. ibid., p. 152.
96. ibid., p. 143.
97. ibid., pp. 153-154.
98. In the Gorgias the function of a paidotribes is stated:  
    'I am a trainer', he will reply, 'and my business is to make men beautiful and strong in body.'  
    PLATO, Gorgias 452B, translated by Jowett in Dialogues of Plato, op. cit., Vol. I.
99. PLATO, Protagoras 326Bff.
100. The palaestra of Taureas is referred to in PLATO, Charmides 153A.
101. BECK, op. cit., p. 91. See also pp. 129-141.  
    also FREEMAN, op. cit., chapter 4 passim.
102. The pankration was a form of all-in wrestling where almost anything was allowed. As Freeman remarks, the paidotribes undoubtedly watched the boys engaged in this sport very carefully in order that the fighting did not get out of hand. FREEMAN, op. cit., p. 133.
103. ibid., pp. 130-134.  
    Games other than the purely physical ones were also played in the palaestra. In the Lysis we see the boys playing at



knuckle-bones. PLATO, Lysis 206Eff.

104. BUTTS, op. cit., p. 37.
105. (XENOPHON), The Constitution of the Athenians II 10, translated by Hartvig Frisch. Gyldendalske Boghandel-Nordisk Forlag-København-MCMXLII.
106. It is interesting to remember that the gymnasia later evolved into much more academic type institutions. Even today in Modern Greek and in many Germanic languages the "gymnasium" is commonly a highly academic secondary school. However, in English the "gymnasium" is still a place of physical exercise. POUNDS, op. cit., p. 47.
107. MYERS, Edward D., Education in the Perspective of History, Harper and Brothers Publishers: New York, 1960. p. 82.
108. BOWEN, James, A History of Western Education Vol. I, Methuen and Co. Ltd.: London, 1972. p. 83.
109. GREEN, W.C., The Achievement of Greece, Harvard University Press: U.S.A., 1924. p. 87.
110. See ISOCRATES, Antidosis 181-182, translated by George Norlin, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann Ltd.: London, 1929.
111. PLATO, Republic II 376E, translated by Jowett in Dialogues of Plato, Vol. I, op. cit.
112. XENOPHON, Memorabilia III xii 6.
113. JUVENAL, Satires X, line 356.
114. BECK, op. cit., p. 137.
115. See XENOPHANES, fragment 2 of Diels, translated by Arthur Fairbanks, in Selections From Early Greek Philosophy, edited by Milton C. Nahm, Appleton-Century-Crofts Inc.: New York, 1947.
116. PLATO, Republic III 411Cff.
117. See EURIPIDES, fragment of Autolukos, translated by Freeman in FREEMAN, op. cit., p. 122.
118. EURIPIDES, Electra lines 386-390, translated by Emily Townsend Vermeule in The Complete Greek Tragedies, Vol. IV, Euripides, edited by D. Grene and R. Lattimore, The University of Chicago Press: U.S.A., 1969. (First Edition 1959).
119. EHRENBERG, op. cit., p. 49.



120. MARROU, op. cit., pp. 43-44.
121. EHRENBURG, op. cit., p. 48.
122. MARROU, op. cit., p. 43.
123. BECK, op. cit., p. 79.
124. ARISTOPHANES, Frogs, line 729.
125. (PLATO), Theages 122E.
126. FREEMAN, op. cit., p. 42.
127. BARCLAY, op. cit., p. 101.
128. PLATO, Protagoras 328A, translated by Guthrie in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.

An Athenian son was expected to support his aged father; however, if the father was remiss in teaching his son how to support himself then the son was absolved from providing such support. If we may believe Plutarch, Solon had instituted the relevant law:

Observing that the city was getting full of people who were constantly streaming into Attica from all quarters for greater security of living, and that most of the country was unfruitful and worthless, and that sea faring men are not wont to import goods for those who have nothing to give them in exchange, he turned the attention of the citizens to the arts of manufacture, and enacted a law that no son who had not been taught a trade should be compelled to support his father.

PLUTARCH, Life of Solon XXII 1, translated by Bernadotte Perrin, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann: London, 1914.

129. HALE, William Harlan, Ancient Greece, American Heritage Press: New York, 1970. p. 203.
130. SMITH, William A., Ancient Education, Greenwood Press Publishers: New York, 1969, (First Published 1955), p. 135.
131. PLATO, Protagoras 326C.
132. SMITH, op. cit., p. 137.
133. MARROU, op. cit., p. 37.
134. SIEWERT, P., "The Ephebic oath in fifth-century Athens", in The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. XCVII, 1977.





135. SMITH, op. cit., p. 135.
136. BARCLAY, op. cit., p. 134.
137. BOYD and KING, op. cit., p. 20.
138. THUCYDIDES, Book II xl 2, translated by Charles Forster Smith, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann: London, 1923.
139. ANDREADES, op. cit., p. 229.
140. HALE, op. cit., p. 203.
141. POUNDS, op. cit., p. 51.
142. THUCYDIDES, Book II xxxviii, op. cit.; see note 2, p. 324.
143. CASTLE, Ancient Education, p. 36.
144. ibid., p. 39.
145. BOWEN, op. cit., p. 73.
146. KITTO, H.D.F., The Greeks, Penguin Books: U.K., 1956. p. 37.
147. πόλις ἕνεκα διδάσκει Fragment 95, Simonides, in Lyra Graeca Vol. II, edited by J.M. Edmonds, Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann Ltd.: London, 1931.
148. EHRENBURG, op. cit., p. 48.
149. FINLEY, M.I., The Ancient Greeks, Penguin Books: U.K., 1977, (First Published 1963). p. 94.
150. DAVIDSON, Thomas, The Education of the Greek People, Appleton and Company: U.S.A., 1912. p. 77.
151. MARROU, op. cit., p. 46.
152. DAVIDSON, Thomas, A History of Education, Burt Franklin: New York, 1971, (First Published 1907). pp. 98-99.

T.R. Glover declares that the early Athenian education and the old ways had accomplished much:

This happy-go-lucky unsystematic way of training boys had made Athenian Empire, Athenian art, Athenian literature, Athenian philosophy; it had given the nidus and the impulse, and made all these things possible and actual. It had produced Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Pericles as well as Cleon — and Pericles' speech is always evidence for its value — and finally where else



had Plato grown but in Athens, and where else could he or Socrates have been possible ?

GLOVER, T.R., Greek Byways, Cambridge University Press: U.K., 1932.

153. THUCYDIDES, Book II xli.

154. Myers well describes how a man was really educated in the first half of the Fifth Century B.C. It is a good example of the general education afforded by living rather than that provided by the narrow education of the institution:

He was accustomed to spending time in the market-place in conversation with his fellow citizens, to sitting in on the citizen-assemblies and to listen carefully to the great orators and statesmen, to serving in the army or navy, to observing the work of the architects and engineers and sculptors and painters, to participating in the life of the POLIS as a whole. And it was these "liberally" or "generally" educated men who were the generals in the army, the commanders in the navy, the architects of the policy of the city-state, the audience for the plays of the dramatists, and it was out of their ranks that the dramatists and poets and philosophers emerged.

MYERS, op. cit., p. 84.



## CHAPTER TWO

### THE COMING OF THE SOPHISTS

#### Introduction

About 585 B.C. a radically new type of education had become evident in the sphere of philosophy and its birth place was in Ionia in Asia Minor, particularly in the wealthy city of Miletus. It was here that men, as Aristotle observes, "owing to their wonder .... at first began to philosophize."<sup>1</sup> The first Milesian philosophers were hylozoists: Thales held water to be the underlying stratum of everything, a reasonable enough assumption from the evidence of nature;<sup>2</sup> Anaximander, the successor and pupil of Thales, found the principle of all existing things to be τὸ ἄπειρον, or the Indefinite, and not any of the other known elements;<sup>3</sup> Anaximenes, pupil of Anaximander, found the underlying nature of all things to be air.<sup>4</sup>

While the answers provided by these early philosophers to the question of the identity of the substratum of everything might appear a little naïve to us today, it should be stressed that the very fact that they asked the question at all is of more consequence than their answers.<sup>5</sup> However, the sort of answers they gave also marked a great improvement in man's intellectual progress. They attempted to provide a rational and scientific explanation rather than rest content with teachings furnished by mythology and the supernatural.

These early Milesian hylozoists were, as Marrou observes, pure philosophers with no time for teaching.<sup>6</sup> We do not know if they had any disciples; but while Thales may have written nothing, at least





Anaximander and Anaximenes wrote prose accounts of their theories. Other philosophers succeeded these Ionians: Pythagoras of Samos (2nd half of Sixth Century B.C.); Xenophanes of Colophon (2nd half of Sixth Century B.C.); Heracleitus of Ephesus (active towards the end of Sixth Century B.C.); Parmenides of Elea (1st half of Fifth Century B.C.); Zeno of Elea (younger contemporary of Parmenides); Empedocles of Acragas (1st half of Fifth Century B.C.); Anaxagoras of Clazomenae (1st three-quarters of Fifth Century B.C.); Democritus of Abdera (born c. 460 B.C. and lived to an old age). So while children continued to receive the old traditional education exciting developments were multiplying in intellectual matters throughout the Greek world. It was Pythagoras and his followers, however, who by setting up a school of philosophy at Croton broke new educational ground. Now there was an institution for a specific purpose, i.e. educating the whole man. It was, as Marrou states, "an organized institution" with its own buildings and rules and it acted as a prototype for the Academy of Plato, the Lyceum of Aristotle, and the school of Epicurus — "it was always to remain the standard pattern of the Greek school of philosophy." Also the first schools of medicine, for example those at Croton and Cyrene which appeared towards the end of the Sixth Century B.C. to be followed in the Fifth Century by those of Cos and Cnidus, are further evidence of a new burgeoning system of education.<sup>7</sup>

But while Greek intellectual activity was being greatly stimulated by the philosophic and scientific speculations of the Pre-Socratic philosophers during the Sixth and early Fifth Centuries B.C. no



major contribution was being made to the solution of ethical problems. However, the Fifth Century as it progressed saw an increased interest in the nature of man and in his role in society. Democracy was coming to the fore in Athens with more and more individuals beginning to take an active part in political affairs, thereby creating a need for an appropriate chrestomathic education.<sup>8</sup>

Democracy had been slowly developing in Athens ever since the "Seisachtheia" or "disburdening" of debts and other reforms instituted by Solon in the early Sixth Century B.C. Further changes and an important reform of the constitution were carried out by Cleisthenes in the last decade of the Sixth Century B.C. A more complete democratic programme was introduced by Ephialtes in 462 and was carried through by Pericles when Ephialtes was assassinated in 462 or 461 B.C. Now the political powers of the Council of the Areopagus passed to the Boulé, the Assembly, and the people's law courts. Even the lowest classes of citizens were admitted to the archonship. Appointment by lot (as opposed to mixed election and lot) was introduced for many offices, including the archonship and the Boulé. Also pay was introduced for participation in the archonship, the Boulé, and the law courts. Now even the poorer citizens were able to take part in the day-to-day running of polis affairs and the democracy. The result was that Thucydides could have Pericles declare in the Funeral Speech:

We live under a form of government which does not emulate the institutions of our neighbours; on the contrary, we are ourselves a model which some follow, rather than the imitators of other peoples. It is true that our government is called a democracy, because its administration is in the



hands, not of the few, but of the many; yet while as regards the law all men are on an equality for the settlement of their private disputes, as regards the value set on them it is as each man is in any way distinguished that he is preferred to public honours, not because he belongs to a particular class, but because of personal merits; nor, again, on the ground of poverty is a man barred from a public career by obscurity of rank if he but has it in him to do the state a service. 9

Also Athens which had once been a predominantly agricultural community had now, helped by the efforts of Themistocles, grown into a wealthy maritime power with a new class of well-to-do traders and merchants who were to rival the previous rulers, the landed gentry.<sup>10</sup> By the mid-Fifth Century B.C. Athens had become very rich and was at the centre of a Greek empire.

At the same time the manly and noble Aeschylean qualities which had routed the Persians (considered by the Athenians to be effete and sybaritic) at Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea were fading. Couch and Geer consider that Athens' character was weakening as early as 454 B.C. with the transfer of the treasury of the Delian Confederacy to Athens. Athens' allies were thus betrayed.<sup>11</sup> The ideal of rendering service to the State was now esteemed lower than that of securing personal aggrandizement. As Burn remarks, the new age saw its typical exponent in the "brilliant and unscrupulous" ward of Pericles, Alcibiades.<sup>12</sup> Castle sees the change as symptomatic of increasing luxuriousness of living and a softening of moral fibre. The old *areté* of courage and civil service was now giving way to the ideal of political *areté* with its concomitant character of individualism.<sup>13</sup> Butts agrees that along with the concept of citizenship





and its social implications there was a strong individualistic strain which sprang to the fore when economic conditions in Athens made it possible for individual citizens to amass wealth and when the ideal of democracy was put under pressure during the Peloponnesian War. The wish to become better citizens, as befitted a democracy, by learning to think and speak better went hand in hand with a desire to achieve personal advantage and power in the political arena. The Sophists helped to cater to both these desires and by so doing effected a pedagogical revolution.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, as Laistner remarks, the rise of the Sophists is a good instance of the law of supply and demand.<sup>15</sup> Jaeger asserts that the fact that the majority of the Sophists were itinerant teachers who travelled from city to city and who lived a very independent sort of life is a sure sign that a new essentially individualistic type of culture was arising: "for the Sophists were individualists, however much they might talk of education to serve the community and train in the *areté* of a good citizen."<sup>16</sup> Ransdell agrees that the Sophists were mainly concerned with teaching their students to better themselves as individuals rather than inculcating any wish to further the interests of society.<sup>17</sup>

#### Anthropocentric Character of Sophistic Education

It may be said that, in general, the Sophists did not continue the speculation with regard to the natural philosophy with which the Sixth Century philosophers of Asia Minor had been mainly concerned.<sup>18</sup>



Humanistic studies now began to spring up when less attention was paid to natural science and it is accordingly fitting to view Socrates and the Sophists as fomenting a revolution whose negative aspect was a turning against cosmology and whose positive element was an embracing of humanism.<sup>19</sup> The problems of man and human conduct came to be especially prominent following the social turbulence brought about by the Peloponnesian War (begun 431 B.C.). Now the abstractions of the natural philosophers began to be considered as secondary to the need for help with regard to everyday practical affairs.<sup>20</sup> However, it should be remembered that older tendencies existed side by side with this new emphasis on human activity. It would be wrong to consider that the Sophists held the intellectual hegemony in the Greece of the second half of the Fifth Century B.C. The older cosmological theories existed alongside the new teachings. Scoon reminds us that Socrates knew Parmenides. Empedocles may have talked with Protagoras. Anaxagoras lived at Athens until, tried for Impiety, he fled in about 430 B.C. Also there were many other minor figures who continued the philosophies of Asia Minor and of Elea.<sup>21</sup> G.B. Kerferd argues that in certain matters, and particularly in what he calls the philosophy of mind, there was "much more continuity and much less of a dramatic contrast between the sophists and their predecessors than has commonly been supposed."<sup>22</sup>

Guthrie observes that it would be wrong on purely chronological grounds to consider that all the Pre-Socratic philosophers and particularly those from Ionia could have influenced the thought of



the Sophists. He declares that Protagoras or Gorgias, for example, are more likely to have influenced Democritus rather than vice versa.<sup>23</sup> Anyway, according to Dodds, there was no rigid line of demarcation between the two lines of thought. Many of the cosmologists and natural scientists were concerning themselves to a certain degree with the study of man and society while the Sophists often discussed and wrote on such areas as mathematics, astronomy etc. However, Guthrie argues that there is little real evidence of any sincere interest in the physical sciences and cosmology. Rather the Sophists maintained that their students should have just enough knowledge of these subjects so that they could discourse eloquently concerning them: "The aim was to be a good talker and to make debating points, not to acquire a scientific interest in a subject for its own sake."<sup>24</sup> I shall return to the theme of Sophistic interest in science later in this work.

Ehrenberg declares that the leitmotiv of all Sophist thought is that man is the centre and also the subject of knowledge — their education was anthropocentric. Apart from the important epistemological aspects of Protagoras' homo-mensura principle the very fact that "man" is the measure is particularly notable.<sup>25</sup> This is the age when Sophocles can pen his famous Ode on Man in the Antigone (lines 332-375) where he hymns the myriad achievements of mankind:

πολλὰ γὰρ δεινὰ κούδεν ἄνθρώπου δεινότερον πέλει

Many the wonders but nothing walks stranger than man. 26

The Sophists were particularly interested in political man. In fact,





they would have agreed with Aristotle's later dictum — ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον — man is by nature a political animal.<sup>27</sup>

Rostovtzeff declares that because of their especial concern with political and social questions "they deserve to be called the fathers of sociology and political science."<sup>28</sup> Scoon reminds us that this "new" humanism was not all that innovative. γνῶθι σεαυτόν — know thyself — had long been a motto at Delphi. Heracleitus, about 500 B.C., had stated ἐδίκησάμην ἑμεωυτόν — I have investigated myself. The power, valour, and capability of man had been demonstrated to wonderful effect in the Persian Wars when the Greeks, far inferior in numbers, had soundly defeated the Persian Satrapy. In fact, the Persian threat was so diminished that about eighty years afterwards, as Xenophon relates in his Anabasis, a small army of ten thousand Greeks had the audacity to march right into the heart of the Persian Empire.<sup>29</sup> It was against this background of an increased interest in humanity that Euripides could shift his focus from the gods to mankind, that Anaxagoras could make νοῦς or Mind dominant over all, and Protagoras could declare that man was the measure of all things.

#### Realization of the Heterogeneity of Societies

While the cosmological hylozoists had sought the single substratum which underlay all nature, the anthropologists were being led more and more to the conclusion that there was a vast multitude of institutions, customs, and traditions in the world.<sup>30</sup> It became increasingly difficult to assent to the view that men are governed by one



cosmic law. The great diversity in human institutions and affairs which became even more obvious in the cosmopolitan days after the Persian Wars made it clear to many, especially the itinerant Sophists, that the notion of a single cosmic law was too simple a doctrine and not really acceptable.<sup>31</sup> As Smith remarks, "growing contacts with other peoples and cultures pointed to knowledge and truth as relative rather than absolute."<sup>32</sup> The new vistas opened to Athens as her Empire<sup>33</sup> developed emphasized the heterogeneity of societies—"autres pays autres mœurs".<sup>34</sup>

Earlier, the great era of colonization when new States had been founded with a mixture of old and new laws also helped to undermine the framework of time honoured tradition and custom. As Guthrie remarks, there had been contact between the Ionian Greeks of Asia Minor and barbarians for centuries and also the intellectual progress of these anatolians had been greatly influenced by Orientals.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, the new interest in historical writing was revealing that there were not only great varieties of morality and customs in place but in time as well.<sup>36</sup> Hecataeus of Miletus (later Sixth and early Fifth Century B.C.) wrote a two volume *τῆς Περιόδου* or Journey About the World, dealing with his wide travels about the lands of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and also with such remote lands as India and Scythia. He included much ethnological and historical material together with accounts of flora and fauna. He constructed what was one of the first world-maps. Anaximander, a townsman of Hecataeus, also made a world-map but we do not know



which was first. While we only possess scant fragments of Hecataeus' work we are fortunate that the Histories in nine books of Herodotus of Halicarnassus (c.484-c.420 B.C.) is preserved. This work by 'the father of history' deals with the history of the great war between the Greeks and the Persians; however, there is also extensive geographical, ethnological, and historical treatment of the many countries visited by Herodotus while undertaking his research. He gave readings of his Histories in Athens and his work was well enough known to Athenians for it to be parodied by Aristophanes in the Acharnians in 425 B.C.<sup>37</sup>

Not only was Athens becoming more and more aware that other societies were often very different to her own but Athenian society itself was in a state of flux. The second half of the Fifth Century saw great societal, cultural, and economic changes in Athens with an accompanying plethora of new laws which were continually being repealed. Credence was thus given to the notion of the conventionality of human laws — there could be no appeal to the legitimacy afforded by remote times. Dodds reminds us of Aristophanes' caricature of the "Decree-Merchant" in his comedy, the Birds.<sup>38</sup>

As most of the Sophists were peripatetic teachers and had travelled extensively it is likely that their Weltanschauung was more cosmopolitan in nature and comprehensive than that of the average Athenian citizen.<sup>39</sup> Of course, with regard to the conventionality of human morality it was not in the interest of these wandering teachers to declare that the laws of one State were better than





another's. But there is no doubt that in their travels from polis to polis they noticed many differences in the City Codes.<sup>40</sup> However, it is clear that a great strength of Sophistic teaching lay in its refusal to adhere to accepted doctrines just because they were traditional. The younger generation, influenced by the new rationality, declined to have the old dogmata forced upon them by their parents. A new spirit of questioning was in the air and they wished to decide matters for themselves.<sup>41</sup>

The philosophical milieu was one which was dominated by the opposition of νόμος , nomos, to φύσις , physis — nomos being the conventions, customs, traditional law of man, while physis is what is fixed by nature, totally independent of human involvement.<sup>42</sup>

A generation before the period we are concerned with Herodotus had related his well known story of how the Greeks and Indians disposed of their dead:

For if anyone should propose to all men, to select the best institutions of all that exist, each, after considering them all, would choose their own; so certain is it that each thinks his own institutions by far the best. It is not therefore probable, that any but a madman would make such things the subject of ridicule. That all men are of this mind respecting their own institutions, may be inferred from many and various proofs, and amongst them by the following. Darius having summoned some Greeks under his sway, who were present, asked them "for what sum they would feed upon the dead bodies of their parents." They answered, that they would not do it for any sum. Darius afterwards having summoned some of the Indians called Callatians, who were accustomed to eat their parents, asked them in the presence of the Greeks, and who were informed of what was said by an interpreter, "for what sum they would consent to burn their fathers when they die?" but they, making loud exclamations, begged he would speak words of good omen. Such then is the effect of custom: and Pindar appears to me to have said rightly, "that custom is the king of all men." 43



It is not surprising that many Greeks, from a study of comparative anthropology, would conclude that *nomos*, i.e. custom or convention, was responsible for human laws and not nature. The playwright Euripides commented repeatedly on the provisional, human, and conventional character of justice.<sup>44</sup> Accordingly, it was easy for certain young men to cast away the bases of traditional morality. We are reminded of Aristophanes' comedy, the Clouds, in which there is a parody of a young man who having received a new humanist education argues that it is natural to behave as the animals and that it is right that he should beat up his aged father. Of course, this is a fictional account provided by a comic playwright whose principal objective was to raise a laugh and should not be taken as being anything like the norm in Athenian society. However, some members of the audience were bound to agree with the sentiment which Euripides makes a character express:

τί δ' αἰσχρὸν ἦν μὴ τοῖσι χρωμένοις δοκῇ;

What is shameful if it does not seem so to those who are doing it ? 45

Sophistic teaching helped to generate a certain tendency to consider that one man's opinion is as valid as anyone else's. Also an individual's opinion which he held yesterday is as valid as the diametrically opposed opinion which the same individual holds today. If we change a man's mind by persuasion his new opinion is just as good as his old one. Therefore wisdom resides in persuasion.<sup>46</sup>



### Necessity of an Education for Public Life

Kathleen Freeman<sup>47</sup> points to the necessity for the young men of Athens to receive the right type of education which would train them for public life. Any other career (except the army and navy which were quite acceptable) was usually closed to a young man of good family. No legal profession existed, each litigant being legally required to address the court in person. It was possible for a speech-writer to prepare the address of the litigant but such speech-writers were looked down upon. The practice of medicine was held in low esteem, as was schoolmastering — it was beneath the dignity of a gentleman. (We have seen earlier Demosthenes' contemptuous attitude to Aeschines because he is the son of a schoolmaster.) The most important priesthoods were handed down from family to family, while State magistrates took over most of the other important religious duties. Commerce was only resorted to if all else failed and was always held in low regard. Of course, anything to do with trades and the work of artisans was held in especially low esteem.<sup>48</sup> As Grattan declares, craftsmen in Athens were regarded as being low on the social scale because by virtue of their occupations they could not achieve the particular areté most esteemed by the upper class intellectuals.<sup>49</sup> Plato, in the Laws, refuses to allow citizens to be tradesmen or artisans.<sup>50</sup> Indeed, the majority of the wealthy young men who were the students of the Sophists would doubtless have agreed with the views of Aristotle written in the Fourth Century B.C.:

Since we are inquiring what is the best government possible,





and it is admitted to be that in which the citizens are happy; and that, as we have already said, it is impossible to obtain happiness without virtue; it follows, that in the best-governed states, where citizens are really men of intrinsic and not relative goodness, none of them should be permitted to exercise any mechanic employment or follow merchandise, as being ignoble and destructive to virtue; neither should they be husbandmen, that they may be at leisure to improve in virtue and perform the duty they owe to the state. 51

Socrates in Xenophon's Oeconomicus (also written in the Fourth Century B.C.) while admitting agriculture and war as professions suitable for a citizen dismisses the mechanical or ignoble arts — *αἵ γε βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι*. The scions of the well-to-do Athenian families in the second half of the Fifth Century B.C. would also have looked askance at the illiberal arts.<sup>52</sup>

So public office was the only career open to young men of good family. If the State were democratic they needed to be able to speak eloquently in order to persuade the popular Assembly: even in an oligarchic State the citizens had to be able to address the ruling Council.<sup>53</sup> The Sophists were willing to teach such an education for public life. As Jaeger declares, "Political education logically became rhetorical education."<sup>54</sup> As Bonnard relates, many of the wares offered by the Sophists could be "a valuable trump-card in the hands of a young politician in a hurry to make his name."<sup>55</sup> Plato's Protagoras is quite clear regarding what he professes to teach his pupils:

Young man, if you come to me, your gain will be this. The very day you join me, you will go home a better man, and the same the next day. Each day you will make progress toward a better state.... When he comes to me, Hippocrates will not be put through the same things that another



Sophist would inflict on him. The others treat their pupils badly; these young men, who have deliberately turned their backs on specialization, they take and plunge into special studies again, teaching them arithmetic and astronomy and geometry and music — here he glanced at Hippias — but from me he will learn only what he has come to learn. What is that subject ? The proper care of his personal affairs, so that he may best manage his own household, and also of the state's affairs, so as to become a real power in the city, both as speaker and man of action.

(Socrates:) Do I follow you ? said I. I take you to be describing the art of politics, and promising to make men good citizens.

That, said he, is exactly what I profess to do. 56

In the Meno Socrates recommends that Meno visit the Sophists in order that he might

acquire the kind of wisdom and virtue which fits men to manage an estate or govern a city, to look after their parents, and to entertain and send off guests in proper style, both their own countrymen and foreigners. 57

This education is essentially that of political areté and most Sophists professed to teach it. Gorgias, however, refused to be included among those who taught areté — in fact, he laughed at them. His claim was to make good speakers.<sup>58</sup>

But Boyd<sup>59</sup> sees a distinction between the political tyros and a second group of youths who desired education for its own sake and who were more attracted by the old tradition of Greek thought.<sup>60</sup>

These youths, too, sought guidance from the Sophists but usually ones who were influenced by the Pythagoreans and the mathematical sciences. Rather than Grammar, Logic, Rhetoric (which later became the medieval trivium) these youths learned Arithmetic, Astronomy, Harmonics, Geometry (the medieval quadrivium) at the feet of the Sophists. So it might be quite wrong, as Walden suggests, to deny that some



youths were impelled by intellectual curiosity to learn about the world.<sup>61</sup> Not everyone who listened to the Sophists was primarily interested in the practical utilitarian advice which they could offer; some were probably more eager to listen to the purely philosophical aspects of their thought. In the Symposium of Plato, Alcibiades addressing Phaedrus, Agathon, Eryximachus, Pausanias, Aristodemus, Aristophanes, even Socrates himself, declares that they have all experienced the madness and the passion of the philosopher in his pursuit of wisdom:

and every one of you has had his taste of this philosophical frenzy, this sacred rage      62

In effect, Alcibiades was probably speaking for many Athenian citizens. At any rate, as Scoon observes, Socrates seems to have had no trouble finding students who were willing to attend to his essentially non vocational philosophy.<sup>63</sup>

#### Who were the Sophists' Students ?

As Jaeger observes, from the very beginning it was the aim of the Sophists in Athens, democracy though it was, not to educate the people but rather the leaders of the people. In a sense they were to teach the new aristocracy, those who wished to become politicians and the ultimate leaders of the State.<sup>64</sup> Power considers that they were little interested in training ordinary men in order that they might vote or even take part in discussions of public affairs. He also asserts that it would be wrong to imagine that the Sophists participated in any democratic movement in Athens. The majority of





their students were of the upper classes: "the Sophists aimed their teaching toward leadership and social success and were indifferent to the untutored common man whose need for a basic civic education was clear."<sup>65</sup> Frederick Beck makes the point that though a number

of Sophists favoured equal educational opportunities, still in practice they were only willing to offer their teaching to those who possessed money enough to pay for it and they consequently did not care what was the social background or pedigree of their

students.<sup>66</sup> It is clear that the Sophists were willing to cater to the needs of the nouveaux riches who were seeking power under the new democratic regime. However, as Marrou declares, they certainly did not ignore the old hereditary ruling class. For the new democracy still engaged most of its leaders from the old aristocratic families for a long time and many of the Sophists' students came from such a background as well as from more newly rich families.<sup>67</sup>

With regard to the Sophists' clientele it is interesting to consult a passage in the Protagoras<sup>68</sup> where the names of a number of pupils of Protagoras are given among whom are the upper class Callias and two of Pericles' sons. Another, said to be the most famous of his pupils, was Antimoerus of Mende who was studying professionally in order to become a Sophist.<sup>69</sup>

Following behind Protagoras, besides a number of Athenians, was a band of foreigners — "Protagoras draws them from every city that he passes through, charming them with his voice like Orpheus, and they follow spellbound."<sup>70</sup> It would be

natural if these attentive foreigners were welcomed by Protagoras as they would constitute a good advertisement for his teaching wares.



If a large number of the leaders of the Democracy were of an aristocratic background still many of the more powerful voices in the changed political climate of Athens were of the nouveaux riches. With democratic privileges being given to the common citizens the aristocrats and the upper classes saw their political control weakening. Many upper class Athenian youths turned to the Sophists for help in the face of the democratic threat. In fact, according to Dodds, much of the content of the Sophists' teaching was largely dictated by the demands of their students and the main subject desired by their aristocratic neophytes was the practical process of attaining personal ascendancy in a democratic regime.<sup>71</sup> John Burnet asserts that much of what was taught these upper class youths was concerned with how to succeed in a democracy when one is not oneself a member of the ruling democracy. In fact, Protagoras's pupils were more likely to be engaged in conspiring against the Democracy rather than being involved in legislation. Many of the Sophists' pupils were those who would later be involved in the oligarchic movements.<sup>72</sup> Havelock suggests that the political theory taught by the Sophists may have been "a thinly disguised apologia for oligarchy".<sup>73</sup> Sir Earnest Barker offers the following analysis why so many of the wealthy wished to sit at the feet of the Sophists:

The rich were anxious to learn; but they were anxious to learn for their own ends. They wished to learn eloquence in order to escape with immunity from accusations before the popular courts: they wished to learn practical ability in order to control elections, to gain what they regarded as their due influence in the State, and ultimately to modify the constitution in an oligarchical direction. 74



### Dislike Shown Towards The Sophists

It is clear, though the Sophists were certainly popular among a certain segment of the Athenian population, that there was also a distinct dislike and antagonism directed against them by many others. In fact, much of the evidence on which we rely for piecing together our account of the Sophists comes from writers and commentators who were decidedly anti-Sophistic. For example Plato, one of our main sources for the lives and thought of the early Sophists, consistently castigates these teachers in his Dialogues. In the Sophist Plato defines a Sophist as 1) the hired hunter of rich young men; 2) a sort of merchant of learning as nourishment for the soul; 3) a retail dealer in the same wares; 4) one who sells the products of his own manufacture; 5) an athlete in debate, appropriating that subdivision of contention which consists in the art of eristic; 6) a purifier of the soul from conceits that block the way to understanding.<sup>75</sup> Plato considers all these definitions pejorative with the possible exception of the last.<sup>76</sup>

The Stranger in Plato's Sophist declares that the art of the Sophist

may be traced as a branch of the appropriative, acquisitive family — which hunts animals, — living — land — tame animals; which hunts man, — privately — for hire, — taking money in exchange — having the semblance of education; and this is termed Sophistry, and is a hunt after young men of wealth and rank — such is the conclusion.      77

A little later the Stranger truly denounces "the wonderful Sophist" by describing him as "the money-making species of the Eristic, disputatious, controversial, pugnacious, combative, acquisitive family, as the argument has already proven."<sup>78</sup> In the Meno Anytus





exclaims that the Sophists are "the manifest ruin and corruption of anyone who come into contact with them."<sup>79</sup> Many other examples could be provided to illustrate Plato's antipathy towards these teachers.

Xenophon likens the Sophists to prostitutes for they sell their wisdom to anyone who offers money.<sup>80</sup> In fact, Xenophon asserts that the very word "Sophist" is a disgrace to right thinking men:

But the "sophists" talk to deceive and write for their own gain and are of no benefit to anyone; for none of them is wise or ever became so, but it is enough for each one of them to be called a "sophist", which is an insult, at least to men of sound understanding. 81

The conservative Aristophanes parodies and lampoons the Sophists in his comedies, particularly the Clouds, and it is clear that he is uttering sentiments which are warmly received by many of his audience. Aristotle also thinks little of the profession of Sophist:

For the sophist's craft is an apparent wisdom but not a real one, and the sophist is a money-maker by apparent but not real wisdom. 82

However, Aristotle is writing after the age of the Sophists with whom we are concerned in this work and he is, perhaps, thinking more of those Sophists of the Fourth Century B.C., many of whom were eristic tricksters and charlatans resembling the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus in many respects.

It will be worthwhile to attempt to explain why such invective was displayed towards these teachers. First of all, it is probable that many upright Athenian citizens considered that the art of rhetoric taught by many of the Sophists was leading the youth of the city



into habits of dishonesty and untruthfulness. It was realized that a persuasive speaker, well-trained by the Sophists, could easily mislead the Ecclesia and the law courts. Also many thought that the wealthy man, who alone could be trained in the art of persuasion by the Sophists, possessed a most undemocratic power in the polis.<sup>83</sup>

The political and religious views of some of the Sophists certainly did not endear them to many conservative Athenians. The notion of many of them that human society was largely conventional, a social contract, and that the strong man has the right to power was anathema to orthodox democrats. Also many Sophists were considered to be highly sceptical with regard to religious matters — vide the relativism and agnosticism of Protagoras, and the frank epistemological doubts of Gorgias. Prodicus also had the reputation of being an atheist.<sup>84</sup> It was mainly through the influence of the Sophists that Critias, though not strictly a Sophist himself, could offer a distinctly rationalistic origin of religion. Religion had been invented by mankind in order to preserve morality:

Next, since laws hindered them from committing obvious crimes by force, yet they acted secretly; it seems to me that at this point some clever and wise man <for the first time> invented fear <of the gods> for mortals, that the wicked might experience fear, even if they act or say or think <something> in secret. 85

Kenneth Freeman is of the opinion that the fact that the Sophists took fees in exchange for their "wisdom", contrary to usual custom, also was instrumental in exciting prejudice against them. Socrates never asked for fees, whereas Plato and Aristotle were



content to accept presents.<sup>86</sup> Plato in the Apology has Socrates deny that he has ever charged a fee for his teaching,<sup>87</sup> the reason, according to Xenophon, was that such a practice limited his freedom. Those who charged fees were obliged to talk with all from whom they took money whereas Socrates could choose his company.<sup>88</sup> Bury links the Sophists' charging of money for their teaching with their unsavoury reputation. On the one hand, there was the traditional prejudice against those who sold their services and, on the other, there was a distinct jealousy on the part of those poor who could not afford the fees and who were consequently at a disadvantage in political affairs compared to the Sophist trained man.<sup>89</sup>

The Sophists, who were mainly foreigners, lived as Metics at Athens thereby living as near social equals with the citizens but without enjoying political rights.<sup>90</sup> (Because they were forbidden by law from developing a political career for themselves they, as Guthrie writes, employed their skills to teach political areté to others.)<sup>91</sup> However, xenophobia was rampant in Athens and, as Burnet declares, comic poets and orators always found it to be very effective to charge that somebody had some foreign connection.<sup>92</sup> There is no doubt that the foreign origin of the majority of the Sophists accounted in part for the hostility shown to them by many of the conservative element in Athens. The notion of the self-sufficiency of the polis was particularly strong at this time and there was a natural distrust of foreign teachers who by teaching radical doctrines to the youth might undermine the social foundations of the





State.<sup>93</sup> But if these Sophists of the second half of the Fifth Century B.C. were nearly all foreigners many of the Sophist-like teachers of the Fourth Century B.C. were Athenian born. The Athenians learned all the arts and knowledge of the early Sophists and were soon not so dependent on foreigners.<sup>94</sup>

The time when the Sophists were prominent in Athens was the period when the city had become, in the words attributed by Thucydides to Pericles, "the School of Hellas".<sup>95</sup> However, as intimated earlier, Athens was also suffering from a certain moral decline. Many considered that people such as Alcibiades and the oligarch Critias were representative of this deterioration and some contemporaries blamed the unsettling doctrines of certain of the Sophists for their degeneracy.<sup>96</sup> Suspicion arose regarding these new teachers — they were considered to be imbued with superficiality and shallowness and to be sellers of tricks rather than to be true philosophers. Certain people in authority deemed that the Sophists were corrupting the youth of Athens, and thereby Athens itself.<sup>97</sup> As Brumbaugh observes, while the account of Protagoras's expulsion and the burning of his books in 418 B.C.<sup>98</sup> may be apocryphal still it is a further indication that to a certain section of the Athenians the Sophists were by no means popular.<sup>99</sup> Even if Protagoras was not in fact expelled there is ample evidence, as Kerferd points out,<sup>100</sup> that many prominent exponents of new thought were prosecuted for Impiety in the second half of the Fifth Century B.C. Included were Socrates, Anaxagoras, Diagoras, Euripides, Pheidias (on a charge of



embezzlement), and Pericles' mistress, Aspasia. Peter Green calls this persecution by the reactionaries a sort of "Pre-Christian Inquisition".<sup>101</sup> It would be highly improbable if many of this old school element did not look askance at certain of the teachings of the Sophists and seek to take action against them. Kerferd argues that in this regard the patronage, friendship and encouragement of Pericles shown to many Sophists did much to shield them from conservative attacks.<sup>102</sup>

On the other hand, the Sophists could also come under fire from the democratic element. Kenneth Freeman suggests that because many of their pupils came from wealthy aristocratic backgrounds and were inclined to espouse oligarchy democrats could consider the Sophists as the nurturers of tyrants and oligarchs — "The odium of resultant class-separation fell upon the teachers." The main reason for Socrates being put to death by the Democracy was that he had been the teacher of Alcibiades and Critias.<sup>103</sup> Kenneth Dover quotes Aeschines who was writing in the second half of the Fourth Century B.C.:

men of Athens, you executed Socrates the sophist because he was shown to have taught Kritias, one of the thirty men who overthrew the democracy.      104

(However this does not explain why Plato treated the Sophists severely, for he was certainly no lover of the democracy which had killed his favourite, Socrates. As we shall see later, Plato's main criticism of the Sophists centred on the fact that in no respect did their teachings and practices measure up to what he defined as



"philosophy". Rather these teachers stressed the mundane and the utilitarian. How to attain material success in this world was their aim. On the other hand, philosophy for Plato was concerned with the non-material world, the world of "Forms".)

There is an interesting passage in Plato's Protagoras where the Sophist declares that the Sophistic art is of great antiquity but that the earlier Sophists were afraid to admit their profession fearing the odium of the people. Instead they hid under various disguises — for example, poets, hierophants, prophets, gymnastic-teachers, musicians.<sup>105</sup> Protagoras openly acknowledges that he is a Sophist but we feel that he is taking an apologetic view of his chosen profession — a view that was perhaps rendered necessary by the antagonism of society:

I therefore have always gone the opposite way to my predecessors'. I admit to being a Sophist and an educator, and I consider this a better precaution than the other — admission rather than denial. I have devised other precautions as well, so that, if heaven will forgive the boast, I come to no harm through being a confessed Sophist, though I have been many years in the profession.      106

The notion that the Sophists sometimes concealed their profession is echoed in Plutarch's life of Pericles where Pericles' music teacher is said to have been Damon. In reality

Damon seems to have been a consummate Sophist, but to have taken refuge behind the name of music in order to conceal from the multitude his real power.      107

However, as Copleston points out, when attempting to weigh the respect or disrespect accorded to the Sophists by the citizenry of Athens it should be remembered that they were often selected to act





as ambassadors of their cities, an honour which would hardly imply that they were regarded, at any rate by their own fellow citizens, as mere mountebanks.<sup>108</sup> Hippias often went on embassies on behalf of his native city, Elis, going most often and on the most important matters to Lacedaemon.<sup>109</sup> Gorgias of Leontini was also selected to represent his city on an official mission to Athens:

The eminent Gorgias, the Sophist of Leontini, came here from his home on an official mission, selected because he was the ablest statesman of his city. 110

Prodicus of Ceos is also reputed to have represented his city on many occasions on diplomatic missions to Athens and while there to have given a number of private lectures thereby amassing a large sum of money.<sup>111</sup> Protagoras of Abdera, a friend of Pericles, must have been well respected at Athens if Heraclides Ponticus is correct. For, according to Diogenes Laertius, Heraclides asserts that Protagoras was chosen to write laws for the new colony at Thurii, an enterprise controlled by Athens.<sup>112</sup>

It has been said by many, contemporaries of the Sophists as well as later critics and commentators, that these teachers and Socrates were responsible for the rapid decline of the old manners and morality of Athens.<sup>113</sup> Nevertheless, as Sagan declares, to say that the Sophists were the cause of Athens' moral degeneracy rather than one of its main symptoms is like arguing that tuberculosis is caused by its fever. The Sophists did not create the Peloponnesian War, they were not responsible for the disastrous Sicilian expedition, nor were they to blame for the Athenian atrocities against Melos and



Scione.<sup>114</sup> Couch and Geer echo these sentiments, also asseverating that the demand for the Sophists existed before they came — they did not create it.<sup>115</sup> As W.T. Stace declares

The Sophists were the children of their time, and the interpreters of their age. Their philosophical teachings were simply the crystalization of the impulses which governed the life of the people into abstract principles and maxims. 116

In this regard, Guthrie reminds us that Plato has Socrates say in Book 6 of the Republic that the Sophists teach nothing different from the beliefs of the many which they express in their assemblies.<sup>117</sup>

#### The Evidence for the Sophists

It should be stressed, at the outset, that the evidence which we possess for the Sophists is quite scanty. Although the Sophists wrote concerning their doctrines very little of their writings is extant and consequently it is notoriously difficult to be precise about the exact nature of the views of individual Sophists. As Jaeger says, the epideixeis which they composed were written to impress their immediate pupils and it is natural that they should not survive. The Sophists were more concerned with men who listened to what they taught rather than with those who would read. They did not enunciate their doctrines so that future generations could read them.<sup>118</sup> Guthrie writes that because much of their written work was set down in educational handbooks later teachers, including Aristotle, would incorporate it in their own handbooks and that these would then be considered to



surpass the original handbooks.<sup>119</sup> Also some critics suggest that the fact that only scanty fragments of the Sophists' writings remain would seem to indicate that there was little of lasting value in their ideas.<sup>120</sup>

It should be emphasized also that many of the authorities and commentators on whom we rely for evidence often lived a very long time, sometimes hundreds of years, after the Sophists and accordingly much of this evidence should be treated with circumspection. However, the main problem which we have concerning Sophistic evidence is that we depend very heavily on Plato and Aristotle (and to a lesser extent on Xenophon and Isocrates) as sources, and these writers were decidedly anti-Sophistic. Plato, who is perhaps our chief source for these teachers, is prejudiced against them and his evidence may be suspect. Marrou considers that Plato's treatment is very equivocal and that it is hard to ascertain "where invention and caricature and calumny begin and where they end."<sup>121</sup> Beck considers that it is possible that Plato often selected the weaker theories of the Sophists in order that these men might be represented in a poor light in his dialogues. Also, through the careful use of dialectic Plato could consistently place the Sophists' arguments in the most pregnable positions without affording them adequate opportunity to defend them. But Beck inclines to the view that the Platonic conversations in which Sophists figure are basically historical. If they did not actually happen as Plato reported them they could possibly have happened.<sup>122</sup> Thus Beck would probably consider that Plato's treatment of the conversations in





which Sophists figure is analogous to Thucydides' handling of his speeches.<sup>123</sup> When considering the Platonic dialogues as evidence for the Sophists and their teachings it is worthwhile to remember Havelock who declares that Plato was not an historian but a philosopher "and the standards governing the literary composition of his day gave wide latitude to the dramatic manipulation of historical figures."<sup>124</sup> However, it is essential to bear in mind that Plato was definitely anti-Sophistic and that he may have misrepresented their teaching. Indeed, his great authority has coloured much of subsequent thought regarding the Sophists. Kerferd speaks of "Plato's profoundly hostile treatment of them, presented with all the power of his literary genius and driven home with a philosophical impact that is little short of overwhelming."<sup>125</sup>

One of the results of the antagonism of Plato and Aristotle towards the teachings of the Sophists was that not much attention was paid to them by Hellenistic scholars, and their works were little read. Also the fact that the Sophists were probably included in Aristotle's works on rhetorical writings (and ignored in his history of philosophy in the Metaphysics) could help to account why this aspect of their work was so strongly emphasized later and other, perhaps more philosophical, aspects were neglected.<sup>126</sup> Furthermore, as Untersteiner states, the philosophical systems which arose after the decline of the early Sophistic period had very different purposes and "therefore were led to dramatize an antithesis which was bound to result in a DAMNATIO MEMORIAE of their predecessors."<sup>127</sup> In short, as Havelock



declares, our sources for the Sophists' thought "are imperfect and imprecise and the task of piecing them together to make a coherent picture requires philological discipline, a good deal of finesse, and also an exercise of over-all judgement which must be content to leave some things unsettled. We can never pretend to know the exact form in which Protagoras cast his thought."<sup>128</sup>

It is beyond the scope of this present work to discuss the involved question whether Socrates was a Sophist or not. Certainly many contemporary Athenians would have considered him to be one and indeed, Aristophanes, the playwright of comedies, reviled him as a Sophist in the Clouds. But in the present work I intend to follow the tradition which represents Socrates and the Sophists as being mutually antagonistic towards each other with regard to the means and ends of their teaching, although I realize that the tradition owes much to Plato's bias in favour of his mentor. It is also outside the range of this work to consider the career and teachings of Isocrates who held himself to be a Sophist.<sup>129</sup> This long-lived Athenian (436-338 B.C.) had been a student of prominent Sophists in his youth, in particular Gorgias. However, Isocrates is essentially a Fourth Century figure — he set up his school in about 390 B.C. — and I am in the main concerned with those early Sophists of the latter part of the Fifth Century B.C. Isocrates himself wished to be disassociated from the other Sophists and in c.390 B.C. he wrote his treatise Against the Sophists, although the chief reason for its composition was to serve as an advertisement for his newly opened school of rhetoric.



In this work he venomously attacks the Sophists. However, he is perhaps not thinking of the greater Sophists but of such captious wranglers as Plato's Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus. In the first place, Isocrates inveighs against the Eristics who "pretend to search for truth, but straightaway at the beginning of their professions attempt to deceive us with lies."<sup>130</sup> He also condemns those Sophists who profess to teach the skills of rhetoric to anyone regardless of their native ability and practical experience; they "undertake to transmit the science of discourse as simply as they would teach the letters of the alphabet."<sup>131</sup> Furthermore, these Sophists "have no interest whatever in the truth."<sup>132</sup> Isocrates is especially afraid lest the opprobrium stemming from these ignoble Sophists might encompass himself who is in the same profession,<sup>134</sup> a fear which he reechoes nearly forty years later in his Antidosis.<sup>134</sup>





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At the end of 478B.C. a number of Greek States formed the Delian League or the Confederacy of Delos, the purposes of which were to take vengeance on Persia and also to present an united Greek front against the possibility of future invasions. The tribute to be paid by the respective allies was to be placed on the island of Delos (most probably in the temple of Apollo). It was soon clear that the allies were under the hegemony of Athens, by far the most powerful and influential State. It is commonly asserted that this hegemony gradually turned into an empire after the transfer of the tribute monies from Delos to Athens. Athens, in effect, could now spend the treasury as it wished. (see reference 33).

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it is to some extent misleading. There was no longer an alliance of independent states, but there was never a unified state with, say, overseas provinces and a full central organization, nor was there ever a colonial empire in the modern sense. The Greeks spoke of 'rule' (archē). The earlier 'hegemony' as a free leadership of free states, especially in war, turned into a system in which increasingly by various means, sometimes not without the collaboration of the local demos, the 'allies' became 'subjects'. Though it was never legally nor completely brought about, the rule of Athens was established by garrisons, tributes, Athenian inspectors, the presence of Athenian navy, various decrees imposing political or economic or jurisdictional dependence, and possibly the introduction of a democratic constitution in an allied state.  
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58. PLATO, MENO 95C.
59. BOYD and KING, op. cit., p. 24.
60. Years before, Heracleitus had said:  
 τὴν παιδείαν ἕτερον ἥλιον εἶναι τοῖς πεπαιδευμένοις  
 "Education is another sun to those who are educated."  
 HERACLEITUS, fragment 134 of Diels and Kranz, op. cit.,



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see also PLATO, Phaedrus 257D.

Plato certainly treated the Sophists harshly; however, it would be wrong to consider that he was always disrespectful to them in his dialogues. As Tejera reminds us, Protagoras is treated well in the dialogue of the same name, and in the Sophist not every definition of Sophist is pejorative. "In this Pirandellian matter of the author's respect of his characters," it is also worth bearing in mind the respect shown to Gorgias by Plato in the Gorgias. (TEJERA, V., Modes of Greek Thought, Appleton-Century-Crofts: New York, 1971, p. 135.) But the arrogant Hippias comes off badly in the Hippias Major as do the two brothers in the Euthydemus. Kenneth Freeman declares that Plato's account of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus is probably not to be taken too seriously. However, these Sophists represented a kind which could be found in Athens: "Among the Sophists were some apparently who were merely jesters, and used their brains solely in arousing laughter." (FREEMAN, Kenneth, op. cit., p. 173.) They are more representative of the second generation of Sophists. As Crito says to Socrates: "I don't know either of them, Socrates. They are another new kind of Sophist, I suppose." (PLATO, Euthydemus 271B, translated by R.K. Sprague in The Older Sophists, (edited by R.K. Sprague), University of South Carolina Press: U.S.A., 1972. Appendix 1).

As frequent reference will be made in the rest of this theseis to the material for the Sophists collected in Sprague it will be convenient to list the translators of the various passages here. Future footnotes which include translated quotations will just refer to the number of the passage in Sprague but without mentioning the translator.

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113. See Glover, op. cit., p. 164  
 Very often, indeed, the Sophists did support the old fashioned behaviour and beliefs but they only did this, according to Walton and Higgins because it helped them to fit in. WALTON, Brian G and HIGGINS, W.R., The Greek and Roman Worlds, University Press of America: U.S.A., 1980, p. 372.
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 However, Xenophon in his Memorabilia relates that Euthydemus, the friend of Socrates, had made a large collection of the works of famous poets and Sophists: γράμματα πολλὰ συνειλεγμένον ποιητῶν τε καὶ σοφιστῶν τῶν εὐδοκίμουτάτων  
 XENOPHON, Memorabilia IV. II. 1.
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124. HAVELOCK, op. cit., p. 159.
125. KERFERD, op. cit., p. 1.  
 Gouldner writes:

Plato's attack on the Sophists is reminiscent of Marx' attack on the utopian socialists: both men are able to make succeeding generations define their opponents as they themselves had; both use a single opprobrious term





for opponents who, in fact, hold a wide variety of views.

GOULDNER, Alvin W., Enter Plato, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers: New York, 1965, p. 193.

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## CHAPTER THREE

### THE INDIVIDUAL SOPHISTS — THEIR LIVES AND WORKS

#### Introduction

In this chapter I wish to provide brief biographical details and the titles of the works of certain of the more prominent early Sophists. As Kerferd declares, we know the names of about twenty-six Sophists who were active during the period c.460-380 B.C. Of these eight or nine were particularly well known and, together with the unknown authors of the Anonymous Iamblich and the Dissoi Logoi, are usually treated as a group in works dealing with the Sophists.<sup>1</sup> The best repository of material dealing with the lives and fragments of the Sophists is Volume II of Diels' and Kranz' Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker. This Sophistic material has been translated into English as The Older Sophists (edited by R.K. Sprague) which also contains a new edition of Antiphon and Euthydemus. In my treatment of the Sophists' lives I confine myself to the men mentioned in the above works. Although it is clear that some of the Sophists were more significant and influential figures than others — Protagoras was, by any reckoning, a more profound thinker than, say, Euthydemus or the authors of the two anonymous Sophistic works — and that a case could be made for grouping these teachers according to degrees of importance and depth and range of thought, for convenience it seems best to keep the order followed by Diels and Kranz and also by Sprague.



## The Individual Men

### a) Protagoras

The greatest of the early Sophists was Protagoras who, according to Diogenes Laertius, was the son of either Artemon or Maeandrius.<sup>2</sup> Apollodorus favours Maeandrius as also does Philostratus who declares that Protagoras' father was a man of great wealth among the Thracians.<sup>3</sup> However, Hesychius states that Artemon was his father.<sup>4</sup> All authorities agree that Protagoras was a native of Abdera (also the birthplace of Democritus).<sup>5</sup> Although Eupolis in the play Flatterers states "Inside is Protagoras of Teos"<sup>6</sup> Guthrie explains this by revealing that Abdera had been colonized from Teos and that it was easier for metrical reasons to refer to him as being *Τήιος* rather than as *Ἀβδηρίτης*.<sup>7</sup>

There is conflicting evidence about his dates. Plato has Hippias state that Protagoras was much older than he.<sup>8</sup> In the dialogue bearing his name Protagoras states that there is none in the room whose father he might not be. Among the company were Socrates, Hippias, Prodicus.<sup>9</sup> Diogenes relates that some say that he died at the age of ninety while he was on a journey.<sup>10</sup> The same author states that Apollodorus declares that Protagoras died at seventy, adding that he had been employed in the Sophistical profession for forty years and that he was in his prime in the eighty-fourth Olympiad (444-441 B.C.).<sup>11</sup> Hesychius thinks that he died at the age of ninety when his ship sank while sailing to Sicily, and agrees that he was a Sophist for forty





years.<sup>12</sup> Plato in the Meno states that Protagoras died at the younger age, seventy.<sup>13</sup> Many scholars tend to agree with Plato and Apollodorus that Protagoras' life was closer to seventy years than ninety. When Apollodorus stated that Protagoras was in his prime at the eighty-fourth Olympiad this is usually taken to mean that he was about forty years old (a man's "floruit" is generally reckoned to signify that he is forty). Apollodorus is probably basing his view that Protagoras was in his prime in 444-441 on the evidence of Heraclides Ponticus that Protagoras framed the laws for the new colony of Thurii founded in 444 B.C.<sup>14</sup> If indeed Protagoras died aged seventy and was about forty in 444-441 this would mean that his date of birth was c. 484-481 B.C. and that he died c. 414-411.<sup>15</sup>

We have evidence that Protagoras did in fact live till at least 411 B.C. for Diogenes tells us that he got into trouble at Athens and was accused by the son of Polyzelus, Pythodorus, one of the Four Hundred. We are told also that Aristotle claims that it was Euathlus who laid the charge.<sup>16</sup> Untersteiner seems to agree that Protagoras lived until about 411 B.C. whereas Kerferd and Guthrie favour a date closer to 420 B.C.<sup>17</sup> Burnet states that his death was in the early years of the Peloponnesian War.<sup>18</sup> Burnet reminds us that Protagoras is spoken of as being dead for a long time in the Theaetetus, the scene of which is supposed to be taking place shortly before the trial of Socrates.<sup>19</sup>

Protagoras' exact date of birth is equally difficult to pin down. Philostratus in his Lives of the Sophists declares that Protagoras'



father had arranged for his son to receive instruction from Persian Magi at the time of Xerxes' invasion of Greece in 480 B.C. For he "entertained Xerxes himself in his house and by means of gifts won from him for his son the privilege of associating with the magi."<sup>20</sup> Some scholars find this pedagogical contact with the Persians improbable on purely chronological grounds for if it were true, they conclude, it would imply the doubtful hypothesis that Protagoras' date of birth was about 500 B.C. However, Untersteiner states that if Protagoras were born about 490 B.C. it is possible that his wealthy father arranged for his son to be instructed by the Persians even at that early age in order to widen his outlook.<sup>21</sup>

There is also the problem that Apuleius declares that Protagoras:

was also a contemporary and fellow townsman of Democritus the natural philosopher (it was from him that he got his learning).      22

The usual date given for Democritus' birth is 460 B.C. which would indeed be satisfactory if we accepted that Protagoras was an older contemporary by at least two decades. But it is unlikely that a much older Protagoras received much of his learning from a much younger Democritus. Other authorities agree that Protagoras was the pupil or disciple of Democritus.<sup>23</sup> Diogenes writes that Democritus adopted the Sophist:

For he used to be a porter, as Epicurus says somewhere; indeed this was the occasion of his having been adopted by Democritus,      24

Hesychius declares:



He was a porter, but after meeting Democritus he became a philosopher and turned to oratory. 25

However, on chronological grounds it seems that Freeman is correct in concluding that Protagoras was not the pupil of Democritus:

For Democritus was not born until about 460 B.C., and we are expressly told that Protagoras began his professional career at the age of thirty. In fact, the story of his relationship to Democritus must fall to the ground in any case, unless Protagoras was not born until about 470 B.C. at the earliest; and this contradicts all that Plato says of him. 26

On the other hand, if it is accepted that Democritus was too young to be the teacher of Protagoras still, as Untersteiner states, "one may perhaps assume an influence exercised by Democritus on the sophist apart from an actual and specific master-pupil relationship."<sup>27</sup> With regard to Protagoras' date of birth most scholars favour about the year 490 B.C., Kerferd stating that it was no later than that date.<sup>28</sup> Burnet, however, is of the opinion that Protagoras was born no later than 500 B.C.<sup>29</sup> Although these dates cannot be absolutely correct, still for our needs we are more interested in relative rather than absolute dates, as Guthrie suggests.<sup>30</sup>

We do not know when Protagoras first visited Athens nor how often afterwards. Nor do we know how long he stayed in Athens on his visits. We know from Plato's Protagoras that the Sophist was in Athens in 433 B.C., the date when the action of that dialogue takes place. We also know from that dialogue that Protagoras had been in Athens at least once before that date. Hippocrates declares that the "Last time he came to Athens I was still a child".<sup>31</sup> As Kerferd remarks, it is





wrong to infer from this passage that Protagoras had been in Athens only once before: the Greek is *τὸ πρότερον* "previously" and not *τὸ πρῶτον* "the first time".<sup>32</sup> Also it would be difficult to believe that Protagoras had only been in Athens once before the visit depicted in the Protagoras: "his close association with Pericles and his selection by him to frame the constitution for the new colony at Thurii must mean that he was already well known at Athens by 444 B.C."<sup>33</sup> At any rate we are sure that Protagoras was in Athens in 444 B.C. and was already well known and respected by Pericles at that date. It may perhaps be assumed that Protagoras visited Athens again in 421 B.C., a visit which occasioned Eupolis' attack in his play Flatterers which was produced in that year. As Athenaeus states: "Now in this play Eupolis introduces Protagoras as being in town."<sup>34</sup> Eupolis is highly critical concerning the Sophist:

The scoundrel puts on false airs about what's in the sky,  
but eats what comes from the earth.      35

If Diogenes is correct and Protagoras was laid under accusation by Pythodorus, one of the Four Hundred, in 411 B.C.<sup>36</sup> we can assert that Protagoras was in Athens at this date, making a minimum of four visits to the city. There is also the evidence of the Hippias Major that Protagoras had been to Sicily:

I went to Sicily once while Protagoras was living there.  
He had a great reputation and was a far older man than I,      37

Protagoras was a respected and influential visitor to Athens and even Plato was quite deferential in his treatment of this Sophist. The obvious evidence for this respect stems from the fact that he was



chosen to make the laws for Thurii in 444 B.C. He was an intimate of some of the leading men at Athens, most notably Pericles. Plutarch in his life of Pericles declares that Protagoras spent a whole day discussing fine legal points with Pericles.<sup>38</sup> His regard for Pericles is shown in the consolation he showed him after the death of his two sons in the Plague.<sup>39</sup> Protagoras obviously knew Euripides for we are told that he read his work On the Gods in the tragedian's house. The same authority, Diogenes, admits that the reading could have taken place in the Lyceum.<sup>40</sup> Protagoras also knew the wealthy Callias at whose house he stayed according to the Protagoras.<sup>41</sup>

Although Protagoras was well received at Athens there is a strong tradition that the favourable climate eventually turned against him. The tradition states that because of his alleged agnosticism, or more likely his alleged atheism, his books were gathered in from all who possessed copies and were burned in the marketplace<sup>42</sup> while he himself suffered banishment.<sup>43</sup> The date of the burning of the books has been placed as early as 444-441 B.C.<sup>44</sup> Sextus relates "that the Athenians voted the death penalty against him. He fled and died in an accident at sea. This story is also mentioned by Timon of Phlius in the second book of his Lampoons. His account follows:

.... afterwards, too, to Protagoras among the sophists, a man with clear voice, eye straight on the mark, and able for any work. They made up their minds to make ashes of his books because he put it in writing that he did not know nor could he perceive what or who the gods are. His words were cautious and reasonable. When this did him no good he made a run for it, hoping to avoid the cold drink of Socrates and a trip to Hades." 45



The story of his shipwreck after fleeing Athens is echoed by other writers including Euripides in the Ixion.<sup>46</sup>

However, Kathleen Freeman refuses to accept the account of Protagoras' prosecution and banishment: "We know nothing of where Protagoras died, or how; but that his end was not violent and that he was never attacked or punished by the Athenians, is certain."<sup>47</sup> She bases her conclusion on "Plato's incontrovertible testimony" of Meno 91E where Socrates declares:

I believe he was nearly seventy when he died, and had been practicing for forty years, and all that time — indeed to this very day — his reputation has been consistently high. 48

She considers that if his books had been burned and he had suffered banishment Socrates (Plato) could not have spoken the above concerning his reputation. However, Guthrie's argument seems to overcome Freeman's objection. For he states that Plato's remarks concerning Protagoras' undiminished reputation are "not necessarily inconsistent with trial and conviction: he would have said the same about Socrates."<sup>49</sup>

We shall see later that Protagoras was the first to charge a fee for his teaching and that he amassed more money from his work as a Sophist than Pheidias and ten other sculptors. Diogenes declares that Protagoras invented the shoulder pad on which porters carry their loads.<sup>50</sup> Hesychius asserts that Protagoras had Isocrates the orator and Prodicus of Ceos as pupils.<sup>51</sup>

When we wish to record the titles of Protagoras' works it is immed-





imately obvious that we are on uncertain ground. Diogenes Laertius provides the following list: "The Art of Debating,<sup>52</sup> On Wrestling,<sup>53</sup> On Mathematics,<sup>54</sup> On Government, On Ambition, On the Virtues, On the Original State of Things,<sup>55</sup> On Those in Hades, On Human Errors, Direction, Trial over a Fee, Contradictory Arguments in Two Books."<sup>56</sup> Untersteiner believes that it is very unlikely that so many titles should belong to separate works. He considers, rather, that Diogenes' catalogue constitutes the subtitles of the Contradictory Arguments in Two Books. As he remarks, "The truth is that the ancients paid little heed to the titles of books."<sup>57</sup> Freeman also considers that many of Diogenes' titles do not represent separate works.<sup>58</sup>

Diogenes does not mention the important work which Sextus called the Refutations<sup>59</sup> and to which Plato gave the title Truth.<sup>60</sup> Protagoras' famous homo-mensura principle opens this work: "Man is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, of what is not that it is not." Another well known work of Protagoras was his treatise On The Gods which opened with the words: "Concerning the gods, I cannot know either that they exist or that they do not exist; for there is much to prevent one's knowing: the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of man's life."<sup>61</sup> Another work not included by Diogenes is the treatise On Being which is mentioned by Porphyry.<sup>62</sup> Untersteiner believes that the Great Speech<sup>63</sup> "can be nothing else but a title given by others to the Truth of Protagoras."<sup>64</sup>



### b) Xeniades of Corinth

Xeniades of Corinth, who is otherwise unknown, receives mention in Sextus' Against the Schoolmasters:

And Xenocrates the Corinthian, whom Democritus mentions, said that everything is false, that every sense-image and opinion lie, and that everything which comes to be, comes to be from the nonexistent, and everything which passes away, passes away into the nonexistent. Virtually he holds the same opinion as Xenophanes. 65

Without knowing the context from which this epistemological statement was taken and the arguments by which it was supported it is probably wiser not to read too much into it.

### c) Gorgias

Gorgias, as we are told by many authorities, was a native of Leontini in Sicily.<sup>66</sup> Leontini was a colony of Chalcis<sup>67</sup> and "belonged therefore to that Ionian world which was so quick to grasp the essential and dramatic significance of things in a vision both impartial and distinct."<sup>68</sup> He was the son of Charmantides<sup>69</sup> and brother of the physician Herodicus.<sup>70</sup> He is reputed to have been a student of Empedocles,<sup>71</sup> and Guthrie considers that this is likely though Gorgias could only have been a few years younger than his mentor.<sup>72</sup> It is impossible to be precise about his dates but the likeliest date of birth is about 490-485 B.C.<sup>73</sup> We cannot be sure about the length of his life but it was by all accounts long and probably passed the century mark:

It is said that Gorgias lived to the age of one hundred



and eight years without suffering physical incapacity from old age but sound of body to the end and with the mind of a young man. 74

The author of Long-Lived Men, Lucian, wrote that

Among the orators, Gorgias, whom some call a sophist, lived a hundred and eight years and died by abstaining from food. They say that when he was asked the reason for his prolonged old age and health with all his faculties he said it was because he never attended other people's parties. 75

Athenaeus relates that Gorgias lived long enough to read Plato's portrayal of him in the Gorgias which was probably written about 385 B.C.:<sup>76</sup>

It is reported that Gorgias, after reading the dialogue of Plato that bears his name, remarked to friends, "How beautifully Plato knows how to satirize !" It is also reported that after reading from Plato's dialogue aloud as part of a public lecture Gorgias remarked that neither had he ever spoken the words attributed to him nor had he heard Plato mention them before. 77

Pausanias recounts that "when Jason was ruling in Thessaly, though the school of Polycrates had acquired by no means little fame in Athens, he preferred Gorgias to Polycrates."<sup>78</sup> It is sometimes understood that this passage implies that Gorgias lived for some time at the court of Jason of Pherae (Jason ruled c. 380-370 B.C.) but, as Kerferd remarks, "the inference is quite unjustified since the story merely relates a comparison between Gorgias' brand of rhetoric with that of his pupil Polycrates."<sup>79</sup> However, there is no doubt that part of Gorgias' long life was spent in the Fourth Century B.C. Whether Gorgias lived at Jason's court or not it is almost certain that he spent at least some time in Thessaly, as we learn





from Isocrates and Plato.<sup>80</sup> Thessaly was wealthy — "its inhabitants were the most prosperous of the Greeks"<sup>81</sup> — and it was possible for Gorgias to make a lot of money here from his teaching. His death, whenever it was exactly, was peaceful. Aelian tells us that Gorgias

at the end of his life and in advanced old age, overtaken by a feeling of weakness, lay down and was gradually slipping off into sleep. When one of his friends came over to see him and asked what he was doing, Gorgias answered, "Sleep already begins to hand me over to his brother Death." 82

Gorgias travelled widely throughout Greece. Philostratus tells us that he was conspicuous at the Festivals, delivering his Pythian Speech at Delphi and his Olympic Speech at the Games in Olympia.<sup>83</sup> We know that Gorgias came to Athens in 427 B.C. on an embassy from Leontini seeking Athenian help against Syracuse. Diodorus Siculus tells us that

At this time in Sicily the people of Leontini, who were colonists of the Chalcideans but relatives of the Athenians, happened to be involved in war with the Syracusans. Being hard pressed in the war and in danger of being forcibly overrun because of the numerical superiority of the Syracusans, they sent ambassadors to Athens, asking the democracy to come to their aid as quickly as possible and to rescue their city from its dangers. The chief of the delegation was the orator Gorgias, in power of speech by far the most eminent of the men of his time. 84

Pausanias declares that Gorgias was accompanied to Athens by the orator Tisias.<sup>85</sup> He also lectured in Boeotia<sup>86</sup> and it seems that he made himself very unpopular in Argos.<sup>87</sup> It is probable that he returned to Athens where he delivered his Funeral Oration, perhaps shortly after the Peace of Nicias (421 B.C.):<sup>88</sup>



The Funeral Oration, which he delivered at Athens, was spoken over those who fell in the wars, whom the Athenians bury at public expense with eulogies, and it is composed with surpassing cleverness. For though inciting the Athenians against the Medes and Persians and contending for the same idea as in the Olympic Speech, he mentioned nothing about concord with the Greeks, since he was addressing the Athenians, who were eager for empire, which could not be obtained unless they adopted extremism, but he dwelt on praise of the victories over the Medes, showing that victories over the barbarians require hymns of celebration, victories over the Greeks require laments. 89

As with many successful men Gorgias found himself the target of others' hostility. We have mentioned the dislike that he encountered in Argos. Also Aristophanes makes him bear the brunt of his satire in the Birds and the Wasps.<sup>90</sup> Antisthenes attacks him in his Archelaus.<sup>91</sup> However, in general, Gorgias' career seems to have been highly successful and he secured admiration from many conspicuous individuals. He is reputed to have made much money<sup>92</sup> but to have left little, only ten thousand staters.<sup>93</sup>

A number of well known men are reported to have been his pupils. While at Athens in 427 B.C. Gorgias, according to Philostratus, attracted the attention of Critias, Alcibiades, Thucydides, and Pericles.<sup>94</sup> However, Pericles could not have met Gorgias on this occasion for he was by now dead, but he may have encountered the Sophist on an earlier occasion, perhaps in Sicily.<sup>95</sup> Gorgias obviously influenced the tragic poet Agathon who "often Gorgianizes in his iambic verse"<sup>96</sup> and also Aeschines the Socratic.<sup>97</sup> Suidas tells us that he was the teacher of Polus of Acragas, Pericles, Isocrates, and Alcidamus of Elaea, the last mentioned taking over the direction of



his school.<sup>98</sup> Quintilian mentions that the most famous of Gorgias' pupils was Isocrates.<sup>99</sup> Diodorus Siculus mentions Licymnius and Polus as being pupils.<sup>100</sup> Other students of Gorgias include Meno,<sup>101</sup> Protarchus,<sup>102</sup> Aristippus of Larisa,<sup>103</sup> his grand nephew Eumolpus,<sup>104</sup> and Proxenus of Boeotia.<sup>105</sup>

We learn from Suidas that Gorgias wrote a great deal.<sup>106</sup> Fragments and references survive from a number of his speeches: Pythian Speech,<sup>107</sup> Olympic Speech,<sup>108</sup> Funeral Oration,<sup>109</sup> Encomium for the People of Elis,<sup>110</sup> Encomium of Helen,<sup>111</sup> and a Defense on behalf of Palamedes.<sup>112</sup> His philosophical treatise entitled On the Nonexistent or On Nature was said by Olympiodorus to have been written in the eighty-fourth Olympiad (444-441 B.C.).<sup>113</sup> In this work he declared that first, nothing exists; second, even if something exists it cannot be comprehended by man; third, even if it can be comprehended it cannot be communicated to another man.<sup>114</sup> It seems also that Gorgias wrote a treatise on the Art of Rhetoric. This may have been called Art<sup>115</sup> or it may have been entitled On the Art of the Timely.<sup>116</sup> Also Kerferd states that there is no good reason not to accept that Gorgias wrote the Onomastikon attributed to him by Pollux.<sup>117</sup>

#### d) Lycophron

We know almost nothing about Lycophron and the main evidence which we have for him are some scattered references in Aristotle. Aristotle calls him a Sophist on a couple of occasions,<sup>118</sup> as also does Alexander of Aphrodisias.<sup>119</sup> In the Metaphysics the saying that "knowledge





is a communion of knowing and of soul" is attributed to him.<sup>120</sup> Lycophron was also interested in the question whether the copula, e.g. "the man is white", makes the one into the many. He removed the "is" and instead of saying "the man is white" he substituted "the man has been made white".<sup>121</sup> In the Politics we read that Lycophron put forward a sort of social contract theory where the law is a convention and "a guarantor of mutual rights", but does not make citizens good and just.<sup>122</sup> He is also credited with the notion that the nobility of good birth is obscure and that there is in fact no difference between the low-born and the high-born.<sup>123</sup> With regard to Lycophron's rhetoric Aristotle accuses him of employing insipid expressions, as when he uses the compound words "the many-visaged sky of the mighty-peaked earth" and "the narrow-passaged promontory". Aristotle is also averse to Lycophron's use of strange expressions, e.g. he calls Xerxes "a monster of a man", and Sciron "a human destroyer".<sup>124</sup>

#### e) Prodicus

Prodicus came from the town of Iulis on the island of Ceos in the Cyclades.<sup>125</sup> We are not sure of his dates. Suidas tells us that he was a contemporary of Democritus of Abdera and Gorgias, and a student of Protagoras of Abdera.<sup>126</sup> He was younger than Protagoras<sup>127</sup> and his date of birth is commonly supposed to lie somewhere in the decade 470-460 B.C.<sup>128</sup> He seems to have outlived Socrates from the evidence of Plato's Apology for he is mentioned here in the present tense.<sup>129</sup> He died therefore sometime after 399 B.C.



He often represented his city on embassies in Athens and Philostratus mentions that he once appeared before the council.<sup>130</sup> He took advantage of these public occasions by making himself known and he earned much money from giving private lectures and teaching younger men:

(Socrates:) Or again, there is our distinguished friend Prodicus. He has often been at Athens on public business from Ceos; the last time he came on such a mission, quite lately, he was much admired for his eloquence before the Council, and also as a private person he made an astonishing amount of money by giving demonstrations to the young and admitting them to his society. <sup>131</sup>

If we accept that the scene of Plato's Protagoras has some basis in fact then it appears that Prodicus was in Athens in 433 B.C., the probable dramatic date of that dialogue.<sup>132</sup> It is possible that Plato is depicting him with at least a hint of irony:

'And there too spied I Tantalus' — for Prodicus of Ceos was also in town, and was occupying a room which Hippo-nicus used to use for storage .... Prodicus was still in bed, wrapped up in furs and blankets, and plenty of them, as far as one could see, .... But what they were talking about I couldn't discover from outside, although I was very keen to hear Prodicus, whom I regard as a man of inspired genius. You see, he has such a deep voice that there was a kind of booming noise in the room which drowned the words. <sup>133</sup>

As Guthrie points out, Prodicus must have been well known in Athens in 423 B.C. and also later in 414 B.C. for Aristophanes mentions him in the Clouds and the Birds which were produced in those years respectively.<sup>134</sup>

Prodicus did not confine himself to Athens but travelled from city to city plying his Sophistic trade.<sup>135</sup> There is a tradition that one



of his students in Boeotia was Xenophon who, being a prisoner, used to obtain bail so that he could leave prison in order to attend Prodicus' lectures.<sup>136</sup> However, Freeman rejects the story.<sup>137</sup> Others reputed to have been his students were: Theramenes,<sup>138</sup> Isocrates,<sup>139</sup> Euripides,<sup>140</sup> Damon.<sup>141</sup> Callias was obviously eager to hear Prodicus' teaching for it was at his house that the Sophist stayed in the Protagoras. In the Symposium Xenophon has Socrates say that he knows

that you (Antisthenes) have played the pander between Callias here and the wise Prodicus, inasmuch as you saw that the former was in love with wisdom and the latter in need of cash. 142

Thucydides was influenced by his skill in defining words.<sup>143</sup> Socrates himself, as we read in Plato, was one of his pupils (Socrates is speaking to Protagoras):

Your learning covers many things but not, it appears, this. You are not acquainted with it as I have become through being a pupil of Prodicus. 144

In the Cratylus Socrates tells Hermogenes that he did not hear Prodicus' fifty-drachma lecture but only the one-drachma performance.<sup>145</sup> In the Charmides Socrates states that he is well acquainted with Prodicus' distinctions between words.<sup>146</sup> In the Theaetetus he declares that he sends many of his weaker students to Prodicus. Socrates is speaking in his famous role as a mid-wife:

but there are some, Theaetetus, whose minds, as I judge, have never conceived at all. I see that they have no need of me and with all good will I seek a match for them. Without boasting unduly, I can guess pretty well whose society will profit them. I have arranged many of these matches with Prodicus, and with other men of inspired sagacity. 147





What Socrates means here is that those students who are not able to undertake his education in dialectic and philosophy can go to receive the lesser education of the Sophists. As Guthrie remarks, "The inference is not flattering."<sup>148</sup>

Plato reveals Prodicus as being especially interested in correct terminology and synonyms.<sup>149</sup> This is also mentioned by Aristotle.<sup>150</sup> However, there is evidence that Prodicus' interests ranged wider than the study of words. Suidas calls him "a natural philosopher and sophist."<sup>151</sup> Cicero states that Prodicus, Thrasyarchus, and Protagoras all spoke and wrote on the subject of natural philosophy.<sup>152</sup> Galen also writes that in his work On the Nature of Man Prodicus combined his interest in linguistics and natural philosophy. Here he concludes from etymology that the word "phlegm" should be given to the hot humour and "blenna" to the cold.<sup>153</sup> Aristophanes calls him a *μετεωροσοφιστής* or "space expert".<sup>154</sup> A cosmogony of his is mentioned in Birds (lines 690-692).

Prodicus wrote an epideixis, The Choice of Heracles, a version of which is contained in Xenophon's Memorabilia.<sup>155</sup> It is difficult to know how close it is to the original. Xenophon himself wrote:

In some such fashion as this, Prodicus related the instruction of Heracles by Virtue. Of course his performance was a masterpiece of stylistic elegance compared with that I managed just now. 156

The parable of Heracles appears to have been part of a longer work entitled Horai



in which he portrayed Heracles interviewed in turn by Virtue and Vice, each soliciting him to elect the manner of life represented by herself, with Heracles ultimately choosing the hardships offered by the former over the fleeting pleasures promised by Vice. 157

As we have seen, Galen relates that Prodicus wrote a book called On the Nature of Man.<sup>158</sup> Prodicus may also have written a work on the nature of the gods. We are told that he considered that primitive man held that nourishing and useful articles were acknowledged as gods. According to Sextus

Prodicus of Ceos says, "The ancients considered that the sun, the moon, and rivers and springs and anything else that helped sustain life were gods, because of their usefulness; for instance, the Egyptians considered the Nile a god." And thus bread has come to be called Demeter, and wine Dionysus, water Poseidon, fire Hephaestus, and so on with everything that is useful to man. 159

Suidas tells us that Prodicus was executed at Athens after being found guilty of corrupting the youth.<sup>160</sup> Most authorities reject this stating that Prodicus is being confused with Socrates. Freeman declares that there is also confusion with an alleged Cean law which required those over sixty years of age to drink hemlock.<sup>161</sup> Kerferd also regards this story as being probably untrue but he reminds us of the incident in the Eryxias of (Plato) where Prodicus was asked to leave the gymnasium because he was teaching the young men doctrines which were unsuitable and bad for them. Kerferd concludes that "it is not impossible that he did have to face the kind of opposition which Protagoras spoke of as the common lot of all Sophists."<sup>162</sup>



f) Thrasymachus

Thrasymachus was a native of Chalcedon in Bithynia<sup>163</sup> where he may have died. Neoptolemus of Paros says in his Epitaphs from Chalcedon that there is there inscribed a memorial to the Sophist.<sup>164</sup> We know very little of Thrasymachus' life. Dionysius of Halicarnassus declares that he was younger than Lysias,<sup>165</sup> however Untersteiner states that he was mistaken and that Thrasymachus was in fact older than Lysias.<sup>166</sup> Thrasymachus was obviously known at Athens in 427 B.C. as he is mentioned in the Banqueters of Aristophanes which was produced in that year.<sup>167</sup> He must have lived until at least 413 B.C. for in his Speech for the Larisaeans he mentions Archelaus the Macedonian king who reigned from 413 to 399 B.C.<sup>168</sup> Aristotle writes that Tisias was succeeded by Thrasymachus who in turn was succeeded by Theodorus.<sup>169</sup> Juvenal implies that Thrasymachus died having repented of his sterile and empty teaching, and a scholiast adds that he hanged himself.<sup>170</sup> However, whether this was our Thrasymachus is open to doubt, as indeed is the whole story.<sup>171</sup>

Four of Thrasymachus' works are mentioned in Suidas:<sup>172</sup> Deliberative Speeches, Textbook on Rhetoric, Trivia, Subjects for Speeches. The Long Textbook mentioned by the Scholiast on Aristophanes' Birds (line 880) is probably the same as the Textbook on Rhetoric.<sup>173</sup> Other works include his Introductions,<sup>174</sup> his Plaints,<sup>175</sup> and his Knock-Down Arguments.<sup>176</sup> Untersteiner thinks that these three works are probably to be considered as chapters of the Textbook on Rhetoric.<sup>177</sup> A long passage of one of Thrasymachus' speeches is preserved by Dionysius who





is primarily interested in the style.<sup>178</sup> It seems to be part of a speech which was to be delivered before the Assembly but being a foreigner Thrasy-machus could not have delivered it himself.<sup>179</sup> It may be part of a model speech since Dionysius declares that Thrasy-machus' "works are all technical or showpieces, and no forensic (or political) oration of his has survived."<sup>180</sup> One sentence survives of Thrasy-machus' Speech for the Larisaeans which is mentioned above:

Shall we be slaves to Archelaus; we who are Greeks to  
a foreigner ?      181

Much of the other surviving evidence pertaining to Thrasy-machus is concerned with his style and theory of rhetoric and do not really concern us. However, the main picture which we have of him is preserved in Plato's Republic where he is treated as a rather boorish young man who vehemently proclaims the doctrine that justice is the interest of the stronger.<sup>182</sup> Plato seems to take pains to depict him in a bad light emphasizing his ill temper and rudeness.<sup>183</sup> How true is the picture is impossible to say. However, in the Phaedrus Plato admits that Thrasy-machus is a masterly orator<sup>184</sup> who proffers a scientific rhetoric.<sup>185</sup> Over against his views on justice contained in the Republic should be placed the somewhat vague evidence of Hermias, a commentator on Plato:

In one of his own writings, he (Thrasy-machus) wrote something to this effect: that the gods take no notice of human affairs, or they would not have left out justice, which is the greatest of goods among men. For we see that men make no use of it.      186

However, as this evidence lacks context it is of little use to us.<sup>187</sup>



g) Hippias

Hippias was a native of Elis,<sup>188</sup> and the son of Diopeithes.<sup>189</sup> We are told that he was the pupil of Hegesidamus<sup>190</sup> concerning whom we know nothing.<sup>191</sup> We have little evidence regarding Hippias' dates. He was apparently much younger than Protagoras<sup>192</sup> and was alive in 399 B.C. since he is mentioned in the same company as Gorgias of Leontini and Prodicus of Ceos in the Apology.<sup>193</sup> Philostratus tells us that he reached old age.<sup>194</sup> Although his date of birth is unknown Untersteiner states that it must be about 443 B.C.<sup>195</sup> We are told that Plathané, daughter of Hippias, married Isocrates when the orator was very old and that the marriage produced a boy, Aphareus.<sup>196</sup>

Hippias, as were a number of other Sophists, was chosen on many occasions to represent his native city on embassies to other Greek cities.<sup>197</sup> He represented her most often in Lacedaemon and on the most numerous and important subjects.<sup>198</sup> It has been pointed out that because Hippias, unlike most Sophists, was a Dorian it might be reasonable to expect him to travel more to Dorian cities.<sup>199</sup> He was also greatly liked by the Lacedaemonians.<sup>200</sup> Hippias travelled widely even going to Inycus in Sicily in order to make money. In the Hippias Major he tells us:

I went to Sicily once while Protagoras was living there. He had a great reputation and was a far older man than I, and yet in a short time I made more than one hundred and fifty minas. Why, in one place alone, Inycus, a very small place, I took more than twenty minas. When I returned home with the money I gave it to my father, reducing him and his fellow citizens to a condition of stupefied amazement. And I feel pretty sure that I have made more money than any two Sophists you like to mention, put together. 201



Hippias also regularly attended the Festival at Olympia where he enchanted everyone with his carefully prepared speeches.<sup>202</sup> He was also in the habit of speaking extemporaneously at these assemblies inviting questions on any topic whatsoever from the audience.<sup>203</sup> We do not know how often Hippias was in Athens. Plato represents him in the Protagoras, the dramatic date of which is c. 433 B.C. He is a guest of Callias and Socrates found him:

sitting on a seat of honour in the opposite portico, and around him were seated on benches Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus of Myrrhinus and Andron, son of Androtion, with some fellow citizens of his and other foreigners. They appeared to be asking him questions on natural science, particularly astronomy, while he gave each his explanation ex cathedra and held forth on their problems. 204

In the Hippias Major Hippias declares that he will deliver the Trojan Speech at Athens (formerly delivered at Sparta) in two days' time "in the school of Pheidostratus, along with many other things worth hearing I have been asked by Eudicus, the son of Apemantus."<sup>205</sup> Hippias may have remained in Athens for a substantial period of time but it is also clear that he was absent from the city state for lengthy spells.<sup>206</sup>

Hippias is reported to have possessed a prodigious memory. Philostratus tells us that after hearing fifty names only once he could repeat them in the order he had heard them.<sup>207</sup> Ammianus writes that Hippias used to improve his memory by drinking certain potions.<sup>208</sup> Xenophon tells us that Callias learned the art of memorizing from Hippias.<sup>209</sup>





Hippias in Suidas is said to have "defined the end as self-sufficiency."<sup>210</sup> Plato who consistently represents Hippias in a poor light and much less favourably than Protagoras, Gorgias, and even Prodicus deals with this self-sufficiency in a very ironic manner in the Hippias Minor. Here Hippias is pictured as having arrived at Olympia having made all his clothes by his own hands. He made his own sandals, wove his own cloak and tunic, made his ring, seal, skin-scraper, and oil-flask. The girdle he wore was also woven by himself and was like the most costly Persian ones.<sup>211</sup> It is a caustic Plato who has Socrates say to Hippias:

I know that in most arts you are the wisest of men ....  
Moreover, you told us that you had brought with you  
poems, epic, tragic, and dithyrambic, as well as prose  
writings of the most various kinds, and you said that  
your skill was also pre-eminent in the arts which I was  
just now mentioning, and in the true principles of rhythm  
and harmony and of orthography. And, if I remember rightly,  
there were a great many other accomplishments in which you  
excelled.       212

There is little doubt that Hippias' talents extended to many fields — Xenophon calls him a polymath.<sup>213</sup> He was interested in rhythms, force of letters, syllables, harmonies.<sup>214</sup> He discussed painting and sculpture.<sup>215</sup> He was particularly skilled in arithmetic and geometry<sup>216</sup> and the history of mathematics — he records that Mamercus, brother of the poet Stesichorus, had gained a reputation for geometry.<sup>217</sup> Hippias is credited with a discovery in geometry which, as Freeman writes, "differentiates him from all the other Sophists and places him in the ranks of the scientific discoverers, namely the invention of the Quadratrix."<sup>218</sup> Proclus writes:



Nicomedes trisected all rectilinear angles by means of conchoid lines, whose peculiar character he himself discovered, and whose genesis, structure, and properties he handed on. Others have done the same thing by means of the quadratrices of Hippias and Nicomedes, and they too have used mixed lines, the quadratrices. 219

Because Proclus does not expressly say that it was Hippias of Elis commentators think that another Hippias is intended but Guthrie declares that most modern scholarship favours the Sophist.<sup>220</sup>

Another science which interested Hippias was astronomy:

In heaven's name, Hippias, on what kind of subject do they listen to you with such pleasure and applause ? Clearly it must be the one on which you are a great authority, the stars and the celestial phenomena ? 221

He agreed with Pherecydes that the Hyades are seven in number.<sup>222</sup>

Freeman considers that it is possible that Hippias wrote an account of past scientific discoveries.<sup>223</sup> Diogenes Laertius records that Hippias held that even inanimate things had souls, arguing from the behaviour of the magnet and from amber.<sup>224</sup>

As has been mentioned already, Hippias went on most of his embassies to Lacedaemon. We are told that the Spartans were little interested in astronomy, geometry, arithmetic, language and speech and such subjects but that they delighted "in the genealogies of heroes and of men and in stories of the foundations of cities in olden times, and, to put it briefly, in all forms of antiquarian lore."<sup>225</sup> Philostratus posits the reason that it was because the Spartans were ambitious to rule.<sup>226</sup> At any rate Hippias was willing to speak on such "archaeological" subjects, as Freeman calls them.<sup>227</sup> We have evidence of Hippias'



researches in the past from a variety of sources. Eustathius tells us that the Sophist stated that Asia and Europa, the daughters of Oceanus, gave their names to the continents.<sup>228</sup> Plutarch declared that Hippias held that Lycurgus was a very experienced and warlike soldier.<sup>229</sup> Hippias asserted that Gorgopis was the stepmother of Phrixus while Pindar held it was Demodice.<sup>230</sup> He pointed out that there was also an Ephyra at Elis.<sup>231</sup> He considered that Homer originally came from Cumae.<sup>232</sup> In his work, the Collection, Hippias discusses the famed beauty Thargelia of Miletus who was married fourteen times and who was wise as well as beautiful.<sup>233</sup> The only item which we actually know was in his Nomenclature of Tribes is the statement that there was a certain tribe called SPARTOI.<sup>234</sup> Hippias was also interested in the origin and meaning of words. He declared that the word "tyrant" was not used in Homer, even for the lawless Echetus, but that it was introduced in the time of Archilochus. Homer used the term "king".<sup>235</sup> If the "Hippias of Thasos" whom Aristotle refers to in the Poetics is in reality our Hippias then we may see that the Sophist offered a textual emendation to Homer.<sup>236</sup> Hippias also discussed characterization in the Iliad.<sup>237</sup>

Suidas tells us that Hippias wrote many things.<sup>238</sup> It is clear that he wrote epideixeis and other speeches. A lecture is mentioned in the Hippias Major which is a discourse on the honourable pursuits which a young man should follow:

On that subject I have composed a discourse, a beautiful work distinguished by a fine style among its other merits. Its setting and its exordium are like this. After the fall





of Troy, Neoptolemus asks Nestor what are the honourable and beautiful practices to which a man should devote himself during his youth in order to win the highest distinction. Then it is Nestor's turn to speak, and he propounds to him a great number of excellent rules of life. 239

Philostratus calls this discourse the Trojan Dialogue.<sup>240</sup> Pausanias tells us that Hippias composed Elegiac verses for the statues which the Messenians dedicated on behalf of the boys' chorus which was drowned on the crossing to Rhegium.<sup>241</sup> Plutarch relates that he published a List of Olympic Victors.<sup>242</sup> His Nomenclature of Tribes and Collection have been mentioned already. Clement of Alexandria quotes a passage which may be part of Hippias' own description of the latter work:

Some of these things may have been said by Orpheus, some by Musaeus briefly in various places, some by Hesiod and Homer, some by other poets, others in prose works of Greek and non-Greek writers; but by putting together the most significant and kindred material from all these sources, I shall make this piece both new and varied. 243

#### h) Antiphon the Sophist

When we come to Antiphon the Sophist there is an immediate problem concerning his identity. Is he the same as the orator Antiphon of Rhamnus, author of forensic speeches and member of the Four Hundred ? The problem was recognized in antiquity. Hermogenes considers the opinion of Didymus the grammarian who distinguished between the Sophist and the Orator:

Discussion of Antiphon must be prefaced by the reminder that, as Didymus the grammarian and several others have



remarked, and as inquiry reveals, there lived a number of Antiphons and two professional teachers whom we must consider. One of these two is the rhetorician to whom are attributed the forensic speeches and public addresses and others of this type. The other is the so-called diviner and interpreter of dreams to whom are said to belong the books On the Truth and the book On Concord and the Politikos. 244

Hermogenes himself on stylistic grounds also considered that the two men were different. The difficulty is further complicated by the addition of a third Antiphon — the tragic poet who wrote in Syracuse at the court of Dionysius.

I do not propose to examine the problem although I am aware that different opinions have been put forward. J.S. Morrison favours a single author — Sophist and Orator are one.<sup>245</sup> However, it appears that most scholarly opinion supports the view that the men were different.

Untersteiner declares: "I do not think that there is any occasion to re-examine the question — which is solved in my opinion by the assumption that two Antiphons must be distinguished, the sophist and the orator of Rhamnus."<sup>246</sup> Kathleen Freeman writes that her account "is based on the belief that Antiphon the Sophist is distinct from the orator and from the tragedian; and that the writings of the Sophist were distinguished from those of the orator by their difference of subject-matter and style."<sup>247</sup> As Guthrie declares, "The question is of minor interest for the history of philosophy."<sup>248</sup>

We know hardly anything about the life of Antiphon the Sophist. Even Plato is no help, as he is for many other Sophists, for Antiphon does not appear in the dialogues.<sup>249</sup> However, we know that he was an Athen-



ian and a contemporary of Socrates. Xenophon in the Memorabilia relates a conversation between Antiphon and Socrates.<sup>250</sup> While there are extant three Tetralogies and three other speeches of Antiphon the Orator, as well as a large quantity of fragments, the Sophist's works are as fragmentary as those of the other Sophists. His main work was a treatise in two books called Truth, the title being connected to Parmenides' Way of Truth.<sup>251</sup> A number of fragments are extant.<sup>252</sup> In addition, fragments remain, references and quotations in other writers, of three other works which are attributed to Antiphon: On Concord,<sup>253</sup> Politikos,<sup>254</sup> and On The Interpretation of Dreams.<sup>255</sup> Nothing remains of a fifth work, Art of Freedom from Pain, the authorship of which is uncertain but which Freeman considers was composed by Antiphon the Sophist.<sup>256</sup>

#### i) Critias

Although termed a Sophist by Philostratus<sup>257</sup> it is clear that the Athenian Critias was different in certain respects to the other Sophists. He was not a paid teacher; rather he was a pupil both of Socrates and of other Sophists.<sup>258</sup> A scholiast writes that "He joined philosophical fellowships and was termed a layman among philosophers, a philosopher among laymen."<sup>259</sup> However, as Kerferd observes, Critias has always been considered part of the Sophistic movement and it is perhaps best to continue this practice.<sup>260</sup> We do not know when Critias was born but it was certainly in the first half of the Fifth Century B.C. Freeman, Guthrie, and Untersteiner all favour the decade 460-





450 B.C.<sup>261</sup>

He came of a rich and noble family, being descended from Dropides, and being related to Solon and Plato. Diogenes tells us:

Plato, the Athenian, son of Ariston and of Perictione (or Potone), who traced her lineage back to Solon. Solon had a brother Dropides, whose son was Critias, father of Callaeschrus. The sons of Callaeschrus were Critias, the member of the Thirty, and Glaucon, father of Charmides and of Perictione. Plato was her son and Ariston's in the sixth generation after Solon. 262

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He was well educated as befitted one of his background, and Athenaeus tells us that he was a good flute-player.<sup>264</sup> He was a friend of Alcibiades and both of them were disciples and friends of Socrates.<sup>265</sup>

Xenophon tells us that the only reason they associated with Socrates was to learn enough to enable them to achieve advantage over their rivals. Once they had learned this they deserted Socrates. Xenophon also relates that Socrates castigated the manner of Critias' love for Euthydemus:

As a consequence Critias came also to hate Socrates, so that when, as a member of the Thirty, along with Charicles, he became lawgiver, he felt a grudge against him and included in the laws a provision against teaching the art of speech. 266

We know that Critias was very much in favour of oligarchical government and was strongly pro-Spartan,<sup>267</sup> but whether he was actually a member of the Four Hundred of 411 B.C. is unclear.<sup>268</sup> However, after the downfall of the Four Hundred it was Critias who voted that the body of the oligarchic leader Phrynichus who was assassinated in 411 be tried as a traitor. If found guilty his bones would be exhumed and



would then be thrown beyond the frontiers of Attica.<sup>269</sup> Critias suffered exile at the hands of the democratic faction in 407 B.C. and proceeded to make his way to Thessaly.<sup>270</sup> Here, according to Philostratus, "he rendered their oligarchies the more grievous by conversing with those in power there and by attacking all democracy."<sup>271</sup> However, Xenophon has a rather different story. For he declares that Critias "along with Prometheus .... was setting up a democracy in Thessaly and was arming the serfs against their overlords."<sup>272</sup> We find Critias back in Athens after the sea battle of Aegospotami and he was one of the five men with oligarchic tendencies who were appointed as ephors.<sup>273</sup> As Xenophon relates, in 404 B.C. "it seemed advisable to the public to choose thirty men to codify the inherited laws in accordance with which they would administer the state."<sup>274</sup> Critias was appointed one of the Thirty, along with Charicles<sup>275</sup> and proceeded to outdo his associates in the wild excesses against the leaders of the democracy. Philostratus declares: "it seems to me that he is the worst of all the men who have gained a reputation for wickedness."<sup>276</sup> Critias died in a fight with Thrasylbulus' men in May 403 B.C.<sup>277</sup> A scholium tells us that some of Critias' supporters, after his death, erected a memorial to him, the memorial depicting Oligarchy holding a firebrand and lighting Democracy. The inscription read:

This is a memorial to good men who restrained the accursed populace of the Athenians from arrogance for a brief period. 278

It should be stated that the evidence for Critias' life reveals an



obvious discrepancy between the damning account offered by Xenophon and that of the well bred, well educated young man represented by Plato. It is a problem which is beyond the scope of this work. However, Guthrie argues convincingly:

Considering all this, Plato may indeed have thought of him as the type of brilliant young man whom he describes in the Republic, with the roots of philosophy in him and an immense capacity for good but also for harm if his environment corrupted him. Unfortunately it did, and the story of his evil latter days was on everyone's lips. To redress the balance, and out of regret for one who was his relative and at one time a companion of his master Socrates, Plato on this hypothesis will have concentrated on the earlier, happier years of hope and promise. He reserved his attack for the corrupting forces which he considered responsible for the downfall of such promising young men, the licence and mob-oratory prevailing under the democracy and the rhetorical teachers who claimed that the art of speaking had nothing to do with moral standards. 279

Critias had a large oeuvre and wrote on diverse subjects in verse and prose. He composed a poem in hexameters on Anacreon.<sup>280</sup> He wrote elegies on various inventions and where they originated e.g. the game of cottabus from Sicily, the waggon from the same place, the throne from Thessaly, the couch from Miletus and Chios, gold and bronze work — the inventions of the Etruscans, letters from Phoenicia, the chariot from Thebes, cargo ships from Caria, the potter's wheel and pottery from Athens.<sup>281</sup> He avered that Orpheus invented the dactylic hexameter.<sup>282</sup> In his elegy hymning Alcibiades Critias employs iambs for Alcibiades' name since it does not fit dactylic metre.<sup>283</sup> In this elegy Critias reminds Alcibiades that it was he, Critias, who had voted for his recall from exile in 407 B.C.<sup>284</sup>





Critias wrote in verse on Well-Balanced Commonwealths<sup>285</sup> but quotations only survive from the Commonwealth of the Lacedaemonians. In this work Critias praises the temperate drinking habits of the Spartans. They drink each from his own winecup and do not pass it around to the right toasting each other as is the custom at Athens.<sup>286</sup> The Lacedaemonian Chilon the Sage is attributed with the saying "nothing in excess".<sup>287</sup> Plutarch writes that Critias in this work prays for

the wealth of the Scopadae, the high-mindedness of Cimon,  
the success of Arcesilas, the Lacedaemonian.      288

The saying that more men are good as a result of practice than from nature is also attributed to Critias.<sup>289</sup>

Critias also wrote dramas and three tragedies are attributed to him, Tennes, Rhadamanthys, and Pirithus, together with the satyr-play Sisyphus. The tragedies are often held to be by Euripides-but they are considered spurious by the Anonymous Life of Euripides.<sup>290</sup> Only one line is extant from the Tennes: "Alas ! there is no justice in the present generation."<sup>291</sup> A number of lines survive from the Rhadamanthys. The longest passage is concerned with a list of common desires in man. The speaker concludes with his own main wish which is to gain a reputation for the right kind of glory.<sup>292</sup> We have a number of fragments from the Pirithus. These include a part of a dialogue between Heracles and Theseus<sup>293</sup> and also one between Aeacus and Heracles.<sup>294</sup> There are two brief cosmological passages:

Untiring time wanders around the everflowing stream. In



its fullness it keeps reproducing itself, and twin bears  
borne on swift-flappings of wings keep watch over Atlas'  
celestial vault. 295

also,

(I call on) you, self-begotten, who interwove all things  
in a heavenly whir, around whom light, around whom  
spangled murky night and the numberless horde of stars  
continually dance about. 296

There are also a few statements of aphoristic content from the  
Perithus:

Not with unpracticed mind did the first speaker make his  
contribution, he who originated the statement that chance  
becomes ally to men of understanding. 297

and,

An honest manner is more steadfast than a law. No orator  
could ever distort the one; but, stirring the other up  
and down with speeches, he frequently does dishonour. 298

and,

Is it not true that it is better not to live than to live  
ill ? 299

and,

Fame points out the good man even in the far corners of the  
earth. 300

A lengthy fragment of Critias' satyr-play Sisyphus is extant, in  
which the theory is put forward that religion was invented by a  
human government in order to provide an ultimate sanction for the  
obedience of its subjects.<sup>301</sup> As Guthrie remarks, "This is the first  
occurrence in history of the theory of religion as a political  
invention to ensure good behaviour."<sup>302</sup>



Fragments of Critias' prose works survive also. A quotation from his Commonwealth of the Thessalians deals with the extravagant habits of those people.<sup>303</sup> A number of quotations remain of his prose Commonwealth of the Lacedaemonians which deal mainly with the habits of the Spartans e.g. the austere training of both males and females,<sup>304</sup> their manner of drinking,<sup>305</sup> their shoes, cloaks, beakers,<sup>306</sup> their furniture,<sup>307</sup> their "tong-dance",<sup>308</sup> their relations with their slaves, the Helots.<sup>309</sup> Critias also wrote a prose Commonwealth of the Athenians but no quotation survives.<sup>310</sup> Other works include Aphorisms in a number of books,<sup>311</sup> Lectures (Books I-II),<sup>312</sup> On the Nature of Desire or of Virtues,<sup>313</sup> Proems Suitable for Public Speaking.<sup>314</sup> Diels and Kranz include a number of fragments from undetermined prose works<sup>315</sup> and a couple of doubtful fragments.<sup>316</sup>

#### j) Anonymous Iamblichii

The Protrepticus of Iamblichus contains many unacknowledged extracts, often taken word for word, from other authors. Among them is a long passage of unknown authorship which has been called the Anonymous Iamblichii. Though many scholarly attempts have been essayed to discover who wrote it "all proposals to assign it to a particular known author or even to his school have been unsuccessful through lack of any kind of hard evidence."<sup>317</sup> The date of authorship is generally considered to have been sometime in the late Fifth Century B.C. or the first half of the Fourth Century B.C. The Anonymous Iamblichii is essentially a treatise on how to achieve success in life. The follow-





ing are some of the main points:

A man must first of all be endowed with nature's gifts, though the author admits that this is a matter of chance. He must earnestly desire what is honourable and good, be hardworking, start early, and be pertinacious in his search over a long period of time. If he lacks even one of these characteristics he will not be able to achieve the greatest excellence, but possession of all of them puts everything within his grasp. Those who strive for a good reputation must start their education early and practice consistently, thereby more easily gaining the respect and trust of other men. Though a man might learn to be skillful in words in a short period of time however virtue cannot be attained unless the quest for it is started early and a man practices diligently.

When fluency, wisdom, or strength have been achieved the possessor must use his excellence for good and lawful purposes. One who does this is absolutely good. One who employs his virtue for wrong and unlawful ends is utterly base. It is not by over generosity with money that a man may benefit the most people thereby attaining complete virtue. Rather a man should obey the laws and do what is just — for it is in this way that cities and men are united and bound together. A man who pursues virtue must be particularly well disciplined. He should be superior to the lures of money and possessions and be unsparing of his own soul. A really good man does not pursue a reputation clad in another's ornaments but rather by his own virtue.



We should not rush into thinking that pursuing our own advantage is virtue and that obeying the laws is cowardice. From this attitude springs all immorality and injury. Because man does not live alone but associates and lives with others in communities it may be concluded that Law and Justice rule among men. This rule has been firmly fixed by nature. Even if there should be a man (as indeed there could not be) free from disease, having no emotions, supremely hard in body and soul, still this man must submit to the law. For if he did not all the other men would be hostile to him and would overcome him by means of their own observance of the law and their numbers. It follows that the real power in society is preserved by law and justice.

The Anonymous Iamblichi concludes with some of the advantages to be gained from observing the law, and also with some of the consequences which result from lawlessness. When there is law in society there is an atmosphere of trust among everyone to the mutual benefit of all — those who have good fortune enjoy it in safety and help those who suffer ill fortune. The origin of community of property lies in the observance of law. When men obey the law they have more time to enjoy their leisure and can rest without anxiety and fear. A society which observes law faces war with less difficulty than the lawless one. On the other hand grave disadvantages result from lawlessness. Men have less time to devote to the leisure activities of life — unpleasant activities are paramount. Men hoard money because of a lack of mutual trust with the result that money becomes scarce. Plots multiply in society, with more internal strife as well as an increase in external



war. Even when men are asleep they find no respite from their problems, for their dreams are fearsome and their troubles are still with them when they awake. The rise of a king or a tyrant in society (tyranny to the author is a monstrous evil) is the result of no other reason than the abandonment of law and justice. Where laws are observed one man could not gain control.

k) Dissoi Logoi

The Dissoi Logoi is a Sophistic treatise of unknown authorship<sup>318</sup> written in a literary Doric. The work, which is clearly incomplete, is found at the end of manuscripts of Sextus Empiricus. Its date has been fixed at about 400 B.C. because of a reference in I (8) to Sparta's victory over the Athenians. Kerferd and Freeman, however, question this reading.<sup>319</sup> As the work lacks a title it has been provided with the name Dissoi Logoi (or Twofold Arguments) from the opening words of the first chapter. They are also found at the beginning of chapters two, three, and four. Guthrie<sup>320</sup> considers that the treatise lacks literary and philosophical merit and that it is likely to be either a student's notes of his Protagoras influenced teacher<sup>321</sup> or else something composed by the teacher for his students. The motives of the author are not clear but an obvious purpose is to show that there are two sides to every question. Freeman considers that the essay "is superficial and casuistic, an example of the kind of instruction for which the Sophists became notorious and were satirized by Aristophanes and Plato."<sup>322</sup>





The work contains nine short chapters, the fundamental arguments of which are as follows: (Chapter I) Those who philosophize assert twofold arguments concerning the good and the bad. Some declare that they are different, others that they are the same e.g. something might be good for some people and bad for others, or good and bad at different times for the same person. (Chapter II) Twofold arguments are adduced concerning the honourable and the disgraceful. Some say that they are different, others that they are the same. (Chapter III) Twofold arguments are proposed concerning the just and the unjust. Some say that they are different, others that they are the same. (Chapter IV) Twofold arguments are put forward regarding the false and the true. Some declare them to be different, others the same. (Chapter V) The argument here is that "The demented and the sane and the wise and the foolish both say and do the same things." (Chapter VI) This chapter is concerned with the teachability of wisdom and virtue, and the author adduces five "proofs" that they cannot be taught. He concludes by asserting that while he cannot say whether wisdom and virtue are teachable, the proofs do not satisfy him. (Of course, it is only to be expected that a Sophist would not agree that virtue could not be taught). (Chapter VII) The argument here is against the view of some orators that offices should be assigned by lot rather than election. (Chapter VIII) This chapter argues that it belongs to the same person and to the same art to be able to declaim in the brief style, to understand the truth of things, to judge correctly in the law courts, to be able to speak well in public, to understand the art of rhetoric, and be able to teach about the nature of all things and how they came



into being. (Chapter IX) This final incomplete chapter declares that memory is the greatest and fairest discovery, and provides some suggestions about how memory can be improved.

#### 1) Euthydemus and Dionysodorus

The brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus who appear in Plato's dialogue Euthydemus are not included in Diels as Sophists. However, Sprague does include them in an appendix to her work The Older Sophists. They are almost certainly not inventions of Plato — Euthydemus, in fact, is mentioned by Aristotle,<sup>323</sup> and Dionysodorus is mentioned by Xenophon.<sup>324</sup> Both brothers are spoken of in Sextus.<sup>325</sup> Plato relates that they came from Chios, that they went as colonists to Thurii, were exiled from there and have already spent a number of years in the region of Attica.<sup>326</sup> He declares that they are willing to teach everything for money and that they are particularly good at teaching "people both how to deliver and to compose the sort of speeches suitable for the courts."<sup>327</sup> Euthydemus states that they can teach virtue better and more quickly than anyone else.<sup>328</sup> Generally, Plato represents the two brothers as shallow quibblers and exponents of eristic, men who are very different, for example, in knowledge and technique to his picture of Protagoras.



## Conclusion

The foregoing brief accounts of the lives and works of a number of the more prominent early Sophists are characterized by an unsatisfactory dearth of facts and details. As has been said, the evidence for these teachers is very meagre. It is relatively easier to conjecture and interpret the scanty fragments of their respective works which are available to us. But to provide adequate hard facts regarding their lives and the titles and contents of their works is well nigh impossible because of the scarcity of relevant source material. It is clear, however, from the evidence that the backgrounds of these men are quite diverse, as indeed are their scholarly interests. We have already seen that the motives and character of certain Sophists, the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus for example, were suspect. It is important to reiterate that while many of the Sophists were honourable teachers and were genuinely interested in their studies many others, particularly those teaching in the Fourth Century B.C., were unscrupulous, superficial, and pretentious.<sup>329</sup> Even during the period we are concerned with, the second half of the Fifth Century B.C., there was a wide range among the worth of the individual Sophists. As Gerald Gutek writes, they "ranged from excellent scholars who sought to devise a well-grounded theoretical base for rhetorical instruction to charlatans who promised their students instant success through the mastery of a few tricks of the trade."<sup>330</sup>

It should also be borne in mind that these early Sophists are not to be confused with the Sophists of later centuries. The early centuries





of the Christian era saw rhetoric begin to play an increasingly dominant role in education and its pervasive influence was felt throughout the Roman Empire. However, this was a rhetoric with a different motive to that of classical times. The rhetorician was now less concerned with persuading his audience to adhere to and follow his point of view. His main interest was rather with the form than the content of his speeches — rhetoric was now an artificial art and one which was practiced for its own sake. The word "Sophist", especially during these early centuries A.D., came to be synonymous with "rhetorician" and the multitude of orators and professors of rhetoric who flourished in Athens and the wealthy cities of Asia Minor, e.g. Ephesus and Smyrna, during this period are commonly said to be part of the "Second Sophistic Movement". These later Sophists are very different to the men we are concerned with in this essay. Not only did they live half a millenium later but, unlike the early Sophists, they seem to have been exclusively interested in the art of rhetoric. John Walden draws the distinction:

The name SOPHIST, as applied to a professional teacher, either of learning in general or specifically of oratory, never went out of existence from the time it was so first used, and the sophists of the second and following centuries A.D., though in their profession and many of their characteristics different from the sophists of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., were historically the direct lineal descendants of these men. The later sophists, however, were not, like the earlier sophists, teachers of all learning with a leaning toward oratory, but they were teachers and expounders of the art of public speaking exclusively.      331

Consideration of these later men, however, is beyond the scope of



this work.

While it is convenient to group the early Sophists under the same heading, we should beware not to consider that they constituted an organized group or taught a common body of knowledge. No two Sophists taught the same programme. They did not form a cohesive school with one defined system of doctrine; rather they were individual and independent thinkers.<sup>332</sup> Theodor Gomperz declares that while the individual Sophists had certain qualities and attitudes in common it would be "illegitimate, if not absurd, to speak of a sophistic mind, sophistic morality, sophistic scepticism, and so forth."<sup>333</sup> However, Guthrie argues that this is an exaggeration and observes that one subject which all Sophists taught in common was the art of rhetoric.<sup>334</sup> Mastery in this subject was especially desired by the ambitious fee-paying students who wished to attain political areté and become prominent and influential in the State. Nevertheless the Sophists, though possessing a common interest in the teaching of rhetoric, display great variations in the range of other branches of knowledge. As Eduard Zeller writes, the interest of individual Sophists differs greatly in, for example, such spheres as mathematics, astronomy, and linguistics, "and their political theories show strong differences which corresponded to their widely opposed conceptions of natural law."<sup>335</sup> Different Sophists specialized in different areas and it is likely that some students, who could afford to do so, attended the courses of more than one Sophist in order to obtain a sound general education. (Chapter 5 of this work discusses the Sophists' teaching



of rhetoric and other subjects of their curricula).

While the Sophists did not constitute a school their chief motive which they all shared tended towards practical ends.<sup>336</sup> As stated, in this they were only catering to the wishes of their paying students. As Dobson writes, the Sophists "merely professed to teach what they described as 'Virtue', that is, the quality which will enable a man to make a success of life, especially public life in a City-State. Their aims were frankly utilitarian."<sup>337</sup> Guthrie also considers that it would be wrong to assert that the Sophists had philosophically nothing in common. Rather,

They shared the general philosophical outlook described .... under the name of empiricism, and with this went a common scepticism about the possibility of certain knowledge, on the grounds both of the inadequacy and fallibility of our faculties and of the absence of a stable reality to be known. All alike believed in the antithesis between nature and convention. They might differ in their estimate of the relative value of each, but none of them would hold that human laws, customs and religious beliefs were unshakeable because rooted in an unchanging natural order.      338

(I will consider briefly the above topics in the next chapter which deals with some philosophical views of the Sophists). Besides holding certain philosophical tenets in common the Sophists were alike in other respects. At a basic level, they were alike in that they were all professional teachers. As the State provided for little or no education the Sophists came to fill a gap, and especially one in the realm of higher education. Another factor shared by the Sophists was their unquestioning belief in humanism and their firm faith in the efficacy of human reason. Their speculations were essentially anthr-





opocentric in strong contrast to the reflections of earlier philosophers and religious thinkers. As Aristotle says in his De Partibus Animalium:

In the time of Socrates ... men gave up inquiring into the works of nature, and philosophers diverted their attention to political science and to the virtues which benefit mankind. 339

There was also a certain tendency among the Sophists to hold doubts, if not antagonism, towards religion. Protagoras embraced agnosticism, Prodicus interpreted religion in anthropological terms, and Critias proffered a rationalistic origin for belief in god. Also, as Guthrie writes, it is difficult to hold that those immoralist supporters of PHYSIS against NOMOS, for example Callicles and Antiphon, "held any sort of religious beliefs."<sup>340</sup>

Another similarity shared by the Sophists is the fact that, with the exception of Antiphon the Sophist, they were foreigners to Athens, provincials, as Guthrie declares, whose small cities could not hold or cater for their genius.<sup>341</sup> Because they travelled about so much they generally did not reflect any specific local characteristic.<sup>342</sup>

Socrates in the Timaeus describes them as "being only wanderers from one city to another, and having never had habitations of their own."<sup>343</sup>

Isocrates relates of his teacher Gorgias that he taught in the neighbourhood of Thessaly where many of the richer Greeks were centred and spent much of his long life in the pursuit of amassing money. However, he did not live in any one city steadily, nor did he marry and raise a family, nor did he devote money to public interests, nor did he pay



any taxes.<sup>344</sup> Ehrenberg writes that in a sense the Sophists were the successors of the old itinerant artisans, medical men, bards, the *ᾠδὴοι* of Homer.<sup>345</sup> An effect of the Sophists' wandering from polis to polis was to help awaken a consciousness in the Greeks of their oneness as a people.<sup>346</sup> Gorgias and Hippias in particular advocated the notion of pan-Hellenism. Because they were independent "free lancers" the Sophists owed no responsibility to any institution nor did most of them owe any loyalty to Athens since they were for the most part non-Athenian.<sup>347</sup> Usually after a course of lessons was completed they dissolved the students who had gathered about them and moved on to the next town. Sometimes a number of students followed them.



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218. FREEMAN, Kathleen, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 385.
219. PROCLUS, On Euclid p. 272, 3 (Freidlein). Sprague 86 B21.
220. GUTHRIE, Sophists, p. 284.
221. PLATO, Hippias Major 285BC, translated by Jowett in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.  
See also PHILOSTRATUS, Lives, I II, 1. Sprague 86 A2.  
Also PLATO, Hippias Minor 367Eff.
222. Scholia on Aratus (Maass) 172 p. 369, 27. Sprague 86 B13.
223. FREEMAN, Kathleen, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 385.
224. DIOGENES LAERTIUS I 24. Sprague 86 B7.
225. PLATO, Hippias Major 285D, translated by Jowett in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
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230. Scholia on Pindar, Pythian 4, 288. Sprague 86 B14.
231. Scholia on Pindar, Nemean 7, 53. Sprague 86 B15.
232. Life of Homer (Roman), p. 30, 27 Wilamowitz. Sprague B18.
233. ATHENAEUS XIII 608F. Sprague 86 B4.  
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237. PLATO, Hippias Minor 364C. Sprague 86 A10.
238. SUIDAS. Sprague 86 A1.
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240. PHILOSTRATUS, Lives, I II, 4. Sprague 86 A2.
241. PAUSANIAS V 25, 4. Sprague 86 B1.
242. PLUTARCH, Numa 1. Sprague 86 B3.
243. CLEMENT, Miscellanies VI 15 (II 434, 19 Stählin). Sprague 86 B6.  
See also KERFERD, op. cit., pp. 48-49.  
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244. HERMOGENES, On Kinds of Literary Composition, B 399, 18 Rabe, (1-3). Sprague 87 A2.
245. Sprague pp. 108-111.
246. UNTERSTEINER, op. cit., pp. 228-229.



247. FREEMAN, Kathleen, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 393.
248. GUTHRIE, Sophists, p. 286.
249. ibid., p. 286.
250. XENOPHON, Memorabilia 1 6ff. Sprague 87 A8.
251. UNTERSTEINER, op. cit., p. 229.
252. Sprague 87 B67-B116.
253. Sprague 87 B117-B145.
254. Sprague 87 B146-B151.
255. Sprague 87 B152-B156.
256. FREEMAN, Kathleen, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, pp. 403-404.
257. PHILOSTRATUS, Lives, I 16. Sprague 88 A1.
258. In the Protagoras Critias was one of those assembled at the house of Callias. (Protagoras 316A, 336Dff.)
259. Scholium on Plato, Timaeus 21Aff. Sprague 88 A3.
260. KERFERD, op. cit., p. 52.  
See also GUTHRIE, Sophists, p. 301 for Critias' role as a Sophist.
261. FREEMAN, Kathleen, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 405.  
Also GUTHRIE, Sophists, p. 301.  
UNTERSTEINER, op. cit., p. 313.
262. DIOGENES LAERTIUS III 1. Sprague 88 A2.  
Also PLATO, Timaeus 20Eff. Sprague 88 A3.  
Also PLATO, Charmides 154B, 157E.
263. PHILOSTRATUS, Lives, I 16. Sprague 88 A1.
264. ATHENAEUS IV 184D. Sprague 88 A15.
265. XENOPHON, Memorabilia I 2, 12ff. Sprague 88 A4.  
For Critias being a disciple of Socrates see PHILOSTRATUS, Lives, I 16. Sprague 88 A1.  
Also PHILOPONUS on Aristotle, de Anima 89, 8. Sprague 88 A22.



Also PLATO, Charmides 156A.

266. XENOPHON, Memorabilia I 2, 31. Sprague 88 A4.
267. PHILOSTRATUS, Lives, I 16. Sprague 88 A1.  
Also (DEMOSTHENES), Against Theocrines 6. Sprague 88 A6.
268. GUTHRIE, Sophists, p. 301.
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273. LYSIAS 12, 43. Sprague 88 A11.
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282. MALLIUS THEODORUS, On Metres VI 589, 220 Keil.  
Sprague 88 B3.
283. HEPHAESTION 2, 3. Sprague 88 B4.
284. PLUTARCH, Alcibiades 33. Sprague 88 B5.
285. PHILOPONUS on Aristotle, de Anima 89, 8. Sprague 88 A22.
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287. Scholium on Euripides, Hippolytus 264. Sprague 88 B7.





288. PLUTARCH, Cimon 10. Sprague 88 B8.
289. STOBAEUS III 29, 11. Sprague 88 B9.
290. Anonymous Life of Euripides p. 135, 33. Sprague 88 B10.
291. STOBAEUS III 2, 15. Sprague 88 B12.
292. STOBAEUS II 8, 12; IV 20, 61. Sprague 88 B15.
293. Sprague 88 B15a.
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295. Scholium on Aristophanes, Birds 179. Sprague 88 B18.
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297. STOBAEUS II 8, 4. Sprague 88 B21.
298. STOBAEUS III 37, 15. Sprague 88 B22.
299. STOBAEUS IV 53, 23. Sprague 88 B23.
300. Sprague 88 B24.
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302. GUTHRIE, Sophists, p. 244.
303. ATHENAEUS XIV 662F. Sprague 88 B31.
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312. Sprague 88 B40, B41, B41a.
313. GALEN, Glossary of Hippocratic Terminology XIX 94 Kuhn.  
Sprague 88 B42.
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315. Sprague 88 B44-B73.
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317. KERFERD, op. cit., p. 54.  
See also GUTHRIE, Sophists, pp. 314-315.  
Also FREEMAN, Kathleen, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 414.
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FREEMAN, Kathleen, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 417, note A1.
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323. ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric II 24, 1401a26; also On Sophistical Refutations XX 177b12. Sprague Appendix 20.
324. XENOPHON, Memorabilia III I, 1. Sprague Appendix 1
325. SEXTUS, op. cit., VII 13; also VII 64. Sprague Appendix 21, 22  
Euthydemus is also mentioned in Plato's Cratylus:  
(Socrates speaking) Nor will you be disposed to say with Euthydemus that all things equally belong to all men at the same moment and always, for neither on his view can there be some good and others bad, if virtue and vice are always equally to be attributed to all. PLATO, Cratylus 386D, translated by Jowett in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
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## CHAPTER FOUR

### PHILOSOPHY OF THE EARLY SOPHISTS

#### Were the Sophists Philosophers ?

Before considering some of the Sophists' more philosophical teachings it might be useful to ascertain whether, indeed, these men deserve the title of philosophers. Jaeger answers in the negative, reasoning that Plato does not consider them philosophers, with one exception — he treats as philosophy Protagoras' theory of knowledge in the Theaetetus. But Protagoras is only one of many Sophists.<sup>1</sup> For Plato the Sophists, unlike the philosophers, are not concerned with truth: "the Sophist possesses a sort of reputed and apparent knowledge on all subjects, but not the reality."<sup>2</sup> Philosophical knowledge for Plato means knowing and understanding the immaterial transcendent Forms which constitute the only true reality. We read in the Sophist:

The Sophist takes refuge in the darkness of not-being, where he is at home and has the knack of feeling his way, and it is the darkness of the place that makes him so hard to perceive .... Whereas the philosopher, whose thoughts constantly dwell upon the nature of reality, is difficult to see because his region is so bright, for the eye of the vulgar soul cannot endure to keep its gaze on the divine.      3

At the very end of the Sophist Plato, through the mouth of the Stranger, truly castigates the Sophists, making clear that they are far removed from his conception of a philosopher:

He, then, who traces the pedigree of his art as follows — who, belonging to the conscious or dissembling section of the art of causing self-contradiction, is an imitator of appearance, and is separated from the class of phantastic which is a branch of image-making into that further division of creation, the juggling of words, a creation human, and not divine — any one who affirms the real Sophist to be of this blood and lineage will say the very truth.      4



Xenophon sees a clear distinction between the Sophists and the philosophers. In his treatise On Hunting he writes:

The sophists talk to deceive and write for their own gain, and do no good to anyone. For there is not, and there never was, a wise man among them; everyone of them is content to be called a sophist, which is a term of reproach among sensible men. So my advice is: avoid the behests of the sophists, and despise not the conclusions of the philosophers; for the sophists hunt the rich and young, but the philosophers are friends to all alike: but as for men's fortunes, they neither honour nor despise them. 5

Aristotle obviously did not consider the Sophists to be philosophers as he passed over them in the history of philosophy which he presents in the Metaphysics. In Book 3 of this work he declares that "sophistic is Wisdom which exists only in semblance" and that "sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but is not."<sup>6</sup>

Jaeger considers that it would be a mistake in historical perspective to regard the Sophists in the same light as such mature thinkers as the Pre-Socratic Anaximander, Parmenides, Heracleitus.<sup>7</sup> They were not in the direct line stemming from the pure disinterested philosophical research of the Ionian cosmologists which was not concerned with matters pertaining to human life:

The fact is that the Sophists did not understand philosophy divorced from life. They are the heirs of the educational tradition of the poets; they were the successors of Homer and Hesiod, Solon and Theognis, Simonides and Pindar. We cannot grasp their historical position until we give them their proper place in the history of Greek cultural education, as the inheritors of the poetic tradition. 8

It is true that they were little concerned with the pure disinterested pursuit of the Ionian cosmologists of abstract knowledge.

Rather they turned, as Jarrett asserts, to a more practical logic,



epistemology, and system of ethics. Logic to them was essentially a matter of successful argument; epistemology was fundamentally empirical and was steadfastly in opposition to any doctrine of unchanging truth, while their ethics were subjective, relativistic and mundane.<sup>9</sup>

Taylor is unequivocal on the point, maintaining that the Sophists were not philosophers, "for philosophy cannot exist where there is no belief in truth."<sup>10</sup> The traditional view of most critics is that the Sophists had no love of wisdom, no interest in ultimate truth, and little regard for absolute values. True knowledge was unattainable or, at best, relative and, anyhow, knowledge, whatever it was, was not an end in itself. As Zeller writes, the great moral problem posed by the Sophists was that they were more interested in persuading their audience of the advantages of the present argument rather than seeking to discover some ultimate truth.<sup>11</sup> It was not their intention to seek for the first causes of things. Crane Brinton declares that the realm of truth aimed at by the Sophists, on the one hand, and by Socrates, on the other, puts us in mind of the distinction between VERSTAND and VERNUNFT. The Sophists' understanding was at the level of the former "with their prudent, indeed banalistic, bookkeepers' reason", while Socrates' insight "into a world where there are no bookkeepers, and no books" was clearly a matter of VERNUNFT.<sup>12</sup> Whereas Socrates believed that knowledge was virtue, the Sophists held success was virtue.<sup>13</sup> As Cary and Haarhoff succinctly phrase it, while the philosophers followed the path to





knowledge, the Sophists only pursued the path to success.<sup>14</sup> Castle remarks that they may best be described as "professors of practical wisdom".<sup>15</sup>

G.B. Kerferd declares that the question whether the Sophists were philosophers or not depends partly on how philosophy is defined and that in this regard the shade of Platonism is still influential.<sup>16</sup> Admittedly the Sophists were concerned with the world in which we actually live, a world which for Plato was only an imitation of reality and as such was not a true object of philosophy. But as Kerferd writes, "The time is surely long past when the rejection of any transcendent reality can be taken as evidence that the search for truth has been abandoned."<sup>17</sup> He continues, stating that even if it is acknowledged that truth can be aimed at without any concern for transcendent reality an objection can be made that the Sophists were not even interested in empirical truths and that this "is indeed the traditional view of the nature of the sophistic movement."<sup>18</sup> However, he himself concludes that, from a study of the admittedly incomplete writings of the Sophists, clear indications exist "of a range of technical doctrines under discussion in what we would now call the spheres of philosophy and sociology."<sup>19</sup> Chambliss, though unwilling to give the Sophists the title of philosophers, writes that they were at least influential in the history of philosophy:

with the Sophists philosophic wisdom became a fundamental part of Greek culture; after them poetic wisdom alone was inadequate to make one an educated man. And this is so



even if the Sophists themselves were not philosophers. 20 Augustus Wilkins declares that there is a good case to be made for the Sophists to be called the fathers of moral philosophy rather than Socrates. They were the ones who led the advance from Sittlichkeit or "unconscious morality" to Moralität or "philosophical morality" when ethical concepts have as their basis rationality and no longer rest upon tradition. This step must be attended by much questioning of accepted beliefs and much scepticism and intellectual challenging.<sup>21</sup>

While considering the question whether the Sophists were philosophers or not it is worthwhile to remember that the Germans often give to this period of Greek history the term that belongs to their own 18th Century "Aufklärung" or Enlightenment,<sup>22</sup> and the Sophists, according to Wilhelm Windelband, are "first and foremost the bearers of the Greek Enlightenment."<sup>23</sup> Brinton likens them to the Eighteenth Century philosophes, "no-nonsense rationalists", and asserts that they probably truly believed that proper thinking could lead man to right conduct and to individual and social well-being.<sup>24</sup> W.T. Stace also sees the age of the Sophists as exhibiting many of the trends of an age of Aufklärung where extreme individualism and subjectivity are the dominant characteristics. But this for him is a reason for reprehension. He finds that the whole tenor of the teaching of the Sophists was "destructive and anti-social". It tended to undermine religion, morality, the very foundations and established institutions of the State.<sup>25</sup> On the other hand, John Burnet declares



that the Eighteenth Century Aufklärung does not find a counterpart in the age of the Sophists, as is commonly thought, but much earlier and 'Xenophanes, not Protagoras, is its apostle. It is not to religion but to science that Protagoras and Gorgias take up a negative attitude, and we shall never understand them if we lose sight of that fundamental distinction. The "Age of the Sophists" is, above all, an age of reaction against science.'<sup>26</sup> Dodds agrees that it is a mistake to identify the Greek Aufklärung and the Sophistic Movement as being the same, declaring that the Enlightenment predates the age of the Sophists by a long time and representatives of it include such early original thinkers as Hecataeus, Xenophanes, and Heracleitus.<sup>27</sup>

While it remains a moot point among scholars whether the early Sophistic Movement should be termed a philosophic one or not there is no doubt from a study of the extant evidence that much of their teaching was concerned with what we would include under the headings of political and social philosophy, epistemology, ethics. Of course, we should beware of the danger of trying to read too much into those few scattered fragments of the Sophists' teachings which are extant so as to attribute to these teachers a deeper, more coherent, and more consistent system of doctrines than they, in fact, held.<sup>28</sup> As A.P. Cavendish declares, all we know of the Sophists' teachings are "disconnected dicta". Our understanding of them is limited to "a vague general impression of the tenor of their doctrines rather than any coherent outline of them."<sup>29</sup> Also we must always remember





that the Sophists were individual teachers usually with little contact with each other and that the doctrines of one sometimes bore little resemblance to those of another. As Zeller remarks, the subjectivism and individualism which are commonly attributed to the Sophists are by no means found equally in them all. Great differences exist in the theories of epistemology and ethics of individual Sophists.<sup>30</sup>

It is commonly remarked that the age of the early Sophists is one which is distinguished by a general air of scepticism. Indeed, it would be understandable if a sceptical attitude with regard to the attainment of knowledge followed from the Eleatic denial of the trustworthiness of sense perceptions and the claims of Zeno about the contradictions involved in the popular views of plurality and motion.<sup>31</sup> The calling into question of the general reliability of man's reason stimulated uncertainty. Since Thales' day the great number of competing doctrines attempting to render a scientific explanation of the universe only served to demonstrate "the incapacity of the human mind to fathom the nature of the universe."<sup>32</sup> With regard to the Pre-Socratic philosophers, Scoon writes:

The conflicting and irreconcilable solutions of the cosmological problem, together with the obvious absurdity and uselessness of the dialectical puzzles that were now put forward as explanations of nature, began by throwing doubt on the whole construction, and finally induced a feeling of weariness and disgust with natural science in general. The inevitable result was scepticism. 33

As has been mentioned earlier the general intellectual interest of the wise men now changed from external reality to man and a prevail-



ing preoccupation with humanism became the dominant characteristic of the age.<sup>34</sup> As Zeller writes:

Sophism is then in the first place a philosophy of civilization and is distinguished in its subject matter from the previous philosophy of nature. Its object is man as an individual and as a social being together with the culture created by him in language, art, poetry, ethics, and politics. 35

While the cosmologists had tried to show man how to take advantage of nature, the Sophists attempted to teach them how to take advantage of organized society.<sup>36</sup> We may agree with Windelband<sup>37</sup> when he declares that what Cicero says with regard to Socrates bringing philosophy down from the heavens and introducing it into the cities and houses may equally well be said of the Sophists:

Socrates autem primus philosophiam devocavit e caelo et in urbibus conlocavit et in domus etiam introduxit et coegit de vita et moribus rebusque bonis et malis quaerere. 38

### The Epistemological Relativism of Certain Sophists

I wish in this section to discuss very briefly the alleged epistemological relativism of certain Sophists. I intend to do little more than mention the sources which point to such relativism as detailed philosophical analysis of this evidence is beyond the scope of this work.

#### a) Protagoras:

It seems that Protagoras, as indeed some of the other Sophists, displayed a distinct relativism with regard to the attainment of knowledge. Sextus writes concerning Protagoras:



Some also reckoned Protagoras of Abdera in the company of those philosophers who do away with the standard of judgement, since he says that all appearances and opinions are true and that truth is a relative matter because a man's every perception or opinion immediately exists in relation to him. At any rate, he begins the Refutations with the following pronouncement: "Of all things the measure is man, of things that are that they are, and of things that are not that they are not". 39

In his Outlines of Pyrrhonism Sextus repeats Protagoras' alleged doctrine of the relativity of knowledge:

So he says, in effect, that man is the standard of judgement of all things, of those that are that they are, and of those that are not that they are not. And for this reason he posits only what appears to the individual, thus introducing relativity. 40

Plato in the Cratylus has Socrates agree that Protagoras' thought is relativistic:

For he says that man is the measure of all things, and that things are to me as they appear to me, and that they are to you as they appear to you. 41

Aristotle in the Metaphysics also agrees with this assessment of Protagoras' famous dictum:

He said that of all things the measure is man, meaning simply that what appears to each person also IS positively the case. But once this is taken to be so, the same thing turns out both to be and not to be, and to be bad as well as good, not to mention the other opposites, since often what seems beautiful to this group of people will seem the opposite to that group, and since what appears to each man is taken to be the measure. 42

Most modern scholars agree with the relativistic assessment of Protagoras' homo-mensura principle. Parker declares that while Protagoras' teaching was certainly on a nobler plane than that of





many of the Sophists, however with regard to content and attitude it was "as highly subjective and as dangerously relative as theirs".<sup>43</sup> Maurice Bowra writes that logically this principle "could lead only to solipsism and an infinite series of isolated, private universes, whose inmates are incommunicably severed from one another."<sup>44</sup> W.K.C. Guthrie agrees that Protagoras embraced an extreme scepticism according to which no reality whatsoever exists other than the appearances perceived by an individual and that each individual's impressions are as true as those of anyone else. There is "no difference between appearing and being."<sup>45</sup> The notion that everything is as the individual perceives it seems to imply that there are no fixed standards.<sup>46</sup> As we have seen, during the age in which Protagoras lived more and more people began to acknowledge that truth was relative: "different standards, beliefs, and institutions seemed to be working equally well in different settings and backgrounds — there appeared to be nothing ultimate or absolute about any of them."<sup>47</sup> (It should also be pointed out in connection with the homo-mensura principle that Protagoras' famous rhetorical technique of making the lesser argument victorious could hardly have helped to change his reputation for teaching relativism).

It would appear straightaway that the homo-mensura principle afforded a poor foundation for education. Protagoras was a teacher. How could he justify his profession if everyone's perceptions are true for that person, and if each one is the best judge of his own experiences ? In fact the question is raised in the Theaetetus.<sup>48</sup>



In the Cratylus, in like vein, Socrates asks how some people may be termed wise and others foolish if the doctrine of Protagoras is accepted. For if each man is the measure and what appears to each man is true for that man how then could one man be wiser than another ?<sup>49</sup>

While Protagoras' homo-mensura principle is certainly concerned with sense perceptions — knowledge is perception — it must also be asked whether he would wish to include the whole range of ethical values also. It seems that the answer is the affirmative. He said that man was the measure of "all things" — *πάντων χρημάτων* — and this is to be taken literally. In the Theaetetus Socrates takes upon himself Protagoras' mantle and attempts to defend the Sophist's views as he would have wished.<sup>50</sup> (However, it must be always kept in mind that Plato's interpretation of Protagoras' views may be suspect). Here the ethical relativism seems clear:

For I hold that whatever practices seem right and laudable to any particular state are so, for that state, so long as it holds by them. 51

Fuller writes that to transfer the homo-mensura principle from the sphere of theory to that of practical conduct and relations is to invite moral anarchy in society.<sup>52</sup> Does Protagoras then advocate total and utter anarchy ? No, it seems not, if we may believe Plato's evidence as presented in Theaetetus 166C-168B. While reiterating that what appears true to one is true for that person still there is a great difference between each person's "truth". There is such a thing as wisdom and the wise man, and the wise man is defined as



one who can change someone else. Protagoras considers the example of a sick man whose food appears sour and the healthy man whose food appears the opposite. Both persons have hold of the truth. The food IS sour to the sick man while it IS the opposite to the healthy man. Neither man is wiser than the other. However, one state is said to be BETTER. The physician is the wise man who changes the worse condition to the better by means of drugs. In like manner, with regard to education the Sophist produces a change in condition (from worse to better) by means of discourse:

It is not that a man makes someone who previously thought what is false think what is true, for it is not possible either to think the thing that is not or to think anything but what one experiences, and all experiences are true. Rather, I should say, when someone by reason of a depraved condition of mind has thoughts of a like character, one makes him, by reason of a sound condition, think other and sound thoughts, which some people ignorantly call true, whereas I should say that one set of thoughts is better than the other, but not in any way truer. 53

The wise man changes the views both of society at large and of the individual from a less sound condition to a more sound one. Here Protagoras gets in his plug for the Sophists. The Sophist because he is wise can guide his pupils in the way they ought to go and is accordingly worth a considerable fee.

Obviously there are problems involved in Protagoras' ethical relativism and his remedy for avoiding anarchy seems inconsistent with the fundamental homo-mensura principle. However, whether Protagoras was himself cognizant of all the implications of his ethical relativism is unclear. At any rate, though a relativist and





subjectivist with regard to knowledge he was far from being a thorough-going nihilist. While each man might be free to find his own truth Protagoras, as we have seen, considered that one truth was better than another. As Scoon states, "Protagoras did not carry his relativism into morality, and he was not an anarchist."<sup>54</sup>

While it would have been a short step for Protagoras to move to the standpoint of the "agnostic hedonist" it was one he did not seem to take.<sup>55</sup> As T. Gomperz declares, as evidence for Protagoras'

ethical views being at least as elevated as others of his age we may point to Plato's treatment of them and also the notable silence of opponents.<sup>56</sup> Fuller agrees, writing that if individual and

societal anarchy had been preached or practiced by Protagoras we would have been made aware of it by his enemies.<sup>57</sup> Protagoras is nowhere accused of immorality by Plato but if Plato could have done so he would undoubtedly not have foregone the opportunity.<sup>58</sup>

Also while Protagoras was an advocate of the relativity of truth, nevertheless he was certainly a supporter of law and tradition.

Indeed, as we shall see later, his firm advocacy of the value of institutions, conventions, and the forces of law is well illustrated by his Great Myth in the Platonic dialogue which bears his name.

#### b) Gorgias:

Gorgias is also considered to have been possessed of severe epistemological doubts as we may at once discern by the title of his no longer extant philosophical work, On the Nonexistent or On Nature. In



this treatise, as Sextus tells us in Against the Schoolmasters,

Gorgias set out to prove three points:

first and foremost, that nothing exists; second that even if it exists it is inapprehensible to man; third, that even if it is apprehensible, still it is without a doubt incapable of being expressed or explained to the next man. 59

It has often been held that Gorgias was not really a philosopher and that his tripartite dictum belongs more to the sphere of rhetoric and ought not to be taken too seriously. For example, Léon Robin considers that Gorgias' main motive in philosophizing was to display his expertise and virtuosity in the rhetorical art and that at bottom his theory was "just a learned game, an exhibition of dialectical acrobatics."<sup>60</sup> A.R. Burn writes that instead of Gorgias' famous tripartite statement constituting a strict philosophical viewpoint perhaps it was intended as the theme for a rhetorical tour de force.<sup>61</sup> John M. Robinson argues that Gorgias was somewhat lacking in the attributes required of a philosopher. While admitting that Gorgias may have taken his treatise on the nonexistent seriously Robinson declares that what he is "not willing to do is to take it seriously myself."<sup>62</sup> Guthrie, on the other hand, considers that while the treatise is a parody — the very title being a sufficient sign of this — however the intention was serious all the same: "it is a mistake to think that parody is incompatible with serious intention."<sup>63</sup> Kerferd asserts that it is not plausible that Gorgias' treatise was purely a rhetorical exercise<sup>64</sup> and in his recent work on the Sophistic Movement he argues that in order that Gorgias' treatise be interpreted correctly the Sophist must be placed "firm-



ly, even if rather destructively, within the main stream of the history of philosophy."<sup>65</sup> However, it is outside the realm of this work to provide a detailed analysis of the philosophical questions entailed in the extant remains of Gorgias' treatise. Even if it exaggerates to declare that his thought is nihilistic there is little doubt that it is relativistic and that he is sceptical about the possibility of attaining knowledge.<sup>66</sup>

#### c) Xeniades of Corinth:

Before concluding this very brief survey of Sophistic relativism the Sophist Xenocrates of Corinth should be mentioned about whom nothing is known other than a few lines in Sextus. This Xenocrates is said to have held that "everything is false, that every sense-image and opinion lie, and that everything which comes to be, comes to be from the nonexistent, and everything which passes away, passes away into the nonexistent."<sup>67</sup> However, what Xenocrates exactly meant by this we do not know.

#### Attitudes Towards God(s)

Any discussion of the Sophists' philosophical views should involve some consideration of their attitudes towards the gods. The anthropocentric character of the Sophistic Movement is often seen to reflect a drawing away from the traditional belief in the divinities towards a more rationalistic humanist Weltanschauung.<sup>68</sup> Certainly the





Sophists were not the first Greeks to question traditional theological attitudes. Xenophanes had criticized the depiction of the gods in the early poets:

Both Homer and Hesiod have attributed to the gods all things that are shameful and a reproach among mankind: theft, adultery, and mutual deception. 69

He also seems to have anticipated the agnostic sentiments of Protagoras:

And as for certain truth, no man has seen it, nor will there ever be a man who knows about the gods and about all the things I mention. For if he succeeds to the full in saying what is completely true, he himself is nevertheless unaware of it; and Opinion (seeming) is fixed by fate upon all things. 70

It is likely that Heracleitus was thinking of the treatment of the gods in the Iliad and the Odyssey when he declared:

Homer deserves to be flung out of the contests and given a beating; and also Archilochus. 71

Later Euripides was horrified at the notion of attributing any evil to the gods:

ἐὶ θεοὶ τι δρῶσιν λίσχρόν, οὐκ εἰσὶν θεοί 72

If gods act in a shameful manner, they are not gods.

There are many other apposite references in his plays.

Our knowledge of the individual Sophist's belief or disbelief in the deities is sketchy because of our lack of evidence. It is likely that Protagoras was an agnostic. One sentence from his work, On the Gods, is extant:

Concerning the gods I cannot know either that they exist or that they do not exist, or what form they might have,



for there is much to prevent one's knowing: the obscurity of the subject and the shortness of man's life. 73

Diogenes Laertius also has this quotation except that he omits the phrase "or what form they might have".<sup>74</sup> There is a tradition that Protagoras got into serious trouble for this agnosticism, that the Athenians banished him from their territory, and that his books were burned.<sup>75</sup> Sextus writes that the Athenians even voted that Protagoras be put to death.<sup>76</sup> Philostratus records the tradition that Protagoras may have received some contact with the teachings of the Magi when the Persian army under Xerxes came through Abdera in Thrace in 480 B.C. and that it was from this instruction that he derived his doubts about the existence of the gods.<sup>77</sup> However, Kathleen Freeman declares that she sees no evidence of Persian thought in Protagoras' recorded doctrines.<sup>78</sup>

It is possible, as Bury remarks, that Protagoras may have believed in the gods; however, it was the acquisition of knowledge concerning the gods that he denied.<sup>79</sup> John Warbeke states that he is reflecting "an honorable open-mindedness".<sup>80</sup> Far from preaching any radical departure from the City's religious beliefs and practices Protagoras, as Burnet suggests, was probably recommending his audience to worship according to the custom of one's respective city: "If we cannot attain sure knowledge about the gods by ourselves, we shall do well to accept the recognized worship. That is what we should expect the champion of Law against Nature to say."<sup>81</sup> It is probably impossible to know for certain what Protagoras' true views



on the topic were but it is surely not legitimate to assert from our single fragment that he was an atheist. However Diogenes of Oenoanda was rash enough to take this step, declaring that Protagoras' agnostic statement concerning the gods "amounts to saying that he knows they do not exist".<sup>82</sup>

Critias is famous for his view expressed in the fragment of his satyr-play Sisyphus<sup>83</sup> that religion was invented by a clever and wise man in order that wrongdoing might be curtailed out of fear of the gods. Guthrie declares that this view "may well have been as original as it was daring" as it is found nowhere else at this time.<sup>84</sup> The fragment states that there was a time when the earth was uncivilized and bestial, and brute force reigned. The good were not rewarded nor were the evil punished. Accordingly men instituted laws in order that lawlessness might be quelled. However, although the laws checked much public evil still misdeeds committed in secret were left unnoticed and unpunished.<sup>85</sup> It was at this stage that a clever and wise man invented fear of the gods to check mortals from acting, saying, or thinking anything wrong in secret. So the divine was introduced:

There is a deity flourishing with indestructible life. Through mind it hears, sees, is extremely thoughtful, and attends to these things, bearing divine nature [in itself]. It will hear all that is said among mortals and will be able to see all that is done. If in silence you plan some evil, this will not escape the notice of the gods. For thought is in it <to too great a degree>.

It is admitted that the man who invented this fear of the gods obscured the truth with a false doctrine. However, laws were instit-





uted and lawlessness was curtailed. The fragment ends with two lines which Sextus declares occurred a little later in the play:

And I think it was in this way that someone first persuaded mortals to think that there existed a race of deities. 86

If the sentiments thus expressed in the Sisyphus correspond to the views actually held by Critias himself it would seem that he must have espoused atheism.

It was commonly held in antiquity that Prodicus was an atheist.<sup>87</sup>

Sextus declared: "those who are called in derision atheists say that there is no god at all, such as Euhemerus ... and Diagoras of Melos and Prodicus of Ceos and Theodorus ...".<sup>88</sup> However, as Kerferd points out,<sup>89</sup> because of the scattered and fragmentary nature of the sources, most of them late, concerning Prodicus' religious views it is really only possible to describe what he had to say but not to interpret it. There were apparently two aspects of his views on the origin of religion. Firstly he held that in ancient times those things which were of major nourishment and benefit to mankind came to be considered gods: "Prodicus says that anything which benefits life is assumed to be a god, such as sun and moon and rivers and springs and grassland and everything of that sort."<sup>90</sup> Cicero in his On the Nature of the Gods wrote: "But what of this ? Prodicus of Ceos, the man who said that those things which benefit human life are what are called gods — what has he left us of religion ?"<sup>91</sup> Secondly, Prodicus held that those discoverers of things helping to alleviate the cares of daily life came in time to be considered



divine: "later ... persons who first invented shelters or found new means of obtaining food or hit upon useful techniques were called names like Demeter, Dionysus, and the like."<sup>92</sup> The words of Themistius seem to imply that Prodicus may not have believed in the independent existence of the gods:<sup>93</sup>

We are already near to the mystical rites and we shall blend the wisdom of Prodicus into our discourse. He derived all of mankind's sacrifices and mysteries and cults from the fair works of tillage, since it is his opinion both that the idea of the gods comes to men in this way, and thus \*\*\* he guarantees every sort of piety. 94

In fine, while Guthrie inclines to agree with antiquity's assessment of Prodicus' atheism T. Gomperz considers it unlikely that he was an atheist otherwise the rigidly orthodox Xenophon would not have spoken of him with such respect nor would the Stoic Persaeus, favourite pupil of Zeno, have approved of Prodicus' religious doctrines in his work, On the Gods.<sup>95</sup> But for lack of evidence the question of atheism must remain moot.

### The Political, Social, and Ethical Views of Certain Sophists

I intend in this section to consider briefly certain political, social, and ethical views of a number of Sophists. In this regard it should be remembered that much of the speculation of the Sophists on society mirrored the question of the dichotomy between NOMOS and PHYSIS which has been mentioned earlier.

#### a) Protagoras:

At the outset it should be stressed that the main evidence which we



possess for Protagoras' political and social philosophy are the dialogues of Plato, particularly the Protagoras, and that, as I have stated on a number of occasions, Plato may not be completely objective with respect to the Sophists.

In the Platonic dialogue which bears his name Protagoras employs the celebrated Myth to illustrate the thesis that virtue can be taught.<sup>96</sup> Once there was a time when gods existed but no mortals. When it was time for these latter to be born the gods entrusted Prometheus and Epimetheus with the task of assigning appropriate powers to each kind. Epimetheus took it upon himself to do the work. To some creatures, the slow ones, he allotted strength; to the weaker ones he gave speed. To the small he assigned the power of flight or the facility for living underground. Some he made big so that their very size would protect them. "Thus he made his whole distribution on a principle of compensation, being careful by these devices that no species should be destroyed."<sup>97</sup> After providing for the well-being and the appropriate methods of living for all the brute animals it was realized by Epimetheus that all the available gifts had been utilized but that the human had not been supplied — they had been left naked, unshod, uncovered and unarmed. Prometheus who came to oversee the operation decided, as a remedy, to steal from Hephaestus and Athena technical skill and fire and grant them to man. But while man now had enough resources to keep himself alive he still had no political wisdom — *πολιτική σοφία*. However, because of his kinship with the divine he worshipped the gods and





built them altars and statues. Also because of their gifts men now discovered the art of speech, invented houses, clothes, footwear, beds, and learned how to utilize the land in order to obtain nourishment.

At first men lived in scattered groups being a prey to wild animals. Seeking to protect themselves they gathered together and founded cities. But because they lacked the political art they continually fought one another, dispersed, and were devoured by the animals. Therefore Zeus, fearing the destruction of the human race, sent Hermes to bestow the quality of respect for others, *αἰδώς*, and a sense of justice, *δίκη*, to all men. Zeus decreed that every man was to have a share in these gifts: for "There could never be cities if only a few shared in these virtues, as in the arts. Moreover, you must lay it down as my law that if anyone is incapable of acquiring his share of these two virtues he shall be put to death as a plague to the city."<sup>98</sup>

In the logos which follows the myth Protagoras asserts that though there are individual experts capable of giving advice in all the various skills, for example building, however with regard to political wisdom every man's opinion must be listened to, for this virtue is shared by all. Also Protagoras seeks to demonstrate that this political virtue is not innate nor automatic but is acquired by instruction and taking thought. Accordingly, those who are ugly or dwarfish or weak by nature do not receive punishment. But those



who lack the good qualities which have been attained through care and practice and instruction are indeed punished:

Among these faults are to be put injustice and irreligion and in general everything that is contrary to civic virtue. In this field indignation and admonition are universal, evidently because of a belief that such virtue can be acquired by taking thought or by instruction. Just consider the function of punishment, Socrates, in relation to the wrongdoer. That will be enough to show you that men believe it possible to impart goodness. In punishing wrongdoers, no one concentrates on the fact that a man has done wrong in the past, or punishes him on that account, unless taking blind vengeance like a beast. No, punishment is not inflicted by a rational man for the sake of the crime that has been committed — after all one cannot undo what is past — but for the sake of the future, to prevent either the same man or, by the spectacle of his punishment, someone else, from doing wrong again. But to hold such a view amounts to holding that virtue can be instilled by education; at all events the punishment is inflicted as a deterrent. This then is the view held by all who inflict it whether privately or publicly. And your fellow countrymen, the Athenians, certainly do inflict punishment and correction on supposed wrongdoers, as do others also. This argument shows that they too think it possible to impart and teach goodness. 99

Thus Protagoras held the enlightened view that the purpose of punishment was intimidation and amelioration and was not for exacting vengeance.<sup>100</sup>

Protagoras, in favour of authority and tradition, supports the value of education. We are told that he held that learning should begin at an early age and that "teaching requires natural endowment and practice."<sup>101</sup> It is also reported that he said: "Education does not sprout in the soul unless one goes to a great depth."<sup>102</sup> He approves the curriculum of the elementary school of the day. The chief end of all the teaching is character-training. After the child has learned the alphabet and has a basic knowledge of reading he is



obliged to read the works of the great poets. He is made to learn these poems by heart so that he "may be inspired to imitate them and long to be like them".<sup>103</sup>

The child is then sent to the music master where he is taught the lyre and is introduced to the works of the lyric poets. These poems are set to music and the children are to become quite familiar with their harmonies and rhythms. By these means they will "become more civilized, more balanced, and better adjusted in themselves and so more capable in whatever they say or do."<sup>104</sup> The boy is then despatched to the gymnastic teacher in order that his body may be trained to minister to a virtuous mind and in order that he will never be obliged through any weakness of the body to act in a cowardly fashion.<sup>105</sup> After the boy leaves school he is compelled to learn the laws of the State and live according to their dictates and not after his own whims and fancies:

(Protagoras speaking) You know how, when children are not yet good at writing, the writing master traces outlines with the pencil before giving them the slate, and makes them follow the lines as a guide in their own writing; well, similarly the state sets up the laws, which are inventions of good lawgivers of ancient times, and compels the citizens to rule and be ruled in accordance with them. Whoever strays outside the lines, it punishes, and the name given to this punishment both among yourselves and in many other places is correction, intimating that the penalty corrects or guides. 106

Protagoras who assents to this shows himself to be a conservative who enjoins adherence to the conventions of the State. As Kerferd remarks, Protagoras defends nomos as against physis, as nomos is a fundamental necessity in order that human societies should exist.<sup>107</sup>





Burnet is correct in his assertion that "So far from being a revolutionary, he was the champion of traditional morality, not from old-fashioned prejudice, but from a strong belief in the value of social conventions."<sup>108</sup> (As we have seen from the brief summary provided in Chapter Three the Anonymous Iamblich also espouses the support of the *nomoi* of man).

Protagoras ends his peroration by declaring that virtue, beyond question, can be taught:

Seeing then that all this care is taken over virtue, both individually and by the state, are you surprised that virtue should be teachable, and puzzled to know whether it is ? There is nothing to be surprised at. The wonder would be if it were not teachable. 109

b) Hippias :

Hippias was also interested in the relation between *nomos* and *physis*. Xenophon relates a conversation between Socrates and the Sophist, the subject of which was law. (Once again, the difficulty should be stressed of relying on such evidence for determining the actual views of the Sophists). It is agreed by the two men that laws have a solid contractual origin and are not by nature. Laws are covenants made by the citizens of a State by which it is enacted what is to be done and what is to be avoided. Socrates asserts that he who obeys the laws acts justly and is just. Hippias now hesitates, declaring that "Laws can hardly be thought of much account, Socrates, or observance of them, seeing that the very men who passed them often



reject and amend them."<sup>110</sup> He thus seems to be minimizing the necessity of adhering to man-made laws. Socrates strenuously disagrees asserting that those cities whose citizens abide by the laws are strongest and happiest. (He himself, though he could have escaped, chose to obey the nomoi of Athens and suffered death as a consequence).

The conversation next turns to the question of "unwritten laws" and Hippias declares that they are those laws "that are uniformly observed in every country". They could not have been made by men since all men could not have met together and all do not speak the same language. Hippias concludes that the unwritten laws have been made by the gods for men. Socrates and Hippias agree that the first of these universal laws is to fear the gods while the duty of honouring parents is another. Hippias is uncertain whether avoiding incest between parents and children constitutes another law of God since it is a law which he notices is sometimes transgressed. However, Socrates answers that such laws are often broken in many ways. Rather, he suggests that the difference between the divine laws and man-made laws is that "the transgressors of the laws ordained by the gods pay a penalty that a man can in no wise escape, as some, when they transgress the laws ordained by man, escape punishment, either by concealment or by violence." Hippias concurs.<sup>111</sup> As Guthrie declares, it appears that the "unwritten laws" and the natural laws are the same.<sup>112</sup>



The dichotomy between *nomos* and *physis* is also considered by Hippias in the Protagoras where he addresses those present in the house of Callias:

Gentlemen, ... I count you all my kinsmen and family and fellow citizens — by nature, not by convention. By nature like is kin to like, but custom, the tyrant of mankind, does much violence to nature. 113

It is true that Hippias, the cosmopolite, was better equipped than most Sophists, or indeed most Greeks, to see beyond the narrow confines of *nomoi* to the unity provided by *physis*. He had travelled extensively and was very interested in history; it is highly probable, as Zeller declares, that his theory of natural law was based on his wide ethnological researches.<sup>114</sup> It is debatable, however, whether Hippias was arguing for the unity of all mankind, Greek and barbarian, when he called his audience in the Protagoras "my kinsmen and family and fellow citizens — by nature, not by convention".<sup>115</sup> It is possible that all he intended was that every Greek (all his audience were Greek) was a member of the one family, or merely that every philosopher was alike by nature.<sup>116</sup> Kerferd considers that, according to the phrase that by nature like is kin to like, Hippias probably wished "to argue for the universal kinship of all human beings who share any specific likeness, e.g. all children, all women, all wise men or all beggars, and so on."<sup>117</sup> Certainly, Untersteiner holds that Hippias was advocating a cosmopolitanism by which he considered that men of all cities and nations were kinsmen. Untersteiner also asserts that Hippias helped to advance this cosmopolitanism by his usage of non-Greek sources in his ethnological





researches.<sup>118</sup>

Guthrie, though decrying the scantiness of our evidence for the espousal of the unity or brotherhood of mankind in the Fifth Century, writes that "it would be strange if belief in universal, 'natural' laws of human behaviour were not accompanied by a conviction that the human race is fundamentally akin."<sup>119</sup> However, Pamela Huby in her book Greek Ethics declares that it is "exceedingly conjectural" whether Hippias held that all men are equal by nature and should therefore treat each other as brothers. Such theories, she writes, did not take root for a long time.<sup>120</sup> It is clear, at least, that Gorgias propounded the kinship of Greeks. He preached homonoia or concord in his Olympic Oration urging the Greeks to turn their attention against the barbarians and not against each other.<sup>121</sup> In his Funeral Oration delivered at Athens he asserted that victories over barbarians require hymns of praise, but those over Greeks require dirges.<sup>122</sup>

While trying to evaluate the importance of Hippias as an ethical thinker it is a pity that there is not extant his discourse called the "Trojan Dialogue" by Philostratus,<sup>123</sup> "a beautiful work distinguished by a fine style among its other merits".<sup>124</sup> This contains the advice given by Nestor, at the Fall of Troy, to Achilles' son Neoptolemus concerning the honourable pursuits which a young man should follow in order to attain a good reputation. It is quite possible, however, that this epideixis is as banal and as full of commonplaces as Prodicus' "Choice of Heracles" which we shall consid-



er later. According to the evidence of Plato, Hippias also provided ethical exegeses of characterization in Homer: "I say that Homer intended Achilles to be the bravest of the men who went to Troy, Nestor the wisest, and Odysseus the wiliest."<sup>125</sup>

Stobaeus provides us with two quotations from Plutarch's lost work On Slander which help us to piece together Hippias' ethical views.

In the first, Hippias posits two kinds of envy, one just when bad men are begrudged the honour bestowed on them, the other unjust when the honour is begrudged to good men. Accordingly, the envious have double suffering, "for they are vexed not only, as others are, by their own ills but also by others' goods."<sup>126</sup> In the second quotation Hippias claims how terrible slander is for no redress is provided by the law against slanderers as there is against thieves. And indeed slanderers are thieves, for they rob one's best possession, friendship. Therefore, concludes Hippias, "violence, wicked as it is, is more just than slander, in that it is not concealed."<sup>127</sup> As Guthrie points out, this is a definite objection by Hippias to *nomos*.<sup>128</sup>

#### c) Lycophron:

Aristotle in the Politics attacks a view of Lycophron, termed the protectionist view of the State by Kerferd,<sup>129</sup> that the State's function is to guarantee men's rights with regard to each other but that it has nothing to do with making men good and just:

..... the community becomes an alliance, differing only



in location from the other sorts of alliance, where the members live at a distance. And the law becomes a convention and, as Lycophron the sophist said, "a guarantor of mutual rights", but not such as to make the citizens good and just. 130

It is a theory, as Untersteiner remarks, which is uttered with pitiless realism.<sup>131</sup>

A fragment of Lycophron couches an egalitarian sentiment and castigates the worth assigned to "good birth":

What I mean is this: Is (good birth) something valuable and worthwhile or, as Lycophron the Sophist wrote, something altogether worthless ? Comparing it with other goods he asserts: "now the nobility of good birth is obscure, and its grandeur a matter of words", on the grounds that preference for it looks to opinion, whereas in fact there is no difference between the ignoble and the well-born. 132

It seems that it should be a short step from such a sentiment to the view that slavery is wrong. However, we cannot assign this view to the Sophists of the Fifth Century B.C. with any degree of certainty. We have indeed a quotation from the Messenian Speech of the late Sophist, Alcidas, the disciple of Gorgias, where it is stated that "God left all men free, nature has made no man a slave."<sup>133</sup> However, this speech was written about 360 B.C. It is true that Euripides in his tragedies, reflecting the new intellectual climate, can sound a particularly defiant democratic note. In the Ion we read:

Save for the something shameful in the name,  
The slave hath no disgrace, and but for that  
May stand by virtue equal with the free. 134

#### d) Antiphon:

There are extant important papyri fragments, discovered in the second





decade of this century, of Antiphon's work On Truth which contains some ethical views of the Sophist. The sentiments expressed in one fragment display an egalitarianism and accord well with his general espousal of physis as against nomos which I shall discuss shortly. It should be noted that the fragment is in a poor condition and that it is difficult to present a wholly satisfactory reading:

We <respect> and revere those who are of good parentage, but those who are not of good family we neither <respect> nor revere. In this behaviour we have become like barbarians one to another, when in fact by nature we all have the same nature in all particulars, barbarians and Greeks. We have only to consider the things which are natural and necessary to all mankind. These are open to all <to get> in the same way, and in <all> these there is no distinction of barbarian or Greek. For we all breathe out into the air by the mouth and the nose, and we <all eat with our hands> .... 135

Although the text is uncertain it seems that Antiphon means to indicate that there is no essential difference between high-born and low-born, Greek and barbarian.<sup>136</sup> We are immediately put in mind of the views of Hippias on the universal kinship of mankind and of Lycophron on the worth of birth.

Antiphon is another who also points the contrast between nomos and physis. In another fragment<sup>137</sup> from his work On Truth Antiphon asserts the supremacy of the necessary laws of physis as against the artificial laws of nomos. It is in the best interests of men to obey the law of nomos before witnesses, but in the absence of witnesses the laws of nature are more important. If someone transgresses one of the laws of man and is noticed he is punished. But if his misdeed escapes notice he goes unpunished. But everyone who violates the laws



of nature, whether noticed by the rest of mankind or not, is punished. Many things which are held to be just according to the laws of man are often at variance with the laws of nature. "But as far as nature is concerned, none of these things is more in accord with nature than any other, either the things from which the laws turn men aside or the things to which they direct them."

Life and death are both natural, life being one of the advantages aimed at by men, death one of the disadvantages. But the advantages afforded by the laws of man only fetter nature whereas the advantages afforded by nature provide freedom. Man's nature cannot be helped more by pains than pleasures. Nor can sorrows be more advantageous than joys. There are many cases of conduct in life which are really against nature and lead to greater pain and damage and which could be avoided. For example: many defend themselves from attacks but never instigate attacks themselves; people are kind to their parents even though the parents have treated them badly; some allow their opponents to take advantage of an oath while neglecting to do so themselves. If, however, the laws protected those who act in such a way and punished those who acted contrariwise then they might have some use. "But as things are, it is clear that justice according to the law does not afford sufficient protection to those who submit in this way, since, in the first place, it licenses the sufferer to suffer and the doer to act, and not even when the act has been committed would it attempt to prevent the sufferer from suffering nor the doer from acting. When justice is brought in to assist in



punishment it is no more on the side of the sufferer than of the doer. For the sufferer must persuade <the jury> that he was the sufferer <and> must <apply> for the opportunity to gain a verdict. It is equally open to the doer to deny the charge ...."<sup>138</sup>

The papyrus continues: The giving of true evidence against someone is normally considered just in society. But whoever does this is not acting justly if a criticism of just conduct is not to wrong anyone who has done you no wrong. For a man, even if he gives true evidence, necessarily harms his neighbour against whom he testifies even though his neighbour has never harmed him. "So in this respect he wrongs the man against whom the evidence is given, insofar as he wrongs someone who never did him any wrong, and the result is that he in turn is wronged by the man against whom he gives evidence because he is hated by him by reason of his true evidence." Not only is he hated but he must be constantly on his guard against whom he testified, one who is now a lasting enemy. Accordingly it is impossible to reconcile the principle that testifying against one's neighbour is just with the principle that one should neither commit nor suffer injustice. Either one is a just principle or both are unjust. "It is clear that the administration of law and justice and arbitration with a view to a final settlement are all contrary to justice. For helping one set of people harms another."<sup>139</sup>

Generally Antiphon is at pains to point the inadequacy of the morality enjoined by the laws of man as against that of the laws of nature. He is by no means a shallow amoral man and, as Guthrie





remarks, much of the evidence of the papyrus may be interpreted altruistically.<sup>140</sup>

e) Thrasymachus:

While Protagoras was in favour of supporting whatever conventions were existing in a society others took a totally amoral stance, for example Thrasymachus of Chalcedon who declared:

φημι γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ  
τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος συμφέρον.

I affirm that the just is nothing else than the advantage of the stronger. 141

He continues:

And each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their — the rulers' — advantage and the man who deviates from this law they chastise as a law breaker and a wrongdoer. This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states — the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere, the advantage of the stronger .... Thus, Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while the unjust is what profits a man's self and is for his advantage. 142

As Kerferd remarks, the roots of Thrasymachus' views "are planted deeply in the soil of the sophistic movement".<sup>143</sup> Also they are views which correspond to the historical reality of the troubled times of the later Fifth Century B.C., a fact for which Thucydides provides ample evidence. As Guthrie declares, at this time "estab-



lished moral canons were ignored and men altered the accepted meanings of moral terms to conform to their actions."<sup>144</sup> It is to be noted that Thrasymachus is speaking as a convinced realist but that it is possible that he was not expressing his own deepest convictions.<sup>145</sup> In reply to Socrates who states that he firmly believes that Thrasymachus is asserting his own real opinions the Sophist declares: "What difference does it make to you ... whether I believe it or not ? Why don't you test the argument ?"<sup>146</sup> In fact, the embittered and pessimistic Thrasymachus can even call justice "a most noble simplicity or goodness of heart."<sup>147</sup>

Together with his views on justice as represented in the Republic we have a titillating if vague piece of independent evidence provided by Hermias, a scholiast of Plato. Hermias states that Thrasymachus somewhere in his works wrote something to the effect that the gods take no interest in what goes on among men otherwise they would not have left out the greatest of goods to men, namely justice. For men are not seen making use of it.<sup>148</sup> One thing is clear at least, that Thrasymachus did not reject the existence of the gods. However, his declaration that they take no part in the affairs of men implies, as Jarrett remarks, that they do not enter into ethical considerations.<sup>149</sup>

Callicles in Plato's Gorgias utters similar sentiments to those of Thrasymachus, the overlap in the general arguments making Christopher Rowe consider that the Gorgias may have been a first sketch for the



Republic.<sup>150</sup> Callicles himself is not a Sophist but rather an aristocratic and wealthy young man who had been heavily influenced by these teachers. Apart from his appearance in the Gorgias he is nowhere else recorded.<sup>151</sup> In many points he goes beyond Thrasymachus and in certain respects actually contradicts him. Whereas Thrasymachus stated that the form of government which makes the laws is the stronger<sup>152</sup> Callicles asserts that those who make the laws in the State, the majority, are the weaker. They make the laws in order to keep the naturally stronger in check, saying that getting advantage over others is shameful and unjust. They themselves are satisfied, being inferior, in enjoying equal status. In effect, Callicles is asserting the right of physis over nomos, nature and convention being antagonistic to each other.<sup>153</sup>

f) Prodicus:

Prodicus' conventional views on morality may be seen to good effect in his famous and influential epideixis, the parable of "The Choice of Heracles". Xenophon, in his own words, relates the story in Book II of his Memorabilia.<sup>154</sup> The story concerns the youthful Heracles who one day met two beautiful women, the one representing Vice, the other Virtue. The former set before Heracles such blandishments as all the sensual pleasures with no physical or mental anguish on his part if he would but follow her. Virtue, however, promised the hero that if he followed her path he would achieve wonderful and noble deeds. But the path, she continued, was strewn with hardships, for





the gods bestow no gifts to man without toil and perseverance. It would be necessary for Heracles to struggle hard to achieve his honourable rewards. Ultimately, Heracles, rejecting Vice, followed the path offered by Virtue.

While "The Choice of Heracles" is obviously banal, "somewhat jejune"<sup>155</sup> and a reecho of the "conventional opinions of the crowd"<sup>156</sup> it provides no evidence that its author was a teacher of amorality or even immorality. While Alexander Grant finds it easy to criticize the parable he declares that its moral orthodoxy is above reproach and that if all the speeches of the Sophists had been of such a character they would not have received such a bad name as teachers of youth.<sup>157</sup>

The pseudo-Platonic dialogue Eryxias refers to views supposedly held by Prodicus but, as Guthrie remarks, they cannot be considered as definitely authentic.<sup>158</sup> Prodicus is attributed with the opinion that riches are good to a good man who knows how to use them properly but to bad and ignorant men they are an evil: "The same is true, he went on to say, of all other things; men make them to be what they are themselves."<sup>159</sup> While there appears nothing extraordinary in this statement it could be held by some, as Kathleen Freeman remarks, that good and bad are themselves relative as opposed to Plato's assertion that absolute goodness exists.<sup>160</sup>

### Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter I considered the claim that the



Sophists were philosophers. Certainly such ancient authorities as Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle refused to grant them this title. Admittedly the Sophists were not seekers after ultimate truth or the first cause of things — rather they were more interested in practical success and effective argument. However, Kerferd is persuasive in his thesis that whether the Sophists may be counted as philosophers or not must depend on how philosophy is defined and that one may be a philosopher without subscribing to such transcendent "Truth" or "Knowledge" as Plato took to be the end of philosophical speculation. There is little doubt that many of the Sophists concerned themselves with such topics as epistemology, ethics, politics, sociology, the question of the existence of the gods, all of which could nowadays be subsumed under the heading of philosophy.

As I have pointed out it is understandable if a number of Sophists displayed a certain scepticism with regard to the attainment of knowledge — it was in part a reaction to the many competing doctrines of the Pre-Socratic philosophers and especially the contradictions of the Eleatics. However, it is uncertain just what exactly Protagoras and Gorgias intended by their homo-mensura principle and tripartite dictum respectively. Of Xenocrates of Corinth we know nothing at all apart from Sextus' mention of him. Nevertheless the epistemology of Protagoras and Gorgias, at least, was distinctly relativistic. At the same time it is possible that Marrou is not too far off the mark when he declares that a great deal of mischief has been committed in devoting metaphysical significance to Protagoras'



homo-mensura principle, categorizing him as a phenomenalist empiricist, and also from his scant fragments in suggesting that Gorgias was a philosophical nihilist. Rather, these extant passages should be taken as they stand. Their authors had no intention of creating any philosophical system; they only wished to devise some practical rules for living. They had little concern with metaphysics or ontology.<sup>161</sup> We are also hindered by a lack of material with respect to the Sophists' religious views. However, concerning those men for whom evidence is available it is possible that Protagoras was an agnostic, and Critias and Prodicus both atheists.

It is very difficult to summarize the political and social theories of the Sophists because of the great differences they display in their thought. These teachers did not constitute a uniform school with a common body of doctrine; rather each was an individual thinker. Nevertheless most Sophists appear to have been interested in the distinction between different kinds of law. As we have seen, the second half of the Fifth Century B.C. was distinguished by the recognition of two main types of law. On the one hand, there was the immutable law of nature and, on the other, there were the man-made statutes and laws which were subject to change. The conservative Protagoras preached support of the latter, to the laws which were in effect in any particular state. (The author of the Anonymous Iamblichi enjoined a like adherence). In contrast, Hippias viewed the law of nature to be superior to man-made laws, customs, and conventions, a view shared by Antiphon. However, while Hippias and Antiphon inclined





to the authority of physis over nomos it is probable that their motives and morality were very different to those of Thrasymachus and Callicles, these latter appearing to adopt an amoral stance.

A.H. Armstrong is probably right in declaring that the great Sophists were certainly not amoral in attitude and that they would have deplored such cynical recidivism as displayed by Alcibiades, for example. They were, he remarks, "as morally respectable as any Victorian agnostic."<sup>162</sup> However, many intelligent Athenians realized that some of the Sophists were introducing ethical relativity in place of moral absolutes, whereby it was claimed that there are no absolute right and wrong but that they are always subject to change.<sup>163</sup> As Zeller remarks, Protagoras considered that morality and laws are only relatively valid — "There is no absolute religion, no absolute morality and no absolute justice."<sup>164</sup> It was easy for conservative Athenians to see how such doctrines could be employed as a rationale to undermine the existing fabric of society. Also the Sophists' stress on individual choice in morality could be viewed in a sinister light. As Wilds and Lottich observe, the morality of the Sophists was basically "so individualistic and rationalistic that to the conservative Greeks they seemed to be teaching immorality."<sup>165</sup> However, it should be emphasized that the Sophists were more interested in teaching practical wisdom rather than any abstract notions of morality.<sup>166</sup> As Windelband states, "the Sophists found their chief task in scientific and rhetorical instruction for public life."<sup>167</sup> The areté which the Sophists professed to teach was not



moral virtue<sup>168</sup> but rather those characteristics which would enable a man to attain practical success and fame in the community.<sup>169</sup>

Obviously the view that areté could be taught to anyone by means of grammar, dialectics, and rhetoric was not congenial to traditionalists of the old order and they attacked the Sophists, those "professors of moral improvement".<sup>170</sup> Rather, they asserted, virtue consisted in what were the customs and examples of the upper classes, the aristocracy. People inherited virtue; it was not taught. It is true that even the nobles had to train and exercise their virtue, but this consisted chiefly in the performance of noble deeds rather than in the exercise or training of the mind. The notion of Socrates that Protagoras was a paid teacher of culture and virtue would have been anathema to many of the upper classes:

You openly announce yourself to the Greeks by the name of Sophist and set up as a teacher of culture and virtue, the first to claim payment for this service. 171

The conservatives felt that the Sophists must of necessity fail if they endeavoured to teach virtue to the lowly born. (As was stated earlier, while many of the Sophists' pupils were of the upper classes many also came from the ranks of the nouveaux riches). Numerous Sophistical doctrines — the theory of Lycophron on the worth of birth, just to mention one — would hardly have received a favourable hearing from the nobly born. Obviously the struggle between the traditional and the new approach to education and morality is mirrored in the political struggle between the aristocratic and democratic factions.<sup>172</sup>



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For me it was not Zeus who made that order.  
Nor did that Justice who lives with the gods below  
mark out such laws to hold among mankind.  
Nor did I think your orders were so strong  
that you, a mortal man, could over-run  
the gods' unwritten and unfailing laws.  
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However, according to Ehrenberg, the Panhellenism advocated





by such as Gorgias and Prodicus very likely was responsible for weakening Athenian patriotism towards their city rather than strengthening solidarity among the Greeks at large. EHRENBURG, Society and Civilization, pp. 63-64.

Although some Sophists argued in favour of the harmony of mankind Plato, at least, stated that a certain enmity is natural. In Book V of the Republic he has Socrates declare:

We shall then say that Greeks fight and wage war with barbarians, and barbarians with Greeks, and are enemies by nature, and that war is the fit name for this enmity and hatred. PLATO, Republic V 470C, translated by Paul Shorey in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.

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had proclaimed that all men, Greeks and barbarians, are alike in every respect." MERLAN, Philip, "Alexander the Great or Antiphon the Sophist ?", pp. 161-166 of Classical Philology, Vol. XLV, 1950, p. 165.

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What Thrasymachus really intends as his definition of Justice in the Republic is discussed in the following articles:  
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KERFERD, G.B., "Thrasymachus and Justice: a Reply", pp. 12-16 of Phronesis Vol. IX, no. 1, 1964;  
MAGUIRE, Joseph P., "Thrasymachus — or Plato?", pp. 142-163 of Phronesis Vol. XVI, no. 2, 1971.
146. PLATO, Republic I 349A, op. cit.
147. PLATO, Republic I 348C, ibid.
148. HERMIAS on Plato, Phaedrus p. 239, 21 Couvreur. Sprague 85 B8.
149. JARRETT, op. cit., p. 84.
150. ROWE, Christopher, op. cit., p. 43.
151. HUBY, op. cit., p. 11.



152. PLATO, Republic I 338E.
153. PLATO, Gorgias 483Cff.  
The doctrine of Callicles that might is right is mirrored in many places in Thucydides' speeches. For example, see Book I lxxvi; Book III xxxvii; Book V cv.
154. XENOPHON, Memorabilia II 1, 21ff.
155. BURNET, Greek Philosophy, p. 118.
156. GUTHRIE, Sophists, p. 278.
157. GRANT, op. cit., pp. 145-146.
158. GUTHRIE, Sophists, p. 280.
159. (PSEUDO-PLATO), Eryxias 397E, translated by Jowett, in Dialogues of Plato, Vol. II.
160. FREEMAN, Kathleen, Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 373.
161. MARROU, op. cit., p. 51.
162. ARMSTRONG, A.H., An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy, Methuen and Co. Ltd.: London, 1965, Fourth Edition, (First Published 1947), p. 24.  
  
But if many of the early Sophists were of a fine intellectual, moral and pedagogical integrity many of the second generation Sophists were charlatans, not above a bit of sharp practice and whose main intention was to amass a fortune by any method at their disposal. Specimens of this latter group, according to Fuller, have been responsible for the Sophists bearing the opprobrium which is often encountered today. FULLER, op. cit. pp. 12-13.  
  
See also BRUMBAUGH, R.S., The Philosophers of Greece, Thomas Y. Crowell Co.: New York, 1964, p. 120.
163. See, for example, PLATO, Theaetetus 167C.
164. ZELLER, op. cit., p. 82.
165. WILDS, E.H. and LOTTICH, K.V., The Foundations of Modern Education, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.: U.S.A., 1970, (First Published 1936), p. 105.
166. LAISTNER, M.L.W., A History of the Greek World from 479 to 323 B.C., Methuen and Co. Ltd.: London, 1957, p. 443.





167. WINDELBAND, op. cit., p. 113.
168. The problem of translating areté as virtue and using it in its usual sense, according to Hirschberger, is that we now have a concept which is really the opposite of what was meant. HIRSCHBERGER, Johannes, A Short History of Western Philosophy, translated by Jeremy Moiser, Lutterworth Press: London, 1976, p. 9.
169. FLACELIÈRE, op. cit., p. 113.  
It was because most of the Sophists, according to Flacelière, remained indifferent to moral virtue that occasioned Socrates' and Plato's attack against them. FLACELIÈRE, p. 115.
170. PLATO, Laches 186C, translated by Jowett, in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
171. PLATO, Protagoras 349A, op. cit.
172. BRUBACHER, John S., A History of the Problems of Education, McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc.: U.S.A., 1947, p. 98.



## CHAPTER FIVE

### SOPHISTIC METHODS AND CURRICULA

#### The Importance of Rhetoric in Fifth Century Athens

We must beware not to underestimate the great importance rhetoric or the art of speaking played in Ancient Greece. First of all, reading usually meant reading aloud and naturally proper enunciation and diction were desirable. Recitation and the learning of passages by heart were much more common then than today. Because of the expense very few books were available and there was generally much greater reliance on the spoken than on the written word.<sup>1</sup> Speaking of Athens, Barr declares that "this polis was an unending conversation."<sup>2</sup> Private reading was almost unknown at this time in Greece. Literature was made known through public recitation. It should be remembered that even in business the spoken word was all important. In general, as James Bowen states, "the possibilities of literacy in creating and holding constant an intellectual environment and in providing a literature whereby each individual could explore it privately were yet to come."<sup>3</sup> But if few actually read a play or poem countless others knew such literature from hearing it at public performances or even performing it themselves at the numerous ceremonial occasions and festivals.<sup>4</sup>

Rhetoric was particularly important in Athens because of the nature of the city state's political system. Democracy was direct in Athens, every citizen having the prerogative and the opportunity to address all other citizens openly. Athens was small enough in area and its citizens were few enough for such a system of government to



be utilized. In fact, as Myers remarks, no part of Athens' border was far enough from the agora for a citizen not to be able to make the journey in the period from sunrise to sunset.<sup>5</sup> The area of Athens (that is, Attica) was about 1,000 square miles, roughly the area of modern Luxembourg,<sup>6</sup> or somewhat smaller in area than Rhode Island.<sup>7</sup> So all citizens could be present to give their opinions when matters of importance to the polis were to be debated. It was, as Jarrett remarks, a government of amateurs with every ordinary citizen being eligible for and in fact actually participating in all the various political activities which took place in a democratic city state.<sup>8</sup> Many offices in the State were assigned by lot so all citizens had to be ready and able to take command of a meeting and speak in public.<sup>9</sup> As we have seen, the political reforms of Pericles and Ephialtes had rendered the archonship open to citizens of all classes and had introduced payment for it and also for membership of the Boule and the people's courts. Now it was financially possible for even the poorest citizens to take part in civic duties. Consequently the man who could deliver the most persuasive speech at the Assembly and who could impose his own opinion on the gathered citizenry became an important political personage.

In this regard the Sophists taught that those who kept silent would remain unknown and impotent in the polis; a prerequisite for getting on in life was to learn the art of eloquence. And rhetoric was what the Sophists professed to teach in the highest degree.<sup>10</sup> The art of oratory now became a sine qua non for every aspiring politician. It





was, as Jaeger aptly phrases it, "the rudder in the statesman's hand".<sup>11</sup> It was likely that during the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.) skill in speaking was especially cherished since, during times of war, rhetorical ability becomes of more importance in a democracy because the issues debated are often of greater consequence and also more eloquent and vigorous leadership is required.<sup>12</sup>

As mentioned earlier, litigation was very common and important in Athens and many citizens were desirous to learn how to defeat their opponents before the judges and jury in the law courts by means of oratory.<sup>13</sup> It is true, as Bury states, that an inarticulate hesitant man dragged before a court would be like "an unarmed civilian attacked by soldiers in panoply".<sup>14</sup> As Marrou reminds us, the Sophist Polus in the Gorgias declares that the rhetorician by means of his eloquence can cause anyone he wishes to be put to death, or their property confiscated or to be banished from the state.<sup>15</sup> So, considering the social and political climate of Athens, it is understandable that the Sophists' claim to be able to make men good at speaking and disputation accounted in large part for their popularity. We read in Plato's Sophist:

Stranger:           And then again where laws are in question  
                          or any political matter, do they not promise  
                          to produce debaters ?

Theaetetus:       If they did not hold out that promise,  
                          hardly anyone would take part in their discussions.     16

In short, in order for a man to win worldly success and to protect himself from his enemies it was particularly important, especially



in a democracy such as that of Fifth Century Athens, to be a good orator and to be able to sway the crowd. The Sophists were willing to provide a training of this nature and, indeed, were particularly interested in the educational ideal of rhetoric - τὸ εὖ

λέγειν.<sup>17</sup> In the Protagoras Hippocrates declares that the Sophist "is master of the art of making clever speakers".<sup>18</sup> These teachers were very well aware of the power of speech. Thus Gorgias in the dialogue bearing his own name defines rhetoric as "the contriver of persuasion", πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική<sup>19</sup>

and again in the Phaedrus the art of rhetoric is defined as "a kind of influencing of the mind by means of words", ἡ ῥητορική ἂν εἴη τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων.<sup>20</sup> Plato in the

Philebus has Protarchus say the following regarding the power of rhetoric:

On the many occasions when I used to listen to Gorgias, he regularly said, Socrates, that the art of persuasion was greatly superior to all others, for it subjugated all things not by violence but by willing submission, 21

Gorgias in his Encomium on Helen attempts to prove that Helen cannot be held accountable for accompanying Paris to Troy for it is impossible to withstand the force of persuasion:

For speech constrained the soul, persuading it which it persuaded, both to believe the things said and to approve the things done. The persuader, like a constrainer, does the wrong and the persuaded, like the constrained, in speech is wrongly charged. 22

Accordingly, no stigma of blame attaches to Helen. The power of speech is emphasized:



But if it was speech which persuaded her and deceived her heart, not even to this is it difficult to make an answer and to banish blame as follows. Speech is a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most invisible body effects the divinest works: it can stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity. 23

also

The effect of speech upon the condition of the soul is comparable to the power of drugs over the nature of bodies. For just as different drugs dispel different secretions from the body, and some bring an end to disease and others to life, so also in the case of speeches, some distress, others delight, some cause fear, others make the hearers bold, and some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion. 24.

### The Schools of Rhetoric

Fixed rules and methods of rhetoric were commonly regarded as having their beginnings in Sicily where the inhabitants had long been renowned for their skill in the art of speaking. Two Sicilians, Corax and Tisias, with whom Aristotle begins his account of the history of rhetoric,<sup>25</sup> were particularly famous in the first half of the Fifth Century B.C. Quintilian declares that

The earliest writers of Arts were the Sicilians, Corax and Tisias. They were followed by a man from the same island, named Gorgias of Leontini, said to have been a pupil of Empedocles. 26

In fact, Cicero in his Brutus links the rise of the Sophists with the establishment of a democratic republic in Sicily after the expulsion of the tyrants.<sup>27</sup> Syracuse was democratically governed from 466 to 406 B.C. and skill in persuasive argument began to be





greatly valued. As Sir Alexander Grant writes,

Everywhere in Greece circumstances were analogous to those in Sicily. Personal freedom gave rise to the contests of the law courts. Nothing was more necessary than that a citizen should be able to defend his own cause. The demand for instruction in rhetoric, and for the development of all its arts, means, and appliances, was met everywhere by the Sophists. 28

Of course, it should be remembered that interest in skilful speaking was not altogether new as the Homeric poems provide evidence that great care was taken, even in those far off days, to the task of composing speeches.<sup>29</sup>

With regard to Sophistic rhetoric Grant distinguishes two main tendencies. On the one hand was the Sicilian school of *ΕΥΕΛΕΙΑ* or "fine speaking", the chief exponents being Gorgias of Leontini, Polus of Agrigentum, and, their follower, Alcidamus of Eleaea in Asia Minor. On the other hand was the Greek school of *ὀρθότης* or "correct speaking", the main representatives of which were Protagoras, Prodicus, and Hippias.<sup>30</sup> The members of the former school were particularly interested in a style which was often very flowery and elaborate, how their speeches sounded, and the effect they had on their audiences. The latter school, while by no means totally disinterested in the foregoing, were more concerned with grammar, etymology, correct use of terms, literary criticism and such like. (I will briefly discuss the Sophists' interest in such topics below). Consideration of the Sicilian school with its emphasis on style belongs more to a history of rhetoric and is accordingly beyond the scope of this work. However, the influence of the rhetoric



of Gorgias, the leading representative of this school, on his pupils and those others who heard him in Athens, should at least be mentioned.

Gorgias of Leontini, "in power of speech by far the most eminent of the men of his time",<sup>31</sup> wrote a new brilliant prose and when he arrived in Athens on an embassy from his native city in 427 B.C. he amazed the citizens by the novelty of his style.<sup>32</sup> According to Philostratus, his followers were many, among whom could be counted some of the most illustrious men of his day:

The admirers of Gorgias were noble and numerous: first, the Greeks in Thessaly, among whom "to be an orator" acquired the synonym "to Gorgianize", and secondly, all Greece, in whose presence at the Olympic Games he denounced the barbarians, speaking from the race course belonging to the temple. Aspasia of Miletus is said to have sharpened the tongue of Pericles in imitation of Gorgias, and Critias and Thucydides were not unaware of how to acquire from him glory and pride, converting it into their own work, the one by careful choice of word and the other by vigor. 33

Again, in the Lives of the Sophists Philostratus testifies to the admiration accorded to Gorgias' eloquence and to his influence on some of the leading men:

and it is no wonder if he was admired by many when he spoke in Athens, although by then an old man, and I understand that he attracted the attention of the most admired men, Critias and Alcibiades who were young, and Thucydides and Pericles who were already old. Agathon too, the tragic poet, whom Comedy regards as wise and eloquent, often Gorgianizes in his iambic verse. 34

However Diodorus Siculus, writing in the First Century B.C., is not completely appreciative of Gorgias' stylistic innovations:



He was the first to use extravagant figures of speech marked by deliberative art: antithesis and clauses of exactly or approximately equal length and rhythm and others of such a sort, which at the time were thought worthy of acceptance because of the strangeness of the method, but now seem tiresome and often appear ridiculous and excessively contrived. 35

But it is true, as Kenneth Freeman remarks, that Gorgias' euphuistic style not only had a tremendous influence on Athenian literature but it also "became the parent of Ciceronian Latin and so of the prose literature of centuries."<sup>36</sup>

#### Sophists as Introducers of Higher Education into Athens

In this section I would like to consider the role played by the Sophists in introducing higher education into Athens, that is an education more advanced than that of the "Old" Athenian one which was discussed in the first chapter.

The Sophists taught in competition with each other, each eager to secure the fees of as many students as possible. Of course, students could register with more than one Sophist, but these teachers never combined their courses.<sup>37</sup> It is important to remember, also, that the higher education provided by the Sophists was completely voluntary. Parents were not compelled to enroll their children.<sup>38</sup>

Since most of the Sophists of the late Fifth Century B.C. were non-Athenian, peripatetic, and did not form a group, they did not found any permanent buildings or schools.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, it was not until the following century that permanent institutions of higher education





were set up at Athens.<sup>40</sup>

Nor did the State provide any special buildings in which the Sophists could conduct their teaching. They taught both in public and private generally giving their classes and delivering their speeches where it was most convenient and, if it were a public lecture, where they could be heard by the most people. However, classes could be small if the students were willing to pay enough. The most common method of instruction, according to Kerferd, was in small classes and seminars.<sup>41</sup> Probably a number of Sophists followed the practice of Prodicus of whom it was related that when he came to Athens from Ceos on public business he took the opportunity of giving private lectures, as well as speaking before the council.<sup>42</sup> Classes were often conducted in the open air as might be expected considering the climate of Athens. It seems to have been common for a Sophist to choose a gymnasium or palaestra in which he taught his students. Becker reminds us of Miccus in Plato's Lysis who takes over a newly constructed palaestra in order to deliver his lecture.<sup>43</sup> As Becker remarks, this shows that the law of Solon prohibiting the presence of adults in palaestrae had been forgotten.<sup>44</sup> Prodicus, we are told, taught in the Lyceum,<sup>45</sup> and the conversation of the Euthydemus occurs in the undressing room of this building.<sup>46</sup> Other Sophists taught in schools - Hippias declares that he will deliver his Trojan Speech at Athens in the school of Pheidestratus.<sup>47</sup> Some Sophists appear to have been guests of rich Athenians and to have held classes in their host's house. Prodicus, as we read in the Axiochus,



delivered a speech in the house of Callias, son of Hipponicus.<sup>48</sup>

Protagoras, according to Diogenes Laertius, gave a public reading of his work On the Gods

at Athens in the house of Euripides or, some say, in the house of Megacleides. According to others, the place was the Lyceum, and his pupil Archagoras, son of Theodotus, lent his voice for the readings. 49

So, the Sophists taught in many varied places - in their own private dwellings and in those of their Athenian hosts, in school rooms which they hired, in gymnasia and palaestrae, in the open, the agora for example. Although they had no permanent schools, Lynch considers that the Sophists may be said to have founded a sort of proto-institution of higher learning and points to Aristophanes' depiction of the phrontisterion or "thinkery" in the Clouds as evidence of this: "A Sophist and his pupils formed a group which had collective, if not corporate, identity and which had embodied an ideal that gave regularity to an aspect of society (education)."<sup>50</sup>

Perhaps the most famous account of a Sophist speaking is contained in the Protagoras and may be based on fact. Here we are told that the youth Hippocrates woke up Socrates one day just before daybreak to persuade him to organize a meeting between Protagoras, who is just newly arrived in Athens, and himself (Hippocrates).<sup>51</sup> The Sophist is staying at the house of that renowned friend of the Sophists, Callias. Also staying are the Sophists Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos. It is worthwhile to quote a long extract from the beginning of that dialogue which sets the scene:



Having agreed on this we started out. When we found ourselves in the doorway, we stood there and continued a discussion which had arisen between us on the way. So that we might not leave it unfinished, but have it out before we went in, we were standing in the doorway talking until we should reach agreement. I believe the porter, a eunuch, overheard us, and it seems likely that the crowd of Sophists had put him in a bad temper with visitors. At any rate when we knocked at the door he opened it, saw us and said, Ha, Sophists ! He's busy. And thereupon he slammed the door as hard as he could with both hands. We knocked again, and he answered through the closed door, Didn't you hear me say he's busy ?

My good man, I said (Socrates speaking), we have not come to see Callias and we are not Sophists. Cheer up. It is Protagoras we want to see, so announce us. So at last the fellow reluctantly opened the door to us.

When we were inside, we came upon Protagoras walking in the portico, and walking with him in a long line were, on one side Callias, son of Hipponicus; his stepbrother Paralus, the son of Pericles; and Charmides, son of Glaucon; and on the other side Pericles' other son, Xanthippus; Philippides, son of Philomelus; and Antimoerus of Mende, the most eminent of Protagoras' pupils, who is studying professionally to become a Sophist. Those who followed behind listening to their conversation seemed to be for the most part foreigners — Protagoras draws them from every city that he passes through, charming them with his voice like Orpheus, and they follow spellbound — but there were some Athenians in the band as well.<sup>52</sup> As I looked at the party I was delighted to notice what special care they took never to get in front or to be in Protagoras' way. When he and those with him turned round, the listeners divided this way and that in perfect order, and executing a circular movement took their places each time in the rear. It was beautiful.

'After that I recognized', as Homer says, Hippias of Elis, sitting on a seat of honour in the opposite portico, and around him were seated on benches Eryximachus, son of Acumenus, and Phaedrus of Myrrhinus and Andron, son of Androtion, with some fellow citizens of his and other foreigners. They appeared to be asking him questions on natural science, particularly astronomy, while he gave each his explanation ex cathedra and held forth on their problems.

'And there too spied I Tantalus' — for Prodicus of Ceos was also in town, and was occupying a room which Hipponicus used to use for storage, but now owing to the number of people staying in the house Callias had cleared it out and made it into a guest room. Prodicus was still in bed, wrapped





up in rugs and blankets, and plenty of them, as far as one could see, and beside him on the neighbouring couches sat Pausanias from Cerameis and with him someone who was still a young boy — a lad of fine character I think and certainly very good-looking. I think I heard that his name is Agathon, and I shouldn't be surprised if Pausanias is particularly attached to him. Well there was this boy and the two Adimantuses — the son of Cepis and the son of Leucolophides — and a few others. But what they were talking about I couldn't discover from outside, although I was very keen to hear Prodicus, whom I regard as a man of inspired genius. You see, he has such a deep voice that there was a kind of booming noise in the room which drowned the words. Just after we had come in, there entered close on our heels the handsome Alcibiades as you call him — and I quite agree — and Critias, son of Callaeschrus. 53

The remainder of the dialogue is chiefly concerned with a speech of Protagoras and a discussion between Socrates and that Sophist.

Jaeger declares that the Sophists brought the sphere of education beyond the concern of only children to that of young men and even of older adults. Now adults could also receive an education at the hands of teachers.<sup>54</sup> Jarrett agrees that the Sophists established that education is certainly more than primary level schooling and more than mere socialization by the various forces of society: "The Sophists may be said to have established, once and for all, the necessity of higher education conducted by professionals."<sup>55</sup> Although M. Flacelière declares that the School of Pythagoras was in fact the distant forerunner of modern universities<sup>56</sup> other scholars claim that the Sophists could be said to have formed the first European university.<sup>57</sup> R.W. Livingstone writes that the education received by the Athenians at the feet of the Sophists was in effect their university education.<sup>58</sup> Mahaffy wrote that the Sophists:



really shaped out the first form which university education took in Europe, meaning by university education that higher general training which, coming after school discipline, trains men for the duties of social and political as well as scientific and literary life. 59

Butts considers that it is of little import to determine whether the Sophists may be said to have been teaching at the secondary or at the higher level. Rather, he argues, their influence in pioneering intellectual fields was of deeper importance than any institutions they may have founded. However, it was certainly partly due to their innovative ideas that a number of pedagogical institutions were created in the Fourth Century. (I shall consider these briefly in the next chapter). As Butts concludes, "If the enthusiasm stimulated by the Sophists had not been put into organized form, their civilizing effect might have been dissipated."<sup>60</sup>

With regard to the elementary educational institutions there is no doubt that there was a great gap between them and the high level of culture of Fifth Century Athens. Not only did the Sophists help to bridge this gap but it was the very existence of this lacuna which was the impetus of originally bringing the Sophists to Athens.<sup>61</sup>

As Scarborough writes, "the Sophists met a desire for higher education in a time when there were no formal universities that could inculcate the young in the mores of Greek culture."<sup>62</sup> But it is important to remember that the traditional education was not replaced by that offered by the Sophists. Children still attended the usual classes of the grammatistes and the kitharistes. Those who consorted



with the Sophists were older and had already completed their formal schooling.<sup>63</sup> Moreover the subjects taught by the Sophists were not necessarily those of the elementary schools at a more advanced level. The range of subjects depended in part on the tastes and abilities of the individual Sophists.<sup>64</sup> However, as explained earlier, most Sophists taught those subjects which were particularly demanded by their students, i.e. subjects which would be of greatest benefit to making a success of public life.

#### Fees charged by the Sophists

There is no doubt that the Sophists received payment for their teaching,<sup>65</sup> and Plato considers this to be an innovation:

None of those great men of the past ever saw fit to charge money for his wisdom, or to give demonstrations of it to miscellaneous audiences; they were too simple ever to realize the enormous importance of money. 66

It is important to bear in mind that the money which the Sophists earned came from their students — they received no money from the State.<sup>67</sup> As the Sophists relied for their living on the money paid by their pupils it was natural if these itinerant teachers drifted towards the big towns, especially Athens, since there would be greater demand for their teaching there and more chance of lucrative pay.<sup>68</sup> Athens was the intellectual capital of the Greek world at this time and, indeed, remained so for almost a millenium after, from about the middle of the Fifth Century B.C. to the closure of the Academy in A.D. 529.<sup>69</sup> It is difficult to be precise regarding





the exact fees demanded by the Sophists. It is likely that the fees demanded in the early days were rather exorbitant but that in course of time the increase in the number of teachers caused the amount of money charged to drop. However, it is known that the fees required by the respective Sophists varied greatly. Prodicus, for instance, was known for his graduated charges.<sup>70</sup> For example, in the Cratylus Socrates declares that he missed Prodicus' fifty drachma show-lecture and only heard the one drachma one:

Knowledge about terms happens to be an important matter. If indeed I had heard Prodicus' fifty-drachma lecture, which he claimed would succeed in conveying a complete education in the matter to anyone who heard it, nothing would have kept you (Hermogenes) from learning the truth about the correct usage of words. But I didn't hear it, only the one-drachma performance. 71

Protagoras is reputed to have have been the first Sophist to demand a fee for teaching virtue:

(Socrates speaking) you openly announce yourself to the Greeks by the name of Sophist and set up as a teacher of culture and virtue, the first to claim payment for this service. 72

Protagoras was also the first to demand a fee of a hundred minas,<sup>73</sup> and is said to have employed a rather unique method of receiving payment:

On this account I have adopted the following method of assessing my payment. Anyone who comes to learn from me may either pay the fee I ask for or, if he prefers, go to a temple, state on oath what he believes to be the worth of my instruction, and deposit that amount. 74

Aristotle's account is a little different:



This is what they say Protagoras used to do; whenever he taught anything whatsoever, he bade the learner assess the value of the knowledge, and accepted the amount so fixed. 75

Gorgias is also said to have charged each of his pupils a hundred minas.<sup>76</sup> This teacher throughout his long life is reported by Isocrates to have made the most money of all the Sophists.<sup>77</sup> In fact, he is reputed to have made so much that he dedicated a gold statue of himself:

Gorgias of Leontini was the first man to dedicate a solid gold statue of himself, which he did around Olympiad LXX (?) in the temple at Delphi. So great was the profit from teaching the art of oratory. 78

Another source has it that it was his grand-nephew Eumolpus who dedicated it.<sup>79</sup>

Protagoras also made a large amount of money from his teaching. We read in the Meno:

(Socrates speaking) I know that one of them alone, Protagoras, earned more money from being a Sophist than an outstandingly fine craftsman like Phidias and ten other sculptors put together. 80

Prodicus was renowned for his love of money.<sup>81</sup> Socrates states in the Axiochus that Prodicus:

would teach no one for nothing and used to repeat the tag of Epicharmus, "One hand washes another: give in order to get." 82

Antiphon was also famous for his fondness for money and love of expensive living and was satirized for it by Plato the Comic Poet.<sup>83</sup>



Philostratus writes:

Comedy lampooned Antiphon for his cleverness in pleading suits and for selling at a high price, particularly to those who stood in jeopardy, speeches composed to frustrate the cause of justice. 84

It is certain that many Athenians disapproved of the Sophists for accepting money.<sup>85</sup> However, Kerferd declares that there was no real prejudice in Athens about certain professionals earning a living — poets, artists, doctors all received payment for their work.<sup>86</sup>

Edward Power asserts that Athenians had been accustomed "for dozens of decades" to paying their teachers.<sup>87</sup> It is possible that the contractual arrangements made by the Sophists with their pupils were the source of a certain scorn among the population, although Power considers that these procedures, unorthodox though they may have been, were accepted without overt disapproval.<sup>88</sup> T.B.L.

Webster states that the Athenians paid the Sophists fees "just as they would pay a fee to Hippokrates to be taught medicine or to Pheidias to become a sculptor."<sup>89</sup> Rather, as Guthrie declares, the problem lay in the curriculum and type of subjects which the Sophists purported to teach, and one of the chief subjects was political *areté* or the art of citizenship. Such an art was the peculiar demesne of a gentleman and an amateur — "Any upper-class Athenian should understand the proper conduct of affairs by a sort of instinct inherited from his ancestors, and be prepared to hand it on to his sons."<sup>90</sup> Brubacher agrees that the fact that the Sophists demanded fees militated against them gaining respect. Athens was composed of freemen and slaves and to accept payment for their





services put the Sophists if not at the level of slaves then at least lower than freemen. Social respectability in this milieu depended in large part on amateur rather than professional status.<sup>91</sup> The notion that the position of the Sophists was rather low on the social scale is stressed by a vignette in Plato's Protagoras. Here Hippocrates, although very eager to meet the great Sophist Protagoras, is embarrassed by the idea that he himself might become one:

(Socrates:) What do you yourself hope to become by your association with Protagoras ?

He (Hippocrates) blushed at this — there was already a streak of daylight to betray him — and replied, If this is like the other cases, I must say "to become a Sophist".

But wouldn't a man like you be ashamed, said I, to face your fellow countrymen as a Sophist ?

If I am to speak my real mind, I certainly should. 92

It would be natural enough if those who could not afford the often high fees charged by the Sophists ended up by becoming antagonistic to them.<sup>93</sup> Because their charges were so high and could only be afforded by the rich the Sophists were sometimes regarded as proponents of the separation of the classes. Some democrats viewed them as teachers of oligarchs.<sup>94</sup> As Fuller writes, many of the poorer Athenians were particularly disgruntled:

What they saw was an invasion of Athens by a lot of over-smart foreigners who made a pot of money out of showing the idle rich how to hang on to their property and influence and balk the natural appetite of the starving democracy. In the eyes of the mob, then, the Sophists were hired champions and advocates of the privileged classes against the masses. 95

Philostratus, however, does not seem to mind that the Sophists charged fees. For he declares that Protagoras



invented the practice of speaking for a fee and was the first to introduce it to Greece. He merits no reproach on this account, for we are more enthusiastic about pursuits which cost us money than about those which cost us nothing. 96

Also Kenneth Freeman considers that the fees demanded and the money which the Sophists are said to have accumulated are probably much exaggerated by unsympathetic contemporaries. He declares that the Sophists' philosopher rivals received more money in gifts from congenial tyrants than all the money they themselves received. 97

#### Teaching Methods of the Sophists

A favourite stratagem of the Sophists, especially when recently arrived in a town was to present an ἐπίδειξις (epideixis), or display speech, at some public gathering which would enable them to exhibit their rhetoric and learning before large numbers of prospective fee paying students. In short they took the opportunity of such occasions to advertise their teaching wares.<sup>98</sup> Because so very little of the writings of the Sophists are extant it is very difficult to give any account of their speeches and even the titles are often in doubt. However, certain evidence is available to us. We know from Aristotle that Gorgias wrote an Encomium for the People of Elis which began with the words "Elis, happy city".<sup>99</sup> Later writers contain brief summaries and extracts from Gorgias' Funeral Oration for those Athenians killed in war.<sup>100</sup> Gorgias also composed a speech for the Olympic Games which was concerned with concord among the Greeks. This oration, according to Philostratus,



dealt with political matters of the greatest importance, for seeing Greece involved in civil dissension, he became a counselor of concord to her inhabitants, turning their attention against the barbarians and persuading them to regard as prizes to be won by their arms, not each other's cities, but the territory of the barbarians. 101

Aristotle writes that

The source of prooemia in epideictic speeches is praise or blame, as for example, Gorgias in the Olympic speech: "They deserve to be admired by many, O men of Greece". For he praises those who create the national assemblies. 102

Clement in the Miscellanies writes that

According to Gorgias of Leontini, "A contest such as we have requires two kinds of excellence, daring and skill; daring is needed to withstand danger, and skill to understand how to trip the opponent (?). For surely speech, like the summons at the Olympic games, calls him who will, but crowns him who can." 103

A mention is also made in Philostratus of a Pythian Speech by Gorgias.<sup>104</sup> We also have extant Gorgias' two mythological "panegyrics",<sup>105</sup> the Encomium of Helen and the Apologia for Palamedes.<sup>106</sup>

Prodicus composed an epideixis called by Philostratus The Choice of Heracles<sup>107</sup> which the Sophist, according to Xenophon, used to recite before large audiences.<sup>108</sup> Thrasyarchus wrote a speech for the Larisaeans,<sup>109</sup> and Dionysius of Halicarnassus quotes from a speech delivered before the Athenian Assembly.<sup>110</sup> Dionysius also writes that Thrasyarchus' works were all technical or showpieces, no forensic (or political) oration of his having survived.<sup>111</sup> It is likely that these showpieces were carefully prepared for delivery before a large crowd. Hippias also delivered speeches at Olympia:





Becoming famous, for the rest of his life he enchanted Greece at Olympia with his varied and carefully prepared speeches. 112

We read in the Hippias Minor that he always attended Olympia at the time of the festival with subjects well prepared for display before the multitude.<sup>113</sup> It is likely that the speech on Homer mentioned in the Hippias Minor which Hippias is said to have only just delivered is an epideixis.<sup>114</sup> Hippias in the Hippias Major tells us of a prepared speech, the Trojan Dialogue, which he has at his disposal, the subject matter of which concerns "the honourable and beautiful practices to which a young man ought to devote himself."<sup>115</sup> With regard to the speeches delivered in public by the Sophists it is probable that at least some of them considered themselves to be in the tradition of the rhapsodes for Aelian tells us that Hippias and Gorgias appeared in purple clothes such as were worn by those men.<sup>116</sup> These epideictic speeches at the various games, Pan-Hellenic gatherings, and religious festivals could be agonistic with prizes for the best display. Hippias can declare that he was never beaten in anything since he first entered the lists at Olympia.<sup>117</sup> It is possible that there were public debates between Sophists, but Kerferd is of the opinion that if formal public debates did occur occasionally they did not constitute an important aspect of Sophistic life.<sup>118</sup>

As has been mentioned, many Sophists were selected by their cities as ambassadors, and accordingly were given a chance to speak publicly. Diodorus Siculus tells us that Gorgias of Leontini "on an embassy to Athens amazed his hearers in the assembly."<sup>119</sup> Prodicus



of Ceos, according to Philostratus, also showed himself to be an extremely capable speaker when he appeared as his city's representative before the Athenian council.<sup>120</sup> Although the above diplomatic speeches were not strictly epideictic orations they still allowed their speakers to display their rhetorical skills before a large audience.

Plato has Protagoras, in the dialogue of the same name, improvise a speech on the Promethean myth and also on the subject of justice and it is possible that Plato actually heard Protagoras declaim on these subjects. A number of Antiphon's speeches are extant as well as a large quantity of fragments of speeches delivered before a court of law and also before the Athenian Assembly.<sup>121</sup> He specialized in speeches for the lawcourts. There survive three forensic speeches: Prosecution for poisoning against the stepmother; on the murder of Herodes; On the Chorus-boy.<sup>122</sup> These three speeches were composed for the use of others. Plutarch tells us that Antiphon

composed on behalf of those Athenians who asked him certain speeches for suits in the courts, being the first to turn to this employment according to some authorities. 123

There are also extant three specimen speeches of Antiphon which were used for training future lawyers. These were called Tetralogies and were model speeches of the type which could be heard any day in the Athenian law courts.<sup>124</sup> These Tetralogies give examples of the four speeches necessary for all cases — accusation, defence, reply, rejoinder.<sup>125</sup>



As well as delivering prepared speeches it appears that some Sophists at least were willing to speak ex tempore. Philostratus tells us that

Gorgias (seems) to have begun extemporaneous oratory. For coming into the theatre of the Athenians he had the boldness to say "suggest a subject", and he was the first to proclaim himself willing to take this chance, showing apparently that he knew everything and would trust to the moment to speak on any subject. 126

We read in the Meno that Gorgias

got you into the habit of answering any question you might be asked, with the confidence and dignity appropriate to those who know the answers, just as he himself invites questions of every kind from anyone in the Greek world who wishes to ask, and never fails to answer them. 127

In the Gorgias Socrates and Callicles are discussing Gorgias:

Socrates: ... I want to learn from him what is the scope of his art and just what he professes and teaches. As for the exhibition, let him give us that, as you suggest, on some other occasion.

Callicles: There's nothing like asking him, Socrates, for that was one feature of his display. He bade any one of the company present just now ask any questions he pleased, and said he would answer all such questions. 128

Plato has the polymath Hippias assert that he is wont to travel from Elis to Olympia for the festival and at the temple, where all the Greeks were gathered together, that he continually expressed his willingness to speak on whatever subject from those which he had prepared and to answer any questions which anyone wished to ask him.<sup>129</sup> If we are to believe other evidence regarding the accomplishments of Hippias (especially the assertions which Plato puts





into his mouth) the list of subjects which he would have prepared for display would be very large.

With regard to the teaching methods of the Sophists Aristotle in his On Sophistical Refutations declares:

The educational method of those earning money by teaching controversial argumentation was like the system of Gorgias. For some assigned rhetorical speeches and others question-and-answer discussions to be learned by heart. Each thought that each other's arguments were for the most part encompassed in these. As a result, the teaching was quick but unscientific for those learning from them. For they thought they were teaching, although presenting, not art, but the results of art, just as if someone claimed to present a science to prevent feet from hurting and then did not teach shoemaking, nor where it was possible to get such things, but offered many kinds of shoes of all sorts. 130

Kerferd considers that the Sophists did not require their students to learn whole speeches by heart but rather those passages and discussions which were called *κοινὰ τόποι* in Greek and "loci communes" in Latin, the usual translation being "commonplaces" or "general arguments". These were often antithetical in character.<sup>131</sup> They were arguments, as Douglas Stewart remarks, which would be employed by both sides in a debate. He offers the example of how two political rivals could appeal to such arguments as patriotism, traditions, or national pride in order to prove their contradictory courses of action.<sup>132</sup> Protagoras is reputed to have composed a *τέχνη ἐριστικῶν* or the Art of Debating,<sup>133</sup> and Cicero may have been thinking of this when he wrote

... and that Protagoras wrote down and prepared disputations on notable subjects, which are now called "general arguments (loci communes)." 134



The Sophists were, of course, quite aware that the same subjects occur again and again and they developed a great number of standard passages, maxims, and pithy aphorisms which they could produce when required. Their pupils, particularly the ones especially interested in oratory, learned a treasury of such passages by heart in order to employ whichever one suited their purposes on any particular occasion. As Beck remarks, we are reminded here of the formulaic method employed by the epic poets.<sup>135</sup> Generally the Sophists concentrated on topics of universal appeal, e.g. justice and injustice, good and evil, and they grew skilled at reducing any subject to simple terms. This, as Marrou observes, helped the Athenians in their search for general ideas.<sup>136</sup>

The method of instruction by question and answer was, as Kerferd points out, related to the ability to speak in the brief style.<sup>137</sup>

We read in the Dissoi Logoi

And so he is <also><able to discourse> in the brief style on all subjects, <whenever> he has to answer questions. Therefore, it must be that he knows everything. 138

Protagoras was equally adept at presenting long speeches and speaking briefly:

Protagoras on the other hand, though he is perfectly capable of long and splendid speeches as we have seen, has also the faculty of answering a question briefly, and when he asks one himself, of waiting and listening to the answer — a rare accomplishment. 139

Socrates preferred Protagoras to speak in the more compendious style:

What they told me, I answered, is that you have the gift



both of speaking yourself and of teaching others to speak, just as you prefer — either at length, so that you never run dry, or so shortly that no one could beat you for brevity. If then you are going to talk to me, please use the second method and be brief. 140

Gorgias claims a similar ability to speak briefly:

Gorgias: There are certain answers, Socrates, that must necessarily be given at length; however, I will attempt to answer as briefly as possible. For that too is one of the claims I make, that nobody could give the same answers more briefly than I.

Socrates: That is what I want, Gorgias; give me an exhibition of this brevity of yours, and reserve a lengthy discourse for another time. 141

Prodicus, however, was of the opinion that the art of speaking required neither long nor short speeches but rather ones of the proper length, a view which Socrates declared would be assented to by Hippias.<sup>142</sup> In the Protagoras Hippias stated:

Socrates should not insist on the strict forms of discussion, carried on through the briefest of exchanges, if it is unwelcome to Protagoras, but should give way and slacken the reins of his discourse, so that it may wear for us a more dignified and elegant air, and Protagoras should refrain from shaking out every reef and running before the wind, launching out on a sea of words till he is out of sight of land. Let both take a middle course. Do this, take my advice, and appoint an arbitrator, referee or president to preserve a moderate length in the speeches of both of you. 143

Many of the Sophists taught that it is possible to argue either side of an argument. Antilogy was their weapon. They employed paradox and contradiction as dialectical arms, the greatest manifestation being in the use of the *dissoi logoi*, an exercise for arguing both sides





of a given argument. (The treatise *Δισσοὶ Λόγοι* or Double Speeches was composed by some unknown Sophist about the end of the Fifth Century B.C. using the Doric Dialect).<sup>144</sup> In fact, the Sophists became so adept at dialectic and at arguing both sides of an argument that it was not until Aristotle set forth the rules that valid inferences could be distinguished from false.<sup>145</sup> A.R. Burn points to Thucydides' Melian Dialogue as a fine example of a piece of writing by someone whose mind was trained by Sophistic methods to state both sides of a complex issue.<sup>146</sup> Protagoras, according to Marrou, borrowed his dialectic from Zeno the Eleatic but at the same time ignored Zeno's serious intention and genuine logical analysis of his famous paradoxes, and developed the method of eristics. To win the debate was the prime concern, regard for truth being very secondary.<sup>147</sup> As Socrates says of Euthydemus and his brother Dionysodorus:

They have become so skilful in wordy warfare that they can confute with equal success anything which anyone says, whether false or true !      148

Anything which would silence an opponent could be utilized — "Fallacies of any kind, verbal ambiguities, long and irrelevant monologues."<sup>149</sup>

Often the arguments which ensued were petty and were concerned with matters of little importance. Plutarch relates the anecdote that when an athlete accidentally killed Epitimus the Pharsalian with a javelin it was said that Pericles

squandered an entire day discussing with Protagoras whether it was the javelin, or rather the one who



hurled it, or the judges of the contests, that "in the strictest sense" ought to be held responsible for the disaster. 150

Seneca in one of his letters writes that

Protagoras says that one can argue equally well on either side of any question, including the question itself whether both sides of any question can be argued. 151

Clement writes

Every argument has an opposite argument, say the Greeks, following Protagoras. 152

We read in Diogenes Laertius that Protagoras

was the first to say that on every issue there are two arguments opposed to each other; these he made use of in arguing by the method of questioning, a practice he originated. 153

Diogenes, quoting from Artemidorus the dialectician's work Against Chrysippus, also declares that Protagoras "was the first to introduce the methods of attacking any thesis."<sup>154</sup> Under the entry "Abdera" in Stephanus Byzantius it is stated that

Protagoras, who according to Eudoxus, created the weaker and stronger argument and taught his pupils to blame and praise the same person. 155

Sometimes the disputation was more a matter of verbal squabbling, quibbling and mere trickery, logic having no place and fallacious thinking being rampant. For example, we read in the Euthydemus of Plato

(Dionysodorus and Ctesippus are speaking)

Just tell me, have you a dog ?

Yes, and a very bad one, said Ctesippus.



Has he got puppies ?  
 Very much so, he said, as bad as he is.  
 Then the dog is their father ?  
 I have seen him myself, he said, on the job with the bitch.  
 Very well, isn't the dog yours ?  
 Certainly, he said.  
 Then being a father he is yours, so the dog becomes your  
 father and you the puppies' brother. 156

Diogenes Laertius could even write of Protagoras himself that

he was also the first to distinguish the tenses of the  
 verb, to expound the importance of the right moment, to  
 conduct debates, and to introduce disputants to the tricks  
 of argument. Moreover, in neglecting meanings and concern-  
 ing himself with mere words, he fathered the present shall-  
 ow tribe of quibblers — to the point that Timon can speak  
 of him as "Protagoras who mixes in, master of wrangling." 157

Aristophanes in the Clouds parodies the notion that there are two  
 arguments on every issue:

They say that both arguments can be found among them, the  
 stronger, whoever he is, and the weaker. Of these two  
 arguments, the one — the weaker — wins out, they claim,  
 by saying what is more unjust. 158

The eagerness always to win the argument under discussion rather  
 than attain the truth made the Sophists appear, as Ulrich remarks,  
 more like trial lawyers than philosophers.<sup>159</sup> Protagoras was commonly  
 supposed to have taught the skill of making the lesser argument  
 victorious<sup>160</sup> and on this account Aristotle roundly castigates him in  
 the Rhetoric:

And this is what one means by "making the weaker argument  
 stronger". (ΚΑΙ Τὸ τὸν ἥττω δὲ λόγον κρείττω  
 ποιεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστίν). And for this reason men  
 were justly offended by what Protagoras professed to do,  
 for it is a falsehood and is not a true, but only an appar-  
 ent, probability. It belongs, moreover, to no art except  
 rhetoric and eristic. 161





Even though Protagoras himself was quite noble minded with regard to what was good or bad for society the rhetorical tricks which he taught for a fee could be employed for both worthy and unworthy purposes by his students.<sup>162</sup> Guthrie declares that Protagoras' doctrine that "there are two arguments on each subject" has its good points in that it is always of benefit to consider both sides of a question but that it is always open to abuse especially when taught for a fee to ambitious and impetuous youths.<sup>163</sup> At any rate, Brumbaugh seems correct in his assertion that the Sophists' use of rhetoric should not be considered as a contribution to philosophy but rather that it stands in opposition to it.<sup>164</sup> Cotterill dismisses the end of the Sophists as being mere intellectualism and rhetorical artifice, describing the latter as "that art of Belial".<sup>165</sup>

Generally speaking, how an argument sounded counted for more than its approximation to logical fact. To be pleasing to the ear was the most important point. Indeed, Freeman observes that the mellifluousness of sound meant more to the southern nature of the Greeks than any logic or precision of facts.<sup>166</sup> Rhetoric, he declares

became simply a question of style, not of argument; and since arguments were not required the strength or weakness of a case did not matter: rhetoric could make any cause attractive to a sensuous Hellenic ear by its tricks of style, and thus make "the weaker cause the stronger".<sup>167</sup>

Obviously this indifference to truth had a deleterious effect on the Greek character and the dominance of rhetoric rendered it difficult to obtain justice in a Greek court.<sup>168</sup> As Ransdell states, however, some of the Sophists appeared to be morally neutral with



regard to the doctrines which they taught their students. It was not their fault if the students abused their newly acquired skills or employed them for ignoble purposes: "It was the Sophist's job to supply the skills, but it was the students' responsibility to decide how to use or misuse it."<sup>169</sup> A point in favour of the practice of composing speeches on either side of an imaginary case was that it had a certain educational value. Similar practices are common today in law faculties of universities.

### The Sophists' Teaching of Literature and Language

For the Sophists the main interest in poetry was in critically analyzing it and examining its techniques, revealing inconsistencies, categorizing metres, and comparing and contrasting poet with poet.<sup>170</sup> Thus in general, literature tended to be studied less for its aesthetic qualities than for its stylistic worth and its utility to the art of rhetoric. The great poets of ancient times, especially Homer and Hesiod, were mainly read to elucidate grammatical points and to afford topics for rhetorical speeches.<sup>171</sup> However Protagoras is undoubtedly partly thinking of aesthetics and literary appreciation when he declares in the Protagoras:

In my view, Socrates, the most important part of a man's education is to become an authority on poetry. This means being able to criticize the good and bad points of a poem with understanding, to know how to distinguish them, and to give one's reasons when asked.      172

A discussion then follows regarding the interpretation of a poem by Simonides. Hippias declares that he has an interesting thesis on the



poem but Alcibiades asks him to put off his exposition until another time.<sup>173</sup> In fact, as Kerferd relates, the whole discussion on Simonides accounts for as much as a sixth of the Protagoras.<sup>174</sup> A mutilated scholium on the Iliad gives further evidence of Protagoras' interest in the aesthetic interpretation of poetry:

Protagoras says that the next episode, the fight between Xanthus and a mortal, is meant to divide the battle, in order to make a transition to the battle of the gods; perhaps also in order to glorify Achilles and ... the dangers ... catching ... leaped no longer in the stream bed but on the plain. 175

In the Hippias Minor Hippias is represented as just having completed an epideixis on Homer and in conversation with Socrates he discusses the characterization of Achilles, Nestor, and Odysseus.<sup>176</sup> Kerferd reminds us of the passage, admittedly later than the period we are considering, in the Panathenaicus where Isocrates relates how three or four ordinary Sophists were sitting in the Lyceum discussing the poetry of Homer and Hesiod.<sup>177</sup> It is clear, as Kerferd remarks, that Protagoras' practice of literary criticism continued long after him.<sup>178</sup>

If it is probably true that much of the Sophists' discussion and examination of literature was often very little more than carping and pettifogging on minor points of language, however some of them did indeed study the structure and rules of language earnestly. For example, in the Cratylus Hermogenes is advised by Socrates to go to the Sophists if he wishes to learn the correctness of names.<sup>179</sup> We know from the Phaedrus that Protagoras wrote a discourse entitled





Ὁρθότης or "On Correctness of Diction".<sup>180</sup> According to Diogenes Laertius Protagoras

first divided speech into four modes: entreaty, question, answer, and command. (According to others he recognized seven: narration, question, answer, command, report, entreaty, and invitation), and these he called the basic parts of speech.

On the other hand Alcidas is stated to have distinguished four forms of speech: affirmation, negation, question, and address.<sup>181</sup>

Aristotle in the Poetics writes that Protagoras criticized the opening line of the Iliad "Sing, goddess, the wrath ..." because "it is a command purporting to be a request. For, he says, to bid someone to do or not to do something is a command."<sup>182</sup>

Aristotle records that Protagoras distinguished the gender of words and divided them into masculine, feminine, and neuter.<sup>183</sup> In this regard in On Sophistical Refutations Aristotle mentions an example of solecism discussed by Protagoras:

One can have the error itself, the mere appearance of the error, and the mere appearance of avoiding it, as one has, for example, if — as Protagoras used to say — the words "wrath" and "helmet" are masculine; for then someone who says "accursed" in the feminine form (to qualify these nouns) is guilty of solecism according to him, although it seems correct to others, whereas someone who uses the masculine form seems to, but does not, commit a solecism. 184

Aristophanes in the Clouds parodies this insistence of Protagoras on the distinction between the gender of different nouns. Animals of different sex should be distinguished by different terminations, e.g. ἀλεκτρυόνα for 'she-fowl' and ἀλέκτωρ for



'he-fowl'. Also masculine nouns should have masculine articles and feminine nouns should have feminine articles.<sup>185</sup>

Hippias is said by Socrates to have been able to draw distinctions with greater precision than any other man with regard to "the properties of letters and syllables and rhythms and harmonies."<sup>186</sup>

In the Hippias Minor he is stated to have possessed a knowledge surpassing others "in the true principles of rhythm and harmony and of orthography".<sup>187</sup> Cicero writes that Thrasy-machus and Gorgias "were the first, according to tradition, to have submitted words to a more or less methodical arrangement".<sup>188</sup> Dionysius of Halicarnassus writes that Thrasy-machus, among others, made a profession of accurate expression.<sup>189</sup> Prodicus of Ceos was particularly interested in etymology, synonymy, and the definition and correct usage of words.<sup>190</sup>

With regard to synonymy we read Prodicus' comments in the Protagoras:

Hearing this, Prodicus began, You are quite right, Critias. Those who are present at discussions of this kind must divide their attention between the speakers impartially but not equally. The two things are not the same. They must hear both alike, but not give equal weight to each. More should be given to the wiser, and less to the other. I add my plea, Protagoras and Socrates, that you should be reconciled. Let your conversation be a discussion, not a dispute. A discussion is carried on among friends with good will, but a dispute is between rivals and enemies. In this way our meeting will be best conducted. You, the speakers will be esteemed by us — esteemed, I say, not praised, for esteem is a genuine feeling in the hearts of the audience, whereas praise is often on the lips of men belying their true conviction — and we who listen will experience enjoyment rather than pleasure. Enjoyment can result from learning and partaking in the intellectual activity of the mind alone, but pleasure arises rather from eating or other forms of physical indulgence. 191



We read in the Laches that Prodicus is the best of all the Sophists at analyzing distinctions between terms<sup>192</sup> and in the Charmides Socrates declares that he has often heard the endless distinctions drawn by the Sophist about such terms.<sup>193</sup> In the Euthydemus Prodicus insists that it is above all necessary to learn about the right use of words.<sup>194</sup> Further accounts of Prodicus' exegeses of synonyms is provided in the Protagoras. Socrates is speaking to Prodicus:

Indeed, our explication of Simonides stands in need of your special talent, whereby you distinguish the meanings of "will" (BOULESTHAI, "to take an interior decision") and "desire" (EPITHUMEIN, "to be eager for") and show that they are not the same thing ... 340B Do "becoming" (GENESTHAI) and "being" (EINAI) seem to be the same thing or different ? Different, by Zeus !, said Prodicus. 341B That which is "terrible" (DEINON), he (Prodicus) says, is "evil" (KAKON) .... What did Simonides mean by the term "difficult" (CHALEPON), Prodicus ? He meant "evil". 195

It is possible, as Guthrie suggests, that Prodicus who very likely was the teacher and/or a friend of Socrates<sup>196</sup> influenced the latter's philosophy. For there seems to be a close connection between Prodicus' fine distinguishing between very similar terms and Socrates' insistence on closely and correctly defining what specific terms exactly mean: for example, virtue, courage, justice.<sup>197</sup> In fine, Guthrie is correct in declaring that the Sophists' interest in the study of grammar and language was motivated more by practical than scientific concerns. One of the main reasons for such study was to increase the effectiveness of speaking, i.e., become a better orator.<sup>198</sup> In like manner Guthrie considers it





probable that Prodicus, who was highly regarded as an orator, insisted on precision in language primarily because of its utility for effective speaking.<sup>199</sup>

### Other Subjects Taught by the Sophists

Rhetoric, literature, and grammar were by no means the only subjects which the Sophists taught. As we have seen in the previous chapter many Sophists had a wide ranging interest in philosophical matters, particularly epistemology, and also in various questions concerning the gods. (Gorgias is reputed to have stated that those who leave philosophy in order to spend more time with general studies are like the suitors in the Odyssey who, though desiring Penelope, nevertheless slept with her servant maids).<sup>200</sup> Because Sophists had to be able to speak well on a multitude of diverse subjects it was necessary for them to have a wide general knowledge and consequently they emphasized the importance of a broad curriculum for their students.<sup>201</sup>

Cicero declares that "Gorgias of Leontini, almost the earliest rhetorician, thought that an orator ought to be able to speak best on all subjects".<sup>202</sup> We have seen earlier in Chapter Three when the evidence for the lives and works of the Sophists was discussed that many of them wrote extensively on a very varied range of subjects. It is extremely probable that many if not all of these subjects were included in their curricula for their pupils.

Some Sophists, for example Hippias, professed pantological interests and claimed competence in teaching any subject — geometry, astron-



omy, music, rhythms, painting, sculpture, archaeological and historical matters.<sup>203</sup> In Plato's Sophist a Sophist is stated to be a controversialist — *Ἀντιλογικὸν αὐτὸν ἔφαμεν εἶναι που* — and an instructor of others in controversy. The Stranger provides a list of topics which such Sophists teach their pupils: "divine things that are hidden from common eyes"; "all that is visible in sky and earth and everything of that sort"; matters concerning "becoming or reality"; "laws and other political matters"; "crafts in general and each particular craft". The Stranger declares that there are many other subjects and that "the pretensions of this art of controversy amount, it seems, to a capacity for disputation on any subject whatsoever."<sup>204</sup>

Mathematics seems to have been a popular subject and one with which the Sophists' pupils would have had previous acquaintance in school. We have already considered Hippias' interest and skill in geometry and arithmetic.<sup>205</sup> Protagoras also displayed an interest in mathematical questions and, as Aristotle relates, he attacked the mathematicians:

Nor is it true to say that mensuration has for its object perceptible magnitudes which are also perishable, for then it would perish when they did. But on the other hand astronomy surely does not have for its object perceptible magnitudes nor does it deal with the heaven that we see. For perceptible lines are not such as the geometer speaks of either, for nothing perceptible is straight or round in that way; for the circle touches the straightedge not at a point, but as Protagoras said it did when he refuted the geometers, nor .... 206

Simplicius in his Physics discusses Antiphon's attempt to square the



circle, an attempt which he considers was not based on sound geometrical principles.<sup>207</sup> Aristotle agrees that Antiphon's solution does not proceed from the principles of geometry and that, therefore, it is not his business to refute it.<sup>208</sup> However, as Kerferd remarks, it does at least show that some Sophists were interested in dealing with geometrical problems.<sup>209</sup>

Cicero in De Oratore tells us that Prodicus, Thrasymachus and Protagoras all wrote on and discussed questions of natural philosophy.<sup>210</sup> Suidas calls Prodicus a natural philosopher<sup>211</sup> and Eupolis is said to have satirized Protagoras for his interest in scientific matters.<sup>212</sup> Hippias was also held to have possessed a great knowledge of science. In the Protagoras he is represented as declaiming ex cathedra on natural philosophy, particularly astronomy, to the assembled throng in the house of Callias.<sup>213</sup> In Hippias Major he is said by Socrates to be an excellent authority on the stars and celestial phenomena.<sup>214</sup> Sextus tells us that Protagoras held a theory of effluences similar to the doctrine of Empedocles:

Now what he says is that matter is in a state of flux,  
and that as it changes there is a continuous replacement  
of the effluvia which it gives off.      215

Gorgias in the Meno is credited by Plato to have also followed Empedocles' doctrine of effluences.<sup>216</sup> There is also the report that Gorgias was represented on the tomb of Isocrates as gazing at an astronomical globe with Isocrates himself standing beside him.<sup>217</sup> Gorgias is also said to have declared that the sun was a red-hot





stone.<sup>218</sup> Theophrastus relates a theory of Gorgias regarding how combustion takes place when rays are reflected from a mirror and from polished bronze and silver surfaces.<sup>219</sup> Prodicus, as we have seen earlier, was satirized by Aristophanes as a "space expert"<sup>220</sup> and Galen provides an example of how he combined his interests in etymology and science.<sup>221</sup> Fragments 87 B93-B116 of Antiphon (contained in Sprague)<sup>222</sup> are concerned in general with the subjects of cosmogony and zoogony. For example, according to Aetius, Antiphon declares that the nature of the sun

is fire which grazes upon the damp air round the earth and which causes risings and settings by constantly leaving behind the scorched air and in turn going after the air which is dampish.      223

Pollux relates that Antiphon declared that "that in which the foetus grows and receives nourishment is called the membrane."<sup>224</sup> Thus, there is ample evidence for us to conclude that at least some Sophists displayed interest in scientific speculation, a conclusion which is supported by the Clouds of Aristophanes.<sup>225</sup> It is likely also that this interest in natural philosophy reflected the demands of certain of the Sophists' students.



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9. JARRETT, ibid., pp. 74-75.
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11. JAEGER, Paideia, p. 287.
12. HAMMOND, History of Greece, p. 420.
13. MARROU, op. cit., p. 52.
14. BURY, op. cit., p. 385.
15. PLATO, Gorgias 466C; see MARROU, op. cit., p. 52.
16. PLATO, Sophist 232D, translated by F.M. Cornford in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.  
Guthrie declares that the rhetoric of Fifth Century Athens is analogous to the role played by advertising today, and just as we have business schools and schools of advertising so also the Greeks had the Sophists — teachers of politics and rhetoric. GUTHRIE, Sophists, p. 50.
17. JAEGER, Paideia, p. 290.
18. PLATO, Protagoras 312D, translated by Guthrie in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
19. PLATO, Gorgias 453A.



20. PLATO, Phaedrus 261A, translated by R. Hackforth in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
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  22. GORGIAS, Encomium on Helen (12). Sprague 82 B11.
  23. GORGIAS, ibid. (8). Sprague 82 B11.
  24. GORGIAS, ibid. (14). Sprague 82 B11.
  25. CICERO, Brutus 12, 47. Sprague 87 A7.
  26. QUINTILIAN III 1, 8ff. Sprague 82 A14.
- Holm reminds us of the famous lawsuit of Tisias, pupil of Corax. Tisias had undertaken to pay for his instruction as soon as he had successfully completed his course in rhetoric. When he refused to pay Corax brought a suit against him. In court Tisias declared that he was under no obligation to pay, for if he won the case then he would, of course, not be required to pay but also if he lost Corax would then be shown to have failed to teach him the art of rhetoric. Holm declares that "This story exhibits the character of the new sciences of rhetoric and sophistry, which aimed at success and were supported by fallacies;" HOLM, op. cit., p. 429.
27. CICERO, Brutus 12, 46ff.  
See also MARROU, op. cit., p. 53.
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  33. PHILOSTRATUS, Epistle 73. Sprague 82 A35.
  34. PHILOSTRATUS, Lives of the Sophists I 9, 3. Sprague 82 A1.
  35. DIODORUS SICULUS XII 53, 4. Sprague 82 A4.
  36. FREEMAN, Kenneth, op. cit., p. 176.





Also BURNET, Greek Philosophy, p. 119.

Also BECK, op. cit., p. 145.

37. BECK, ibid., pp. 147-148.
38. FREEMAN, Kenneth, op. cit., p. 162.
39. LYNCH, op. cit., p. 41.
40. See "The Origins of Higher Education at Athens: The Lyceum and Athenian Education before Aristotle", Chapter II of LYNCH, ibid.
41. KERFERD, Sophistic Movement, p. 30.
42. PLATO, Hippias Major 282C.
43. PLATO, Lysis 204A.
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45. (PLATO), Eryxias 397D. Sprague 84 B8.
46. PLATO, Euthydemus 272E.
47. PLATO, Hippias Major 286B.
48. (PLATO), Axiochus 366B. Sprague 84 B9.
49. DIOGENES LAERTIUS IX 54. Sprague 80 A1.
50. LYNCH, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
51. We read in the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Theages about a father, Demodocus, complaining that his son, Theages, is annoying him to be allowed enroll for a course with some Sophist:
 

My opinion is that some of his fellow-townsmen, about his own age, who pay visits to the city, excite him with accounts of certain discussions they have heard there; and in his envy of these he has long been pestering me with the demand that I should take due thought for his needs, and pay fees to some sophist or other who will make him wise. (PLATO), Theages 121D, translated by W.R.M. Lamb in Loeb Classical Library, William Heinemann Ltd.: London, 1964.
52. With regard to these foreigners Kerferd remarks that if



Protagoras provided board it could explain why his fees were so high. KERFERD, Sophistic Movement, p. 30.

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55. JARRETT, op. cit., p. 108.
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PLATO, Protagoras 357E.  
PLATO, Hippias Major 282Cff.  
PLATO, Gorgias 519C.



- PLATO, Gorgias 520C.  
 PLATO, Meno 91B.  
 PLATO, Sophist 223A.  
 PLATO, Sophist 231D.  
 PLATO, Sophist 233B.  
 PLATO, Theaetetus 167D.  
 PLATO, Euthydemus 271D.  
 PLATO, Laches 186C.  
 PLATO, Hippias Minor 364D.  
 (PLATO), Alcibiades I 119A.  
 XENOPHON, Anabasis II 6, 16ff. Sprague 82 A5.  
 XENOPHON, Memorabilia I 6, 13. Sprague 79 2a.  
 XENOPHON, Symposium IV 62. Sprague 84 A4a.  
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 DIOGENES LAERTIUS IX 50. Sprague 80 A1.  
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Concerning the Olympic Speech Plutarch writes as follows:  
When Gorgias the orator read a speech at Olympia about concord among the Greeks, Melanthius said:  
"This fellow advises us about concord, though he has not persuaded himself and his wife and his maid, only three in number, to live in private concord."  
For it seems that Gorgias had a passion for the little maid and his wife was jealous. PLUTARCH, Advice to Bride and Groom, 43p. 144BC. Sprague 82 B8a.
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106. Sprague 82 B11 and B11a.
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113. PLATO, Hippias Minor 363Cff.
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Philostratus also tells us that Gorgias improvised easily ....  
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128. PLATO, Gorgias 447C, translated by W.D. Woodhead in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
129. PLATO, Hippias Minor 363Cff.
130. ARISTOTLE, On Sophistical Refutations XXXVIII 183b36. Sprague 82 B14.
131. KERFERD, Sophistic Movement, pp. 31-32.
132. Douglas Stewart in Sprague, op. cit., p. 75, note 9.  
See also FREEMAN, Kenneth, op. cit., p. 175.
133. DIOGENES LAERTIUS IX 55. Sprague 80 A1.
134. CICERO, Brutus 12, 46. Sprague 80 B6.  
Also Quintilian III 1, 12. Sprague 80 B6.
135. BECK, op. cit., p. 168.
136. MARROU, op. cit., p. 54.  
Also Beck, op. cit., p. 145.
137. KERFERD, Sophistic Movement, p. 32.
138. Dissoi Logoi VIII 13; Also VIII 1. Sprague 90.
139. PLATO, Protagoras 329B, translated by Guthrie in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
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144. JAEGER, Paideia, p. 312.
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147. MARROU, op. cit., p. 51.  
One source states that Protagoras was the first to invent  
eristic arguments. HESYCHIUS, op. cit. Sprague 80 A3.
148. PLATO, Euthydemus 272A, translated by W.H.D. Rouse in Collected  
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149. KERFERD, Sophistic Movement, p. 63.
150. PLUTARCH, Pericles 36, 3, translated by Bernadotte Perrin  
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153. DIOGENES LAERTIUS IX 51. Sprague 80 A1.
154. DIOGENES LAERTIUS IX 53. Sprague 80 A1.
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156. PLATO, Euthydemus 298Dff., translated by W.H.D. Rouse in  
Collected Dialogues, op. cit.  
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157. DIOGENES LAERTIUS IX 52. Sprague 80 A1.
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See also Clouds lines 889ff., The Contest of the Just and the  
Unjust Argument.
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Socrates states in the Phaedrus that Tisias and Gorgias  
"realized that probability deserves more respect than truth."  
PLATO, Phaedrus 267A, translated by Hackforth in Collected  
Dialogues, op. cit.
162. FREEMAN, Kathleen, God, Man and State, p. 130.
163. GUTHRIE, Sophists, pp. 24-25.



164. BRUMBAUGH, op. cit., p. 115.
165. COTTERILL, H.B., Ancient Greece, George G. Harrap and Co.: London, 1915, p. 322.
166. FREEMAN, Kenneth, op. cit., p. 174.
167. ibid., p. 175.
168. ibid., p. 175.
169. RANDELL, Joseph, The Pursuit of Wisdom, Intelman Books: California, 1976, p. 57.
170. JARRETT, op. cit., p. 19.
171. CASTLE, Ancient Education, p. 54.
172. PLATO, Protagoras 339A, translated by Guthrie in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
173. PLATO, Protagoras 347B.
174. KERFERD, Sophistic Movement, p. 40.
175. AMMONIUS, Scholium on Homer (POxy II no. 68) col. XII 20 on Iliad XXI 240. Sprague 80 A30.

The following anecdote is also related of Protagoras regarding his interest in poetry:

When a maker of verses cursed Protagoras because he would not approve of his poems, his answer was, "My good sir, I am better off enduring your abuse than enduring your poems." Gnomologium Vaticanum 743 no. 468. (Sternbach Wiener Studien). Sprague 80 A25.

176. PLATO, Hippias Minor 364C.
177. ISOCRATES, Panathenaicus 18.
178. KERFERD, Sophistic Movement, p. 41.
179. PLATO, Cratylus 391B.
180. PLATO, Phaedrus 267C.
181. DIOGENES LAERTIUS IX 53ff. Sprague 80 A1.
182. ARISTOTLE, Poetics 19, 1456b15. Sprague 80 A29.
183. ARISTOTLE, Rhetoric III 5, 1407b6. Sprague 80 A27.





184. ARISTOTLE, On Sophistical Refutations XIV 173b17. Sprague 80 A28.
185. ARISTOPHANES, Clouds lines 658ff.
186. PLATO, Hippias Major 285Cff., translated by Jowett in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
187. PLATO, Hippias Minor 368D, translated by Jowett in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.  
See also PHILOSTRATUS, Lives of the Sophists I II, 1. Sprague 86 A2.
188. CICERO, Orator 13, 40. Sprague 85 A12.
189. DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS, Isaeus 20. Sprague 85 A13.
190. See MARCELLINUS, Life of Thucydides 36. Sprague 84 A9.  
Also PLATO, Cratylus 384B. Sprague 84 A11.
191. PLATO, Protagoras 337Aff., translated by Guthrie in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
192. PLATO, Laches 197D. Sprague 84 A17.
193. PLATO, Charmides 163D. Sprague 84 A18.
194. PLATO, Euthydemus 277E. Sprague 84 A16.
195. PLATO, Protagoras 340Aff. Sprague 84 A14.  
See also Meno 75E. Sprague 84 A15.  
Also ARISTOTLE, Topics II 6, 112b22. Sprague 84 A19.  
Also ALEXANDER OF APHRODISIAS ad. loc. 181, 2. Sprague 84 A19.
196. GUTHRIE, Sophists, p. 275ff.
197. GUTHRIE, ibid., pp. 222-223.
198. GUTHRIE, ibid., pp. 219-220.
199. GUTHRIE, ibid., p. 223.
200. Gnomologium Vaticanum 743 No. 166 (ed. Sternbach Wiener Studien X 36). Sprague 82 B29.
201. BECK, op. cit., p. 169.



202. CICERO, On Invention 5, 2. Sprague 82 A26.
203. PHILOSTRATUS, Lives of the Sophists I II, 1-3. Sprague 86 A2.  
 Protagoras, "a sophist of very wide knowledge" (APULEIUS, Florida 18. Sprague 80 A4), discusses such varied topics as livestock rearing, veterinary science, agriculture, and medicine in a short speech in the Protagoras. This does not mean that they therefore were part of his curriculum but since Protagoras had earlier declared that he would teach his pupils how to best look after their households (Protagoras 318E) it is likely, as Beck remarks, that these subjects were included by the Sophist as part of his pedagogical repertoire. (BECK, op. cit., p. 172). Beck also suggests that since Protagoras was highly regarded as an expert on law it may be assumed that he taught this subject. (BECK, ibid., p. 172).
204. PLATO, Sophist 232Bff., translated by F.M. Cornford in Collected Dialogues, op. cit.
205. See Protagoras 318D.  
 Also Sprague 86 A2; 86 A11; 86 B12; 86 B21.
206. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics III 2, 997b32. Sprague 80 B7.  
 See also Sprague 80 B7a.  
 Also Guthrie, Sophists, p. 267.
207. SIMPLICIUS, Physics 54, 12. Sprague 87 B81.
208. ARISTOTLE, Physics 1 2, 185a14. Sprague 87 B81.
209. KERFERD, Sophistic Movement, p. 38.
210. CICERO, On the Orator III 32, 128. Sprague 84 B3.
211. SUIDAS. Sprague 84 A1.
212. EUSTATHIUS on Homer Odyssey V 490 1547, 53. Sprague 80 A11.
213. PLATO, Protagoras 315C.
214. PLATO, Hippias Major 285Bff.  
 See also PHILOSTRATUS, Lives of the Sophists I II, 1. Sprague 86 A2.  
 Also DIOGENES LAERTIUS 1 24. Sprague 86 B7.  
 Also Scholia on Aratus (Maass) 172 p. 369, 27. Sprague



86 B13.

Also Hippias Minor 367Eff.

Also Protagoras 318D.

- 215. SEXTUS, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I 217. Sprague 80 A14.
- 216. PLATO, Meno 76Aff. Sprague 82 B4.  
See also KERFERD, Sophistic Movement, p. 39.
- 217. (PLUTARCH), Lives of the Ten Orators p. 838D. Sprague 82 A17.
- 218. SOPATER, Commentary on Hermogenes, Rh. Gr. VIII 23 Walz.  
Sprague 82 B131.
- 219. THEOPHRASTUS, On Fire (Gercke) 73 p. 20. Sprague 82 B5.
- 220. ARISTOPHANES, Clouds line 360.
- 221. GALEN, On the Physical Faculties II 9. Sprague 84 B4.  
See also GALEN, On Medical Methods X 474 Kühn. Sprague 84 B11.
- 222. 87 B22-B43 of DIELS-KRANZ.
- 223. AETIUS II 20, 15 (D351). Sprague 87 B98 (DK B26).
- 224. POLLUX II 223. Sprague 87 B109 (DK B36).
- 225. See FREEMAN, Kenneth, op. cit., p. 166.  
Also KERFERD, Sophistic Movement, p. 39.





## CHAPTER SIX

### CONCLUSION

In the foregoing I have treated some of the issues dealing with the rise and development of the Sophistic Movement in Greece in the latter half of the Fifth Century B.C. I have also discussed some of the main theories, teaching practices and curricula of certain of the more important Sophists. I have shown that the Sophists responded to the changing educational needs of the time, needs which were not satisfied by the "Old" elementary education, and that these teachers accordingly introduced higher education into Athens. An attempt has been made to consider this Movement from a broad perspective and as a constituent part of the main currents of the total scheme of Athenian and wider Greek history.

Earlier in this work I have discussed certain reasons why the Sophists were disliked by some of their contemporaries in Athens. Yet, at the same time, there is no doubt but that these teachers were widely acclaimed and were popular.<sup>1</sup> An example of this popularity, as we have already observed, is the opening section of Plato's Protagoras wherein is evident the fervent excitement aroused among the youths, Hippocrates in particular; by the arrival of the Sophist Protagoras in Athens. It was widely acknowledged that it was through the acquisition of *politiké areté* that the road to worldly success lay and it was felt by many young men of unbridled ambition that acquaintance with the teachings of the Sophists would most easily light them the way to this worldly and political eminence. There was no shortage of



young men eager to attend to the teachings of the Sophists and they were not deterred by being obliged to pay fees. Socrates, in the Apology, speaking of Prodicus, Hippias, and Gorgias declares that

Each one of these is perfectly capable of going into any city and actually persuading the young men to leave the company of their fellow citizens, with any of whom they can associate for nothing, and attach themselves to him, and pay money for the privilege, and be grateful into the bargain.      2

In the Republic Socrates, somewhat sardonically, again testified to the Sophists' popularity:

... Protagoras of Abdera and Prodicus of Ceos and many others are able by private teaching to impress upon their contemporaries the conviction that they will not be capable of governing their homes or the city unless they put them in charge of their education, and make themselves so beloved for their wisdom that their companions all but carry them about on their shoulders,      3

However, it would be wrong to consider that most, never mind all, Athenian youths received instruction from the Sophists. For it is clear that their classes were only attended by a relatively small number of the rich.

Nevertheless, the Sophists were certainly not popular with everyone. As mentioned earlier, many perceived them as fomenting political unrest and the aristocratic party naturally desired a return to the old ways. That staunch laudator temporis acti, Aristophanes, consistently lampooned and parodied the new teachings in his comedies, above all in the Clouds, and he was only one of many who still hungered after the old values and norms. In the Clouds the Sophists are said to be:



Prophets sent beyond sea, quacks of every degree, fops  
 signet-and-jewel-bedecked,  
 Astrological knaves, and fools who their staves of  
 dithyrambs proudly release — 4

Not only did those who were aristocrats by birth oppose the Sophists who professed to be able to make people better thereby threatening the very basis of aristocracy, "the idea of hereditary excellence", but there were also many non-aristocrats, Aristophanes himself for example, who supported the old traditions and aristocratic way of life and who viewed the Sophists as constituting a serious threat to society.<sup>5</sup> Many felt that the Sophists were responsible for Athenian society becoming more effete and luxurious. Instead of developing their bodies in the gymnasium, learning the basics of military life, and understanding the meaning of citizenship through observation and emulation of their elders many Athenian youths were devoting most of their time to these new teachers. It would be natural, as Monroe suggests, if this appeared to be mere idleness to the older Athenians of a conservative disposition.<sup>6</sup> The "Old Oligarch" in the Constitution of the Athenians mentions the breakdown of physical activity:

The people have spoiled the athletic and musical activities at Athens because they thought them unfitting (they know they can't do them). 7

There was a distinct falling away from the sterner curriculum of the "Old" education. However, as already stated, it might be a mistake to assert that the Sophists were chiefly responsible for these changes rather than being a symptom of a larger societal revolution. Many other factors must be taken into account — economic, religious, political, intellectual, cultural. Actually, while Athens was flour-





ishing economically and politically the Sophists were treated kindly enough by the city authorities. But as soon as Athens' fortunes dipped during the vicissitudes of the Peloponnesian War attitudes changed. The City Fathers now began to blame the Sophists and their new theories for helping to undermine the stability of the State. The youth were being corrupted; due respect was no longer paid to the city's gods, institutions, and traditions; scepticism pervaded the air.<sup>8</sup> Clearly many of the older generation were scandalized by certain of the teachings of the Sophists, however R.M. Cook is probably correct in declaring that "it may have been hypocrisy that was undermined as much as morality."<sup>9</sup>

Although the Sophists received a poor "press" in ancient times there is no doubt but that they exerted a certain positive influence on contemporary and subsequent educational theory and practice. As Beck remarks, they catered to deeply felt needs in the second half of Fifth Century Athens and indeed supplied most of the higher education during that period. Under their tutelage new curricula were developed which were felt to be directly related to the needs of human society.<sup>10</sup> We have seen earlier that under the "Old" educational system formal education for Athenian children ended at age fourteen or fifteen after the completion of the elementary schooling taught by the grammatistes, kitharistes, paidotribes. Any secondary or higher education was provided by life, there existing no institution which would cater to the educational needs of youths before they took up the responsibilities of citizenship. The Sophists came forward to fill



this gap and the Athenians were indebted to them for introducing secondary and advanced intellectual education. Thus Athenian education which formally had been almost totally centred on children was now extended to older youths and adults.

Athens was undergoing profound changes in the period with which we are concerned, the chief political change being the on-swell of democratic sentiments and practices. We have observed how important rhetoric was in such a society and it was, above all, the art of eloquent and persuasive speech which the Sophists professed to teach. The whole trend of Greek education was changing from a narrow aristocratic viewpoint focussed on the needs of an hereditary ruling caste to a democratic concern which would come to pervade more strata of society. Skill in persuasive speaking was all important to a citizen who wished to make his mark in the polis and in this regard the Sophists stressed consciousness of the power and efficacy of language, grammar, literacy, facundity. One of the chief effects of the Fifth Century Sophists was that the way was paved for the tremendous flood of professional orators and speech writers of the succeeding century. By the middle of the Fourth Century Athens had become a great school of oratory, a fact attested by Isocrates' Antidosis (written c.354-353 B.C.):

For you must not lose sight of the fact that Athens is looked upon as having become a school for the education of all able orators and teachers of oratory. And naturally so; for people observe that she holds forth the greatest prizes for those who have this ability, that she offers the greatest number and variety of fields of exercise to those who have chosen to enter contests of this character and want to train for



them, and that, furthermore, everyone obtains here that practical experience which more than any other thing imparts ability to speak; and, in addition to these advantages, they consider that the catholicity and moderation of our speech, as well as our flexibility of mind and love of letters, contribute in no small degree to the education of the orator. Therefore they suppose, and not without just reason, that all clever speakers are the disciples of Athens. 11

But the Sophists did more than teach their students the art of eloquent speech. They emphasized the role of the intellect with a corresponding turning away from those physical activities which had formerly played so influential a role in the life of the youths. They espoused and furthered the cause of rationality and logical thought by their development of dialectic thereby effecting a shift from the old reliance on the wisdom of the oracles and the obscure tergiversations of the priests.<sup>12</sup> Also the broad choice of subjects offered by the individual Sophists could not but widen the intellectual horizons of their Athenian students. The curricula of the elementary schools was narrow in form and content, and, although the normal day-to-day living in Athens helped to provide a broad all round education for Athenian youths, the more formal education furnished by the Sophists was responsible, as Marrou declares, for putting "Greek education on the road to maturity."<sup>13</sup>

The general shift of emphasis from one of theocentrism to one of anthropocentrism fostered by the Sophists helped to underscore the essential value and worth of man. In short, the Sophists promoted humanism leading a revolt from accounts, reasons, and explanations based on mythology and the supernatural. It was strongly felt by





certain members of the older more conservative element at Athens that this new stress on man was in effect a nourishing of individualism which was helping to destroy the foundations of the stratified ancien régime at Athens. Certainly, as Jarrett remarks, the Sophists "were guides in the movement toward individualization and the corresponding break up in the rigidities of the highly stratified society of an earlier time."<sup>14</sup> The Sophists were clearly influential in forming and changing people's attitudes during the age under discussion. But how far they were responsible for effecting radical changes in society is subject to argument. However, it is safe to say that much of their teaching was probably not at variance with the prevailing currents of the time. The Sophists did not instigate a trend toward individualism at Athens nor a break up of her stratified society. These teachers, as has been said earlier, were more the effect than the cause of changes at Athens.

I have discussed the Sophists' interest in one of the most prevalent issues of their day, that of the dichotomy between *physis* and *nomos*, that is between nature and convention. Their cosmopolitan Weltanschauung stemming in part from their continual wanderings from city to city pointed them towards the realization that most societies, even Greek ones, were often very different to each other with regard to such things as laws, customs, traditions, culture, religious practices etc. It was soon considered by many that *nomos* was man-made and that the heterogeneity of societies and their respective laws was conventional and not natural. Many Sophists advocated the



superiority of physis and not all of them adopted the Real-Politik of Thrasymachus. It was this realization of the primacy of nature which led to the espousal of pan-Hellenism by a number of Sophists and the notion of the kinship of all Greeks (and perhaps of all men). Unwittingly they were reaching out towards a concept of kinship which still lay in the future. As Gulick writes of the Sophists:

They had, without knowing it, heralded a time when the narrow limits of the little city-state, fervid and patriotic though it was, were to be transcended by wider conceptions which culminated in the empire-state, and made easy the transition to the concept of man as member of a great human brotherhood. 15

The early Sophists had a pervasive influence both on their contemporaries and on their successors. As Tejera asserts, without them the thought of Euripides, the political science of Thucydides, the methods of the orators, and Plato's Socrates would hardly have been conceivable.<sup>16</sup> Gulick writes that without the Sophists we would not have had Plato or Aristotle and without these two giants "it is impossible to conceive of modern philosophy and science".<sup>17</sup> The Sophists

were creatures of their day, reflecting the rampant individualism, the enthusiasms, and the scepticisms that swept Athens in the later fifth century B.C. Their contribution in widening the scope of advanced education and in helping to organize large, nebulous bodies of knowledge into teachable form was no mean one. Theirs was a transition task that was eventually overshadowed by the towering educational structures erected by Plato and Aristotle. 18

I have considered earlier whether the Sophists should be termed philosophers or not and concluded that much of their thought would



today be regarded as being in the realm of philosophy, notwithstanding that their motives for intellectual pursuits were often different to those of the Pre-Socratic philosophers and such Fourth Century philosophers as Plato and Aristotle. The Sophists were particularly important for promoting the study of ethics, a pursuit especially suited to their age. It was a study which would receive a great flowering at the hands of their contemporaries, Socrates and Plato, and later by Aristotle. As Alexander Grant aptly phrases it:

If physical philosophy begins in wonder, Ethics may be said to have begun in scepticism. The dialectical overthrow of popular moral notions, begun by the Sophists and characteristic of their times, merged into the deeper philosophy and constructive methods of Socrates. 19

At any rate, Guthrie is correct in stating that if we remember what philosophers lay in the future — Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and others of Hellenistic times — then it would be a mistake to consider that the age of the Sophists ushered in a decline in Greek thought. Rather Greek philosophy entered "its early manhood".<sup>20</sup>

Freeman Butts declares that one of the main results of the Fifth Century Sophists was the coalition of many of their ideas and methods into institutionalized forms during the course of the following century: "If the enthusiasm stimulated by the Sophists had not been put into organized form, their civilizing effect might have been dissipated .... The more or less intermittent and informal methods of the Sophists had given way to regular institutions of advanced education."<sup>21</sup> Rhetorical schools were founded, that of Isocrates





(392 B.C.) being the most famous; there were noted schools of philosophy, e.g. the Academy of Plato (387 B.C.) and the Lyceum of Aristotle (335 B.C.). As the century was drawing to its close two other influential philosophical schools were set up: the Garden of Epicurus in 306 B.C. and the Stoa of Zeno in 301-300 B.C.<sup>22</sup> However, the influence of the Sophists carried further than the next century. The utilization of rhetoric, dialectic, and grammar, the exegesis of texts, and the emphasis on mathematical study were practices to be adopted in much of ancient and medieval education. They founded what later became known as the Trivium which was made up of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic; thus the Sophists inaugurated the classical tradition.<sup>23</sup> As Castle remarks, the notable Sophists such as Protagoras, Prodicus, Gorgias and his great pupil Isocrates, were just as much sires of the classical educational tradition as the more famous Plato and Aristotle.<sup>24</sup> Out of their theories and practices eventually grew the notion of the Liberal Arts which had a great maturation in the rhetorical education favoured by Cicero and, later, by Quintilian.<sup>25</sup> Even today, as Jaeger reminds us, the system of higher education which dominates most of the world owes its origin to the activities of the Sophists.<sup>26</sup>

The Sophists saw great virtue in the public life, the *vita attiva* as opposed to the *vita contemplativa* (the latter would later be eulogized by Plato). Plato would assert that this earthly life was a *μελέτη θανάτου* i.e. a preparation for death; the soul's eventual goal was communion or participation with the Forms after its final release



from the body — in Orphic terminology the body was the tomb of the soul, *σῶμα σῆμα* . On the other hand, the concerns of the Sophists were on the present. Their anthropocentred care was on man's needs in society and on the necessity of preparing citizens for active participation in democratic government. Otherworldliness of the Platonic ilk was anathema to the Sophists. As Jarrett observes, quoting Antiphon, they had little regard for those who

do not live the life each day brings, but make preparations with great eagerness as if they had another life to live, not the one each day brings. And in the meantime the hours pass by unnoticed. 27

It matters not a whit that the Sophists taught for financial gain. Most teachers in most ages have received money in exchange for their instruction. I cannot but agree with Henri Marrou when he writes: "I shall continue to respect them because, primarily, they were professional men for whom teaching was an occupation whose commercial success bore witness to its intrinsic value and its social utility." 28

It is still common in modern histories of philosophy for the Sophists only to receive a brief chapter between lengthy accounts devoted to the Pre-Socratic philosophers, on the one hand, and to Plato, on the other. Yet the evidence which we possess for the Pre-Socratics is often as scanty and as fragmentary as that for the Sophists. Obviously Plato and Aristotle are still influencing opinion against these teachers. However, a thorough study of the extant material reveals that the Sophists deserve an important position in intellectual history. Many of the topics which they broached concerned such



perennial subjects as: nature versus custom; the brotherhood of man; the nature of knowledge; the nature and use of language; the existence of God; the social contract. These topics remain of crucial importance for us and it should be stressed that the teachings and arguments of the Sophists on such matters still have relevance today and will repay study.<sup>29</sup> It is certainly true, as Kerferd declares, that what we possess of the Sophists' writings "are the fragmentary remains and traditions of a great movement in human thought."<sup>30</sup>





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








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